


THE MOVE FORWARD PARTY (MFP) POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
AND ITS EFFECTS ON VOTERS' PERCEIVED POLITICAL IDEOLOGY,
ATTITUDE HOMOPHILY, AND THE 2023 THAILAND GENERAL ELECTION
DECISION: COMPARING FOUR THAI GENERATIONS



**BANGKOK
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Salas Supalakwatchana

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
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ABSTRACT

During the past few years, the popularity of the Move Forward Party (MFP) has been growing significantly, more so in younger generations. The purpose of this research is to discover the causal relationship between the MFP's political communication, the attitude homophily, the perceived political ideology of Thai voters, and their election decisions in 2019 and 2023. This study employed a mixed-method approach, combining the textual analysis and a survey method. In the first phase, 20 contents from the MFP's Facebook and Twitter accounts with the highest engagements between March 1st, 2021, and August 31st, 2022 were textually analyzed. The analysis results demonstrated that the majority of message themes that occurred in the MFP's political communication between the studied period represented the Libertarian-Left political ideology based on the Political Compass diagram which aligned with the party's political ideology. In the second phase, an online survey was conducted with 240 Thai voters to test three research hypotheses. The results of data analyses revealed that Thai voters in four different generations have different perceived political ideologies and made their voting

decisions differently such that younger generations with the Libertarian-Left ideology voted for the MFP whereas the older generations with the Authoritarian-Right ideology voted for other parties.

Keywords: The Move forward Party, Political Communication, Social Media Exposure, Political Ideology, Election Decision, Generations



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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this first chapter is to explain and provide details of this study's background which consists of rationale and problem statement, the significance and purpose of why this study should be conducted, the scope of the study, research questions, how this study is significance and the definition of relevant terms.

1.1 Rationale and Problem Statement

1.1.1 Political Landscape in Thailand

Political ideology is a collective of beliefs, values, opinions and ideas about the ideal order of a society. Over time, the meanings of political ideology have changed due to the context and struggles of the situation. Ideology is the interpretation of the political systems in countries (Freeden, 2001).

1.1.1.1 Left Ideology

There are many ideology groups categorized as the left, such as Radical, and Liberal. The Radicals are positioned on the left as they believe that to change the current political system, revolution must take place quickly. This is because the current status cannot improve the quality of society and the economy. Freedom and equality are limited as the power is being held by one group of people which needs to be changed (Senthong, 2019).

Liberalism sets a high priority on individual freedom and advocates the limitation of the power of the state to protect this freedom. Individuals are capable

of taking their own responsibility for their behaviors and well-being. Therefore, according to the liberals, the best state is a weak one (O'Neil, 2010). Nowadays, liberalism can be divided into classical liberalism and modern liberalism which are similar with some differences as shown in the following.

Classical Liberal beliefs

- 1) The individual is more important than the state.
- 2) Every individual is reasonable enough and can make their own decision, which means individuals have freedom and can control themselves.
- 3) Advancement in political activities should be possible for every individual.
- 4) The state should have limited power and authority to foster and protect freedom.
- 5) The economic inequality is something that cannot be avoided.
- 6) The economic freedom is more important than the economic equality.

Modern Liberal beliefs

- 1) The state can sometimes intervene in the lives of individuals and society to prevent some individuals from rejecting the freedom of others.
- 2) Freedom must be optimistic.
- 3) Economic inequality must be eliminated as modern liberals see that economic equality is more important than economic freedom.

These three ideas show that modern liberalism values equality over freedom. All in all, both classical liberalism and modern liberalism believe that every citizen must have freedom of speech and that the state should not deprive the rights of

its citizens (Senthong, 2019).

1.1.1.2 Far-left Ideology

Communism and Anarchism are categorized as the far-left political ideology. Even though these two ideologies are on the far left, their values and beliefs are opposed to one another. Communism prefers a stronger state over the freedom of its citizens, aiming to create a more equal society, while anarchism prefers a limited authority of the state and gives more freedom and equality to the citizens (Senthong, 2019).

Although communism is also on the left of the political spectrum, it differs greatly from liberalism, especially in its views of freedom and equality. Communism rejects the idea that personal freedom will ensure the prosperity of the majority while liberalism preserves individual freedom over equality (O'Neil, 2010)

1.1.1.3 Right Ideology

O'Neil (2010) categorizes the rights into two groups, which are the Conservatives on the right and the Reactionaries on the far right. The conservative's beliefs are opposed to the liberals as the conservatives are not a fan of change, this is because they believe that changes bring more problems into the society which disrupts the current and functioning system.

1.1.1.4 Far-right Ideology

The reactionaries are opposing progressivism and political advancement. This is because they believe in preserving the traditional values and trust in the existing political system and which to keep it that way. This group has similar traits to the radicals in the sense that they are not afraid to use violence for

their political causes (Senthong, 2019).

In Thailand, the battle of political ideologies began during the 14-16 October 1973 event which ended on 6 October 1976 where the Rights or Conservatives won the decisive battle over the Lefts or Liberals where many students and citizens were killed (Senthong, 2019). Thailand's political ideology has long been divided into 2 main groups which are Pro-Democracy or the Left and Pro-Monarchy or the Right. The battle between the two sides has become a psychological warfare where the social media platforms have become a battlefield (Wongcha-um, Thephumpanat & Tostevin, 2019). Bamrugsuk (2012) mentioned that the current political system of Thailand is a hybrid regime that favors military leaders and elite conservatives to come into power, for example, the 2006 Coup d'état by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin followed by the 2014 Coup d'état by General Prayuth Chan-O-Cha.

The Future Forward Party was established on 15th March 2018, and was led by a progressive CEO of Thai Summit, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit (Thaitrakulpanich, 2019) The party dissolved by the Constitutional Court's decision on 21st February 2020 and former members of Future Forward Party moved to Phung Luang Party which later adopted a new name, the Move Forward Party or MFP in short. Pita Limjaroenrat, a former member of Future Forward Party became the leader of this new political party, and he stated that the work of Future Forward Party would be continued and would not be changed (Techakitteranun, 2020).

The MFP party's political ideology is progressivism (Bangkok Post, 2020) which is located on the bottom-left of the political spectrum. The party focuses on Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity which was used during the French Revolution in 1789 (Wongsurawat, 2019) and later became the motto of the French

Republic in 1958 as written in the Constitution. (Embassy of France in the US, 2007).

1.1.2 Political Communication by Thai Political Party

The definition of political communication is strategically used to influence public knowledge and beliefs and persuade the public on political matters (Swanson & Nimmo, 1990). Social media has become an essential media platform where people engage in political news and issues such as commenting or sharing (Konsongsaen, 2021). In recent years, social media platforms have played a big part in Thailand's political scene, especially in the 2019 general election, social media became an effective tool for the Future Forward Party to spread ideas through political communication to persuade voters to vote for them (Prasitwongsa & Panthanuwong, 2020).

The MFP has been using social media to spread the party's content to younger generations in Thailand ever since the formation of the party. Social media have been used by the MFP to communicate with its target audience as stated on the party's official website including its official Facebook page, official Twitter account, and official YouTube channel. It is found that the political communication of the Future Forward Party, now the Move Forward Party (MFP), contains useful messages that make the Gen-Z audience feel important and trust the party (Prasitwongsa & Panthanuwong, 2020).

Since the emergence of the Future Forward Party, the popularity of the left-wing Move Forward Party has risen over time. According to the 2021 surveys by NIDA Poll (2021) which were conducted quarterly, the popularity of the MFP has increased each time the surveys were conducted. Contradictory, the popularity

of the Right-wing Phalang Pracharat Party which supports Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-Cha has declined each time the surveys took place (See Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: Popularity of Two Political Parties


Poll	Move Forward Party (MFP)	Phalang Pracharat Party
1/2021	13.48%	16.65%
2/2021	14.51%	10.70%
3/2021	15.11%	9.51%

Source: Pouaree, S. (2021). Quarterly Political Popularity Survey No. 3/2021

[Data set]. *NIDA Poll*. Retrieved from <https://nidapoll.nida.ac.th/data/survey/uploads/FILE-1703330114873.pdf>.

Those poll results indicated the possible shift in the political ideology of the Thai citizens towards the left side of the linear political spectrum, based on the one-axis political spectrum from Heywood (2017) (See Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Linear Political Spectrum, A One-axis Political Spectrum



Source: Heywood, A. (2017). *Political ideologies: An introduction* (6th ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillian.

The Political Compass diagram is a two-axis political spectrum that includes 1) The economical scale, and 2) The social scale. It was introduced in 2001 by www.thepoliticalcompass.org when the website recognized the deficiencies of the standard one-axis political spectrum (See Figure 1.2). The Political Compass diagram is divided into four positions of political ideologies which consist of 1) Authoritarian Left in the top-left corner, 2) Authoritarian Right in the top-right corner, 3) Libertarian Left in the bottom-left corner, and 4) Libertarian Right in the bottom-right corner.

1.1.2.1 Authoritarian Left

The Authoritarian left or the left-wing Authoritarian can be described as individuals who believe that the rich should be stripped of their belongs and status, all conservatives are racist, sexist and homophobic, and classrooms are safe spaces to protect students from harmful ideas (Costello, Bowes, Stevens, Waldman & Lilienfeld, 2020). To summarize, the Authoritarian Left believes in the power of authority, is submissive to authority, and is against capitalism.

1.1.2.2 Authoritarian Right

The Authoritarian Right or the right-wing Authoritarian is a term used to describe individuals who advocate social hierarchy, are naturally submissive to their authority figures, and act aggressively in the name of the authority (Altemeyer, 1981). According to the author, he defined the personality of a right-wing authoritarian as an individual who exhibits the following personality and traits: 1) High degree of authority submission, 2) Aggressiveness against people who are perceived to be sanctioned by the authority, and 3) High level of adherence to the social conventions that are perceived to be endorsed by the authority. In summary,

the Authoritarian Right believes in conservative views, believes in the power of authority, and is pro-capitalism.


1.1.2.3 Libertarian Left

The left-wing libertarianism is a political philosophy that believes in freedom of individuals and social equality. Left Libertarians consider that all natural resources should be held collectively as we do not own nature. People have self-ownership, and, with themselves, people can do things as they please under their own guidance according to their own ideas (Narveson, 2008). The Left-libertarian advocates for Free Love, LGBTQ+ rights, and Women's rights (McElroy, 1996). To sum up, the Libertarian Left believes in freedom, has progressive views, and is against capitalism.

1.1.2.4 Libertarian Right

The right-wing libertarian, sometimes called libertarian capitalism is a political ideology that supports free-market capitalism and the reversal of the modern welfare state (Baradat, 2015). Right and Left libertarians share general antipathy towards the government's authority and power, the rights support freedoms on the agreement with private property rights and public amenities abolishment (Carson, 2015). In summary, The Libertarian Right believes in conservative views, believes in capitalism, freedom, and is against the power of authority.

Figure 1.2: Political Compass, A Two-axis Political Spectrum Diagram



Source: *Political compass*. (2019). Retrieved from <https://thedeisionlab.com/reference-guide/political-science/political-compass>.

Based on the “Political Compass,” it is interesting to investigate whether samples standing on four political positions are influenced differently by the political communication of the MFP and can the political ideologies of the samples change after a high amount of exposure to online political communication of the MFP.

1.1.3 Political Communication, Media, and Ideology

The concepts of political communication, media, and ideology are not independent of each other. The political actors produce certain ideologies and spread these ideologies through the media to maintain their existence (Çakmak, 2018).

In political communication, media will certainly establish the bridge linking political communication with political ideologies (Aziz, 2007 as cited in Çakmak, 2018).

In Thailand, the use of the internet and social media in the political sphere has increased in recent years, especially by political actors such as political parties and politicians. Issarachai (2006) discovered that the top five reasons for the political used of the internet and social media are the following:

- 1) Social media is a channel with a high degree of freedom.
- 2) Social media is the easiest channel for citizens to express their comments about the authority.
- 3) Social media is a channel with safety and privacy.
- 4) Some news shown on social media is not shown in other media channels.
- 5) Social media can be accessed at all times.

A study by Nulty, Theocharis, Popa, Parnet and Benoit (2015) about social media and political communication in Europe showed that in the communication strategies of political campaigns, social media play an important role by reflecting the information and opinions of political actors and their public followers. Political issues and the framing of those issues are provided in the content.

Political parties and candidates embraced new online tools as part of their campaign communication (Gibson, 2013 as cited in Nulty et al., 2015) to increase their exposure at minimum cost (Theocharis, Barberá, Fazekas & Popa, 2015 as cited in Nulty et al., 2015) and social media also provided a platform for citizens to communicate directly with political candidates.

1.1.4 Political Communication and Effects

Face-to-face deliberation can result in aggregate shifts in political views (Gastil, Black & Moscovitz, 2008). The results from the study show that there were certainly differences between the pattern of attitude change between the two groups and the individual's views moved toward favoring liberal policy approaches and disfavoring conservative views. As this study was done in a small face-to-face group, it is interesting to see if similar effects would apply to individuals' exposure to online political communication when individuals are receiving the messages and not in a group discussion (Gastil et al., 2008).

Gastil and colleagues (2008) also suggested that for future research, it should be continued to explore the complex ways in which individual and group attitudes can shift and to explore the linkage between group characteristics and individual attitude changes.

Çakmak (2018) discovered that political actors always have the power to gather the target masses around certain ideologies to sustain their existence and to get votes from the target group. One of the factors affecting voting decisions is the role of the media. With the power to manipulate the masses, the content created by the media serves certain ideologies in political communication, the media presents content that represents ideologies to convey the audiences which the audiences are easily manipulated through media, and their ideology can be changed in the desired direction. Moreover, the target audience who is frequently exposed to the messages is affected by these messages without being aware and is formed around certain ideologies emotionally or intellectually.

From past studies, it is safe to say that one of the factors that affect the shift in political attitudes and ideologies is the use of media by political actors. The more exposure to the contents from the media, the more possibility that political views and political ideologies can be changed in the direction directed by political actors through the use of media. What we don't know is, does this also applies to the political landscape of Thailand. Do certain age groups and their current political ideologies also have an interrelationship between exposure to political communication and the shift or change in their political ideologies. Do different message strategies and media strategies of political actors from different ideology groups have a significant impact on the shift of ideologies of individuals? These are the research gaps that could be further explored.

Therefore, this research aimed to understand more about the interrelationship between the individual's ideologies and how the political communication, message strategies, and media strategies of the MFP can influence the four distinctive groups differently. As well as to understand whether the amount of exposure to the MFP's political communication resulted in a change in individual's political ideologies. This research could help the MFP and other political parties to better understand how to effectively communicate with people who have different sets of values and beliefs, and to avoid communication that will result in negative effects on perceptions towards the political parties and politicians. This research could be one of the essential tools for all political actors to strategically plan their political communication, message strategies, and media strategies appropriately.

1.2 Objectives of Study

This research intends to understand the causal relationship between the level of exposure to the progressive political communication of the Move Forward Party (MPF) and the political ideology of Thai citizens. The objectives of this research are as follows:

1.2.1 To examine the message themes of the MFP political communication publicized via social media from 1st March, 2021 to 31st August, 2022.

1.2.2 To investigate the relationship between exposure to the MFP's message strategy and attitude homophily of Thai voters.

1.2.3 To investigate whether the exposure to the MFP's message themes has a differently significant impact on the perceived political ideology of Thai voters in four distinct political ideologies based on the Political Compass.

1.2.4 To investigate whether different perceived political ideologies have a differently significant impact on future election decisions of Thai voters in four distinct generations.

1.3 Scope of Study

This research aims to examine the two main elements of the political communication of MFP, which consists of 1) The message themes of the Move Forward Party's political communication, and 2) the effects it has on Thai citizens aged between 18–70 years old in Thailand who are frequently exposed to the MFP online political communication contents posted on official MFP Facebook Page, and official MFP Twitter account. This research employs a mixed method which begins with textual analysis which is a qualitative research approach followed by

survey research which is a quantitative research approach. The first part of this research employs a textual analysis method to examine the message strategies (message and theme) of the MFP's political communication. The contents for the textual analysis are selected from the Move Forward Party's official Facebook page and official Twitter account from 1st March 2021 to 31st August 2022. The method selected for the quantitative research is an online survey with the data collection duration from 18.00 on 14th May 2023 after the election ended and the data collection period lasted for approximately 4 weeks before all the data were collected.

1.4 Research Questions

From the stated information, the main purpose of this study is to seek answers for the following research questions.

RQ#1: What are the key message themes of political communication of the Move Forward Party (MFP) from March 1, 2021 to August 31, 2022?

RQ#2: Is Thai voters' attitude homophily positively correlated with exposure to political communication and message themes of the Move Forward Party?

RQ#3: Does Thai voters' exposure to the MFP's message themes have a differently significant impact on the perceived political ideology of Thai voters in four distinct generations?

RQ#4: Do different perceived political ideologies have a differently significant impact on future election decisions of Thai voters in four distinct generations?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The significance of this research is to look beyond the surface of political communication as this research focuses on examining the message and themes of the MFP's political communication and factors that could possibly influence and affect the audiences and their political ideologies, which explores using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative method.

Although several pieces of research, both locally and internationally, have sought for explanation of political communication, media, and ideology, they have not yet focused on how the messages and themes of online political communication from a political party like the Move Forward Party could have significant impact on the political ideologies of Thai citizens who are frequently exposed to the political communication of the MFP. Moreover, the previous studies have not yet framed their research based on these communication theories which are 1) Agenda Setting Theory, 2) Selective Exposure Theory, and 3) Uses and Gratification Theory (UGT).

The importance and potential impact of this research is to provide a better understanding of online political communication for political actors such as political parties, politicians, and political candidates. The discovery of this research could provide a new aspect of social media usage for political objectives such as electoral campaigning or simply spreading ideas and ideology to attract more supporters for parties and candidates. This research could help the Move Forward Party and other political parties in Thailand to test the effectiveness and the impact of the MFP's current online political communication so that they can develop an effective political communication strategy for the future.

Moreover, the citizens on the receiving end of the political communication could be aware of media framing of political parties that could have a significant impact on the attitudes, political views, and political ideologies of individuals. The high frequency of exposure to these online political communications aims to frame target audiences' political ideologies may result in a shift in political ideology more similar to the political actors who plant the idea in the messages and themes of their online political communication through social media.

1.6 Definition of Terms

The operational definitions of terms in this research are provided in this section.

1.6.1 Political Communication

This term refers to communication that has a political agenda or encrypted message that has political objectives in the contents of the communication. For this research, it is media message conveying ideas, policies, and ideology of the Move Forward Party in various forms including Text-post, Image-post, Infographic-post, Video-post, and Live Sessions on the MFP's social media platforms.

1.6.2 Message Strategy of Political Communication

Message strategy refers to “what to say” and “how to say” in order to achieve the communication goal. In this research, the message strategy of the Move Forward Party's online political communication is the messages and themes that occurred in online political communication which the MFP has included in the contents.

1.6.3 Media Strategy of Political Communication

Media strategy refers to a strategy of the Move Forward Party that implements the use of particular social media platforms to achieve the communication goal. This research specifically focuses on two social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, which are regularly used by the MFP as mediums to communicate with the audiences.

1.6.4 Political Ideology

A political ideology is defined as “a set of ideas, beliefs, values, and opinions, exhibiting a recurring pattern, that competes deliberately as well as unintentionally over providing plans of action for public policy making in an attempt to justify, explain, contest, or change the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community” (Freedon, 2001).

1.6.5 Political Spectrum

A political spectrum is “a system to characterize and classify different political positions in relation to one another. These positions sit upon one or more geometric axes that represent independent political dimensions” (Heywood, 2017).

For this study, the spectrum includes five following political positions:

- 1) Communism, “Communism, in its simplest sense, refers to the communal organization of social existence, especially through the collective ownership of property” (Heywood, 2017).

- 2) Socialism, “Socialism, as an ideology, has traditionally been defined by its opposition to capitalism and the attempt to provide more humane and socially worthwhile alternatives” (Heywood, 2017).

3) Liberalism, “Liberals believe that human beings are, first and foremost, individuals, endowed with reason. This implies that each individual should enjoy the maximum possible freedom consistent with a like freedom for all” (Heywood, 2017).

4) Conservatism, “As a political ideology, conservatism is defined by the desire to conserve, reflected in a resistance to, or at least a suspicion of, change.” (Heywood, 2017).

5) Fascism, “The defining theme of fascism is the idea of an organically unified national community, embodied in a belief in ‘strength through unity’.” (Heywood, 2017).

1.6.6 The Political Compass

This term refers to the two-axis political spectrum developed by www.thepoliticalcompass.org in 2001 which added the economic axis to the standard one-axis political spectrum. It includes four following political standpoints:

1) Authoritarian left, individuals who believe that the rich should be stripped of their belongs and status, all conservatives are racist, sexist and homophobic, and classrooms are safe spaces to protect students from harmful ideas (Costello et al., 2020).

2) Authoritarian right, individuals who advocate social hierarchy, are naturally submissive to their authority figures and act aggressively in the name of the authority. The personality of right-wing authoritarian is an individual who exhibits the following personality and traits: 1) High degree of authority submission, 2) Aggressiveness against people who are perceived to be sanctioned by the authority, and 3) High level of adherence to the social conventions that are perceived to be

endorsed by the authority (Altemeyer, 1981).

3) Libertarian left, individuals who believe in freedom and social equality. Left Libertarians consider that all natural resources should be held collectively as we do not own nature. People have self-ownership, and, with themselves, people can do things as they please under their own guidance according to their own ideas (Narveson, 2008). The Left-libertarian advocates Free Love, LGBTQ+ rights, and Women's rights (McElroy, 1996).

4) Libertarian right, individuals who support free-market capitalism and reversal of the modern welfare state. The Right-wing libertarian, sometimes called libertarian capitalism, shares a general antipathy towards the government's authority and power similar to the Left. The rights support freedoms on the agreement with private property rights and public amenities abolishment (Carson, 2015).

1.6.7 Media Framing

Lakoff (2004) defines media framing as a process in which our perception and understanding of the world are shaped by communication. Lakoff (2004) emphasized that frames are “mental structures that shape the way we see the world” and are influenced by how we interpret information and facts, often without conscious awareness, activating specific thoughts, and ideas in people's minds. Public opinion and behavior can be significantly affected by the way topics, and issues are framed by the media. In the political context, framing is used by media and political actors as a tool to shape public perception and guide debates aligned with the political ideology that they value to achieve their political goals (Lakoff, 2004).

As for this research, media framing refers to how political actors such as political parties and politicians send their political communication contents, aligned

with their political strategy, aimed to shape the political perception of the audiences with certain political views and ideologies aligned with their own.

1.6.8 Exposure to Favored Information

Exposure to favored information, based on the selective exposure theory, refers to the individual's tendency to prefer information that reinforces pre-existing views or political ideologies while avoiding contradictory information (Hart, Albarracín, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg & Merrill, 2009). For this research, this term describes how highly likely that recipients may only be exposed to selected media and messages of political actors that are similar to their political views and ideologies.

1.6.9 Gratifications of Political Communication Consumption

This term describes, based on the Uses and Gratification Theory (UGT), how individuals use media to gratify specific needs. Media can gratify the needs of the audience in many dimensions. According to West & Turner (2017), the audiences' needs can be categorized into five types as follows:

- 1) Cognitive: Acquiring information, knowledge, comprehension.
- 2) Affective: Emotional, pleasant, or aesthetic experience.
- 3) Personal Integrative: Enhancing credibility, confidence, and status.
- 4) Social Integrative: Enhancing connections with family, friends, and so forth.
- 5) Tension Release: Escape and diversion

In this research, the term gratifications of political communication consumption refers to recipients' satisfaction from consuming political communication that meets at least one of their needs such as cognitive, affective, personal integrative, or social integrative need(s).

1.6.10 Persuasive Power of Political Communication

This term refers to how Thai citizens can be persuaded by the message themes that occurred in the contents of the Move Forward Party's online political communication. It is possible that different message themes of the MFP would have different impacts on the perceived political ideology of Thai voters in four distinct generations. This could describe the possible change of ideology of Thai voters after being exposed to online political communication from the MFP.

1.6.11 Generations

According to Dimock (2019), the president of PEW Research Center, the term Generations or Generation groups is often considered by their age span. Although there is no exact formula for the cutoff points or how long the age span should be, the PEW Research Center has established a method by which generations can be categorized into 5 age groups which are described as follows.

1.6.11.1 Generation Z (Gen Z)

This term refers to a person who was born between 1997 and 2012. Gen Z was born in the technology evolution era, The author mentioned that when the iPhone was first launched in 2007, the oldest Gen Z was only 10 years old.

In 2023, the number of eligible Thai voters categorized as Gen Z is equal to 7,670,354 people, Thai PBS (2023, February 7).

1.6.11.2 Generation Y (Millennials)

This term refers to a person who was born between 1981 to 1996. Millennials grew up in the shadow of wars, especially wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for Americans, which contributed to the intense political polarization that shaped the current political environment. When the 9/11 attack occurred in 2001, most of the

Millennials were between the ages of 5 and 20 years old. Technology-wise, Millennials grew up during the internet explosion era where the internet can be accessed in most households.

In 2023, the number of eligible Thai voters categorized as Gen Y is equal to 15,144,468 people, Thai PBS (2023, February 7).

1.6.11.3 Generation X

The term Generation X refers to a person who was born between 1965 and 1980. The computer revolution period occurred while Generation X was growing up.

In 2023, the number of eligible Thai voters categorized as Gen X is equal to 16,091,150 people, which is the majority of 2023 general election eligible voters, Thai PBS (2023, February 7).

1.6.11.4 Boomers (Baby Boomers)

This term refers to a person who was born between 1946 and 1964. Baby Boomers are the only generation officially designed by the U.S. Census Bureau based on the surge in post-WWII births in 1946 and the age span for this generation is 19 years.


In 2023, the number of eligible Thai voters categorized as Baby Boomers is equal to 11,153,133 people, Thai PBS (2023).

1.6.11.5 Silent (Silent Generation)

According to Dimock (2019), the term Silent generation refers to a person who was born between 1928 and 1945. In 2023, the age of the silent generations is between 78 and 95 years old.

In 2023, the number of eligible Thai voters categorized as Silent generation is equal to 2,227,540 people, Thai PBS (2023).

In this research, we will be studying the first four generation groups as the Silent generation age is well above the scope of this study.



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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides related literature reviews in relation to political communication, the internet and social media as a tool of political communication, the role of political ideology in communication and media, and the political marketing communication of the defuncted Future Forward Party which is the predecessor of today's Move Forward Party.

2.1 Previous Studies and Related Literature

This section consists of the reviews of related literature and previous studies concerning political ideology, the internet and social media as a tool for political communication.

2.1.1 Internet as a Political Tool in Thailand

In 2010, Poowin Bunyavejchewin explored the use of the internet as a tool for political objectives in the article "Internet Politics: Internet as a Political Tool in Thailand" which was published in Canadian Social Science. Bunyavejchewin (2010) mentioned that the internet played a critical part in the contemporary political context of Thailand as it was used to promote, mobilize and protect the mainstream ideology of this country.

The emerging innovations and technologies have become more accessible for Thais as the internet consumption in Thailand has risen and it has impacted the socio-political aspect of the World, sometimes in dramatic and astonishing ways and the internet itself has rapidly transformed our social and political life. This caused

the control of the information to become decentralized from the government because people have more access to the internet where everyone can access indefinite sources of information and the internet has been adopted as a place to express the perception and reaction towards political related issues (Bunyavejchewin, 2010).

The politics of Thailand has become unbounded by geographical boundaries as the internet enables users to freely express their voices in political situations. Unlike traditional media where the audience receives one-way communication in a strictly controlled media environment, the internet allows the users to respond to current contents as well as authorize internet users to become the information senders themselves which is displayed in the political mobilization of the Red-Shirt and Yellow-Shirt pretests that went out of control since 2009. Bunyavejchewin (2010) stated that in that political conflict, the internet was used by all sides as a tool for their political goals, and the internet was also used by the government for promoting and protecting Royal Nationalism as well as to handle the protesters. The author concludes that the internet can be a political tool for all sides in many ways.

The previous studies helped clarify that the internet has become a political tool in Thailand, and this leads to the next question on the role of political ideology in political communication on the internet and social media.

2.1.2 The Role of Ideology in Political Communication and Media

In recent years, political communication has become more complex due to the development of technology where the forms of political communication have gradually transformed. The study by Fatma Çakmak aimed to examine the interaction of political communication, ideology and media. The researcher's literature review has discovered the fact that the communication target masses are being manipulated

with ideologies through the media in political communication without being aware (Çakmak, 2018).

2.1.2.1 Political Communication

Political communication can be referred to as communication activities that have political goals (Çakmak, 2018). According to the researcher, political communication is a complex network of political activities being agenda setting, media supervision, lobbying, or political advertising which has a certain budget set for mass media channels, and it is essential for political actors such as political parties to spread the political ideology and gain social legitimacy as the political communication is a tool to influence and persuade people and forge public opinion on certain views and ideology. The crucial concept of political communication is that voters support or oppose political views depending on the ideas gathered by politicians and whether the voters are persuaded by them.

2.1.2.2 Ideology

The definition of ideology is a phenomenon produced by the forces that govern society and it surrounds people's life. In society, ideologies are produced by those who hold material and mental power which direct the society, and the people are influenced by the groups with that kind of power (Çakmak, 2018).

In terms of political leaders and voters, ideology is certain ideas that exist to create specific political goals according to an ideology. Political parties are often shaped by these ideologies and therefore the political communication activities are also shaped by the basis of the ideology the party believes in. The voters who receive the communication are intentionally influenced and persuaded by the ideology of that political party (Çakmak, 2018).

Ideologies are two-part systems of beliefs that provide an action plan for the supporters. The two parts consist of 1) Purposes, Values and Self-beliefs and 2) Principles of activities. According to Çakmak (2018), despite the flow of events, self-beliefs remain constant while the principles of activity can be reformulated with the altering of desires of the environmental conditions. Çakmak (2018) also stated that although beliefs do not easily change, the principles of activities can be frequently changed.

2.1.2.3 Media

The media plays a very active role when it comes to the communication process as the media presents the contents that represent the political ideologies from the political power groups to the target group and voters can be easily manipulated by the changes in political ideology in the desired direction (Çakmak, 2018).

Internet and social media networks have become imperative in the World today including political communication activities as the mass media, both traditional and online, is used by the government and those who want to be in power to create public opinion (Çakmak, 2018). Çakmak mentioned that it is no longer possible to think that the media is independent of ideology in today's World, instead, the ideology of the media became one of the main functions of mediation at the point of transfer.

The concepts of Political Communication, Ideology and Media cannot be described as independent from each other. The media plays a role in establishing a bridge in political communication that carries and transmits political ideologies to the mass target audience (Çakmak, 2018).

Previous studies demonstrate that ideology plays a significant role in political communication as most of these communications contain political objectives related to the ideology of the senders which contribute to audience manipulation. For the purpose of this research, a more specific literature review on the Future Forward Party, the Move Forward Party's predecessor, will be explored in order to understand the rise and the fall of the FFP through its previous political communication.

2.1.3 The Rise and Fall of Future forward Party

The Future Forward Party has existed for a very limited time but has great impact on Thailand's political landscape. Many political pundits were surprised when they found out the election result where the Future Forward Party had over 6.3 million votes, which is a lot for such a new party. Unfortunately, the party was short-lived when it was dissolved by the constitutional court's sentence on February 21, 2020, and many people deem the controversial decision unfair. Former members of the Future Forward Party then formed a new political party called the Move Forward Party to continue the work of its predecessor with the same political ideology.

In the book review article written by Suthikarn Meechan, the author examined a book titled "Future Forward: The Rise and Fall of a Thai Political Party" by McCargo and Chattharakul (2020). The content regarding the Future Forward Party in this book is divided into three parts, being, 1) The party leaders, 2) The voters, and 3) The Party. The authors illustrated the elements that made the party rise, the political conditions as well as the political challenges the party faced until its dissolution which had a major impact on Thailand's younger generations and led to mass protests in July 2020 (Meechan, 2021).

2.1.3.1 The Future forward Party Leaders

Thanathorn Juangroonruangkit, Piyabutr Saengkanokkul and Pannika Wanich were the three main figures of the newly founded Future Forward Party. In the modern era of communication, the party leaders were not following the footsteps of previous political leaders' way, instead, they introduced new public policies that communicate directly to the voters which created a new political phenomenon in Thailand's politics. After the dissolution of the Future Forward Party, a new party was formed under the name of Move Forward Party and Pita Limjaroenrat became the leader of the new party along with other former members of the Future Forward Party such as Wiroj Lakkanaadisorn and Sirikanya Tansakun (Meechan, 2021).

2.1.3.2 The Voters and the Party

The hype of the Future Forward Party among younger generations could be seen on social media with the #FahRakPhor which had a positive impact on the 2019 general election for the Future Forward Party (Aim, 2019; McCargo & Chattharakul, 2020). In terms of the party's positioning, it stands on the opposite side of the Palang Pracharat Party which is a conservative party that has great ties with General Prayut Chan-o-cha who was the leader of the 2014 coup d'etat. Two weeks before the 2019 general election, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit was in a debate with other political party leaders which was broadcast via many social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. His contents in the debate were targeting people with democratic ideology and opposed the military intervention in Thailand's politics. He also shed light on how ordinary citizens could change Thailand's political structure of power to stop inequality in all dimensions to create

a better living standard, not only for the younger generations but for all citizens of Thailand who believe in progressive ideology (Meechan, 2021).

Even though the Future Forward Party did well in creating popularity on social media, the campaigns in local areas were very limited as it was hard to compete against the election canvasser network of older political parties that exist and have been influencing the voters in those areas for a long time. This shows in the 2019 general election results that most of the Future Forward Party voters were 1) First-time voters, 2) Middle-income class in urban areas, and 3) Vote-in-advance voters, mostly non-Bangkok citizens who work in Bangkok. The focus of the Future Forward Party election campaigning was using volunteers in local areas to be the voice of the party to help with the offline election campaigning, and this campaign speeded online and got people talking about it with the #Futurista which the party was used to call the members who support the Future Forward Party (Meechan, 2021).

In all communications, the Future Forward Party adopted the orange color as the main party color. It symbolizes the middle ground between the Red-shirts and the Yellow-shirts conflicts that have been going on for over a decade (Meechan, 2021).

The life of the Future Forward Party was short, but it was a sensational one. It marks a new era of a transitional political shift for Thailand which makes Thai politics become interesting to the people again, especially those who seek alternate ways and opportunities of the future. The party did not promote individuals but the ideology that gathered the masses to unite on social media and online platforms that allowed people to be actively involved in politics and later become members of the

Future Forward Party. This communication format was very successful and made many political parties adapt the way they communicate (Meechan, 2021).

The rise and fall of the Future Forward Party which led to the birth of the Move Forward Party provides us with a better understanding of what were the elements of the previous FFP election campaign. It is interesting to look further into the actual political communication strategy itself to discover the previous strategy used by the FFP in the 2019 general election.

2.1.4 Political Strategy and Political Marketing Communication of the Future Forward Party

The studies showed that Political Marketing Communication was fully implemented by the Future Forward Party during the 2019 General Election in Thailand. The party had clear policy formulation, member communication, and the party's slogan coincided. This helps portray the image of the party as a new political model competing against old political model which gives opportunities for new generations to take part in Thai politics and to stop the authoritarian regime. The party had a clear target group which members are individuals with different messages and themes of their own. The visibility of the party's communication is gained from social media and online channels and proved to be effective in winning more popularity as shown in surveys conducted by agencies (Thanon, 2020).

Thanon (2020) selected two theories to conduct the study of the political strategy and political communication of the Future Forward Party including 1) Political Marketing, and 2) Political Communication. Thanon (2020) cited Newman (2001), who introduced the theory described as follows, political marketing is a theory applied in political campaigns by organizations or individuals based on


marketing knowledge to drive the policies, and ideologies to achieve desired political results. This process needs an exchange of valuable means between two parties.

The political party offers public policies or visions to exchange with votes from eligible voters. Politicians serve as marketers while voters are the consumers in this equation. Political Marketing also adopts marketing strategy tools such as market research, segmentation and targeting, positioning, brand image, and advertising and public relations strategy to fulfill the political needs of the voters in exchange for electoral votes.

The researcher stated that the framework of political marketing is developed from the conventional marketing 4P as follows:

- 1) Product, this can be referred to as the policies and politicians who are campaigning for an election.
- 2) Push Marketing is the process of spreading information about policies and politicians through the political party system and media to gain popularity.
- 3) Pull Marketing is the spread of information using mass media channels such as newspapers, radio, and television.
- 4) Polling, the process of polling is an important tool to gather public opinions for policy planning and examine the effectiveness of political campaigns.

Figure 2.1: Political Marketing 4P



Source: Nukulwatanavichai, L. (2016). Political marketing: A comparative study of the Democrat and the Pheu Thai Party's campaign strategies in the 2013 Bangkok Governor Election. *Kasetsart University Political Science Review Journal*, 4(2), 122–144.

The Future Forward Party has implemented the marketing 4P into their 2019 election campaign which Thanon (2020) described each element in the following table.

Table 2.1: Political Marketing Strategies of the Future Forward Party

Political Marketing Strategies of the Future Forward Party	
Product	<p>The Policy: The FFP advocated these 3 points 1) Unlock, 2) Restructure, and 3) Create opportunities. The slogan was “Future Forward is the Future where the ultimate power belongs to the people”. The Members: Each member has unique specializations and personalities such as LGBTQ+, education, and environmental which were aligned with the party’s main policy.</p>
Push Marketing	<p>Membership network: The FFP members are extremely diverse. For example, an ethnic minority MP advocated the equality of all people, decentralizing the power of the government’s authority, and giving this power to local authorities.</p>
Pull Marketing	<p>Online-focused communication: The FFP used a website, fan page, Line official, Twitter, YouTube, and music. The party concentrated on Online hype: The FFP utilized online media very well which created word of mouth and hashtags that were able to put themselves in the spotlight of traditional media channels such as Television.</p>

(Continued)

Table 2.1 (Continued): Political marketing strategies of the Future Forward Party

Political Marketing Strategies of the Future Forward Party	
Polling	The FFP popularity polling: There were several polls result showing the rise of the FFP popularity Niche Market and New Voters: The main target group of the party were new generations which the party focused on communicating with an audience who would get to vote for the first time.


Source: Thanon, P. (2020). Thai political marketing strategy 2019: Case study: Future forward party. *Journal of Communication and Innovation NIDA*, 7(2), Retrieved from <https://so02.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/jcin/article/view/246567>.

Thanon (2020) explained that the image of the Future Forward Party was a party of the new generations that will develop the future of all citizens. The party wanted to transform the outdated political system and create a free and fair system that benefits the citizens of Thailand. The orange color of the party represented the color of a new dawn where people could start a new day with hope. The inverted triangle was selected as the party's logo which represented the importance of the people which is usually positioned at the bottom of the pyramid.

McNair (2011 as cited in Thanon, 2020) claimed that there are 3 components in political communication which include 1) Political Organization, 2) Media,

and 3) Citizens. Political Organizations can be political parties, the government, independent organizations, and other political groups. These organizations play an important role in political communication as the sender of political messages that aim to persuade the citizens to believe and follow the political direction of the organization. In political communication, media has three roles including 1) Sending information from political organizations to citizens, 2) Generating information or messages such as analysis and criticism, and 3) Serving as a medium for citizens to express their voice. The citizens or the target audience receive and react to the message and information which political opinions of the voters could be developed and lead to election decision to vote for or against.

Figure 2.2: Elements of Political Communication



Source: McNair, B. (2011). *An introduction to political communication*. New York:

Routledge.

The study showed that in 2019 General Election, the Future Forward Party cracked the code of modern political communication strategy under the framework of political marketing (Thanon, 2020). The author discovered the key importance of the strategies used by the Future Forward Party in the election campaign which are described as follows.

1) Illustration of opposite political sides between old and new. The Future Forward Party was very clear in its slogan and communication on creating a new kind of political party created by a new generation for a new generation that aims to put an end to the old style of Thai politics.

2) Niche Market targeting. Prior to the dissolution, the Future Forward Party had a clear group of audience they wanted to target, which were the New Voters. This is shown in how all communication materials by the party came out under the same communication theme. FFP also differentiates the characters of the members to show the diversity of the party which reflects the beliefs, values, and ideology of the party that FFP exists for everyone in Thai society.

3) Online and social media. The essential tool of the Future Forward Party used in the election campaign was social media. The party used their official accounts on various social media platforms as a medium for all their communication. The distinctive point of this type of media is the coverage, the accessibility, and the ability of the audience to reflect and interact with the message they have received. This created an online conversation that benefited the Future Forward Party in popularity.

Prasitwongsa & Panthauwong (2020) found in their study that more than half of the FFP contents included rational appeals and the most engaged posts and

tweets were a combination of both rational and emotional appeals. Moreover, the communication appeals most used by the Future Forward party were anger, humor, and motivation. More anger and humor appeals were brought to the political communication implementation after the dissolution of the Future Forward Party in 2020.

Furthermore, the contents of the Future Forward Party were loaded with persuasive messages aimed at the receiver's conforming and other behaviors. Prasitwongsa & Panthanuwong (2020) mentioned that sometimes purely rational or emotional appeals might not create the audience's behavior change. For example, in messages that attack the opposition, only emotional appeals might not be enough to convince the audience. Hence, rational appeals such as reasoning, testimonials, or evidence need to be included in the messages so the receivers can trust the messages and develop behavior change. On the receiver's end, the researchers also found that it is possible that the Future Forward Party had become an influencer for the new generation movement in Thailand.

From this section of the literature review, we have a better understanding of the strategies used by the Future Forward Party, and it is interesting to look further into the receiving end of communication and see whether the role of ideology affects the reception of political communication.

2.1.5 The Role of Political Ideology in the Reception of Political Communication

Klapper (1960 as cited in Lück & Rinke, 2010) stated that the media effects, if exist, would hugely be conditional and depend on the audiences' predispositions. According to the study by Lück & Rinke (2010), having found many past studies

regarding selective exposure and selective perception, two main points were discovered by the researchers.

1) People tend to select information from media sources that they expect to agree with pre-structured ways by their cognitive and attitudinal apparatus.

2) Political ideologies are the key factor in selective exposure and political communication's perception.

Although the previous studies suggested that media can only reinforce existing attitudes and opinions but cannot change them and political ideology has been frequently cited as a condition of political communication effects, Lück & Rinke argued that differences between groups of differing political ideologies have been questionably forsaken and should be taken into consideration in future media effects research.

Hypotheses involving personality traits and cognitive styles associated with pre-existing individuals' political ideologies are needed to dive deeper into this subject. These internal factors with media-specific or external factors, relevant characteristics of media form and media contents, are essential and needed for further investigation (Lück & Rinke, 2010).

2.1.6 Political Communication and Campaign Effects

Previous studies have discovered that ideology and attitude can result in aggregate shifts in small face-to-face group deliberation (Gastil, Black & Moscovitz, 2008). It is speculated that there are more ways other than face-to-face in which individuals' ideology, and attitudes can be shifted, and these ways are worth exploring.

The study by Gastil and colleagues (2008) has hypothesized that a polarization pattern between groups with opposite ideologies, liberal and conservative, is expected to underline a relatively modest shift in overall attitudes. The procedure was first to get the participants to complete a pre-discussion questionnaire, then the participants were randomly assigned into groups that have discussions about public policies. The results show that there were certainty differences between the pattern of attitude change between the two groups and the individual's views moved toward favoring liberal policy approaches and disfavoring conservative views. As this study was done in a small face-to-face group, it is interesting to see if similar effects would apply to individuals' exposure to online political communication when individuals are receiving the messages in different contexts rather than in a group discussion.

Agenda control is used by electoral candidates, journalists, and media to include or ignore certain issues in political communication. As individuals do not monitor the entire political universe, they are selectively exposed to a handful of current issues that appear important (Iyengar & Simon, 2000). The researchers suggested that political campaigns can influence voters in more than one way. The acquisition of information and agenda control are more subtle forms of influence and often occur automatically without the awareness of the voters. Moreover, most voters despise to accept and declare conversion, they resist and rebut messages at odds with their prior preference instead (Iyengar & Simon, 2000).

Furthermore, a study by Çakmak (2018) revealed that political actors have the power to gather the target masses around certain ideologies to maintain their presence and to gain votes from the target. One of the aspects affecting voting

decisions is the role of the media. With the power to manipulate the masses, the content created by the media serves certain ideologies in political communication, the media presents content that represents ideologies to convey the audiences which the audiences are easily manipulated through media, and their ideology can be changed in the desired direction. The audience who is frequently exposed to the messages is affected by these messages without being aware and is formed around certain ideologies emotionally or intellectually.

2.1.7 Message Theme

In advertising, a message theme is the central idea or central message that is reflected in all campaigns and advertisements. It is used to position the product in the audience's minds. Advertisements created under the same campaign will contain the same message theme, so the consumers receive the same message in several ways and remember the same thing in their minds (MBA Skool, n.d.).

For this study, a message theme refers to the central idea contained in each political communication post on the MFP's official Facebook and official Twitter accounts which the party used to communicate with the audience. It is interesting to find out that before the message themes reached the audience and does attitude homophily play a role in audiences' selective exposure to the message themes communicated by the Move Forward Party.

2.1.8 Attitude Homophily

Interactions between viewers and media personalities who are similar to the viewers help fulfill a need for information seeking, socialization, personal identity, affiliation, and consistency (Triawan 2020). The researcher stated that being similar to another character helps one predict the actions and interactions of that person.

Homophily provides verification of how to act in interpersonal settings and also helps to satisfy social and identification needs (Bandura, 2001 as cited in Triawan, 2020).

Triawan (2020) discovered in the study titled “Influences of parasocial interaction between Mark Wiens’s travel vlogs and Indonesian viewers on their travel intentions to Thailand” that the respondents who think they are similar to Mark Wiens are very likely to have positive parasocial interaction with Mark Wiens which suggested that attitude homophily does have a strong influence in parasocial interactions as hypothesized, Triawan (2020).

As for this study, it is fascinating to find out whether attitude homophily plays an important role in Thai citizens’ selection of political communication to be exposed to and to explore if attitude homophily is positively correlated with exposure to the MFP’s political communication.

2.1.9 Exploratory Approach

To understand how online community employed social media to mobilize people for a political goal, an exploratory approach which is mixed-method research was used in a study by Choi & Park (2013) to explore South Korea’s Twitter-based community that calls for the elimination of a conservative newspaper whose activism is contextualized in Korea’s political history. The results indicated that the role of the information provider contributed to the sustainability of the group, and a collective identity is formed by members through the framing process of discourse.

As for this study, the Move Forward Party acts as the information provider with contents suspected to contain a political agenda that frames the audiences’ perception towards the party and political landscape in Thailand. It is reasonable that this research would employ the same exploratory approach to explore what messages

and themes are contained in the MFP political communication and what effects it has on Thai citizens who are exposed to the message strategy and media strategy of the MFP. This approach would allow the analysis of both data from the contents of the information provider through textual analysis, and empirical data from the receivers through survey.

2.2 Related Theories

This section reviews five theories that are related to the development of this study and its conceptual framework. The theories included in this section are Agenda Setting Theory, Selective Exposure Theory, Uses and Gratification Theory, Political Communication Theory, and Political Marketing Theory.

2.2.1 Agenda Setting Theory

Assumption of the Agenda Setting Theory

According to West & Turner (2017), Agenda Setting Theory rests on three basic assumptions which are as follows.

- 1) The media establish an agenda and in so doing are not simply reflecting reality, but are shaping and filtering reality for the public
- 2) The media's concentration on the issues that comprise their agenda influences the public's agenda, and these together influence the policymakers' agenda.
- 3) The public and policymakers have the possibility to influence the media's agenda as well.

In the first assumption, media plays a role in shaping and filtering the reality in which we live, and we may not be aware of it. The media provide a lens

both to understand and to reflect our social reality and provide us with an agenda for our considerations. The message and information we receive have been filtered for an established agenda, shaping what the audience hears and reads in the process (West & Turner, 2017).

The second assumption of the theory is related to the gatekeeping function of the media as the media's focus on the issues that comprise an agenda that influence the public's agenda and later the agenda of decision makers. This allowed the media to become the gatekeeper of the topic or issue by sustaining attention to certain topics (West & Turner, 2017).


The third assumption of the Agenda Setting Theory is that policymakers and the public can affect the media's agenda due to the interrelationship of the three elements. There is the possibility that the media initiates an agenda because of the pressure of influence from the other two elements (West & Turner, 2017).

Media Framing and Priming are included in the two levels of agenda setting. Media Framing refers to how the media depicts events influences and constrains the way the audience can interpret the events. Priming is a cognitive process by what is presented by the media and influences what the audience thinks about afterward in processing additional information (West & Turner, 2017).

According to West & Turner (2017), there are three parts in the agenda setting process which are setting the media agenda, setting the public agenda, and setting the policy agenda. In the media agenda, the priority of issues discussed in mediated sources and the result of it is the public agenda where the media agenda interacts with the public opinions. The public agenda then interacts with what

policymakers consider significant for policy agenda creation.

Figure 2.3: The Impact of Public and Media Agenda on Policy Agenda



Source: Roger, E. M., & Dearing, J. W. (1998). Agenda-setting research: Where has it been? Where is it going?. In J. A. Anderson (Ed.), *Communication yearbook 11* (pp. 555–594). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

As the Future Forward Party tried to portray itself as a new kind of political party battling against the old conservatives and authoritarian regime of General Prayuth Chan-o-cha (Thanon, 2020), and the Move Forward Party is following the footsteps of its predecessor, the Agenda Setting Theory could apply to this study to examine the interrelation of the party as policy agenda, the social media communication as media agenda and the audience as public agenda.

2.2.2 Selective Exposure Theory

Assumption of the Selective Exposure Theory

Selective Exposure refers to how individuals tend to favor information based on their own pre-existing views while avoiding contradictory information (Hart et al., 2009). The Selective Exposure Theory has its root in the Cognitive Dissonance Theory which people can dissect the exposed information and only select the favorable while ignoring the unfavorable (Festinger, 1957)

According to Dahlgren (2005), the author mentioned that communication patterns of political debate that occurred in social media and online platforms could suggest that the channel has an impact on the dialogue where subjective terms are used to stress one's political opinion.

The Selective Exposure Theory is selected for this study to examine whether the political ideology of individuals affects how people choose to favor one piece of information over another in social media environments and online platforms. For example, would an individual who has a conservative political view ignore information communicated by the Move Forward Party and vice-versa.

Lück and Rinke (2010) mentioned in their articles that two major points are found after reviewing previous works in the field of selective exposure and selective perception research. First, people prefer to pay attention to information from media and sources that they are likely to agree with, and to perceive in ways that are pre-structured by their cognitive and attitudinal apparatus. Second, political propensity, which includes partisanship and political ideology, are key factors in selective exposure and perception of political communication. The question that follows is whether selective exposure works uniformly for people of different political

ideologies, which Lück & Rinke believe that some important differences between groups with different political ideologies need further exploration to understand the media effects on political communication better.

2.2.3 Uses and Gratification Theory (UGT)

Assumption of the Uses and Gratification Theory

People are active in choosing and using the media for their own satisfaction and needs, and people see the use of media to gratify the needs they have.

West and Turner (2017) posited that the Uses and Gratification Theory (UGT) provides an understanding of when and how individual media consumers could become more active or less active, and if it increases or decreases the involvement.

West and Turner (2017) provided that there are five basic assumptions of the UGT which include the following:

- 1) The audience is active, and its media use is goal oriented.
- 2) The initiative in linking need gratification to a specific medium choice rests with the audience member.
- 3) The media compete with other sources for need satisfaction.
- 4) People have enough self-awareness of their media use, interests, and motives to be able to provide researchers with an accurate picture of that use.
- 5) Value judgments of media content can only be assessed by the audience.

The UGT can be incorporated into this study as it provides a framework for understanding individuals' motivations in the use of media such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other social media platforms which can examine the political communication contents and the platforms used by the Move Forward

Party and the behavioral engagement of the audience.

Kongsongsaen (2021) investigated the mechanisms behind the motivation of Thai millennials' online political engagement, the UGT provides a framework through which we understand individual usage motivation in media which he explores behavioral engagement on political news contents and media platforms, especially news agencies' Facebook pages. The researcher discovered that the journey of political engagements of Thai millennials starts from selective exposure to the sources and contents where individuals have the ability to select sources to be exposed to. After that, they consume the content and then make a decision whether they will engage with the content. Lastly, they will make decisions based on uses and gratification to like, share and comment as they decide what values they will gain from such engagement. What is not yet known is that, since online political engagement occurred right after the exposure to those contents, with high frequency in level of exposure to agenda controlled political contents such as political communication from the Move Forward Party, will there be a significant impact on political ideologies of individuals?

The above literature reviews lead to the development of these following hypotheses:

HP#1: Thai voters' attitude homophily is positively correlated with exposure to political communication and message themes of the Move Forward Party.

HP#2: Exposure to the MFP's message themes have a differently significant impact on perceived political ideology of Thai voters in four distinct generations.

Attitude homophily refers to the tendency of individuals to associate with others who share similar attitudes or beliefs (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). In this study, this means that people are more likely to be exposed to political communication and message themes of political parties whose values and ideologies align with their own.

The Move Forward Party is a political party that promotes progressive policies and advocates for social justice. The party has a significant number of young followers and those who are more socially liberal (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2020).

Based on these factors, HP#1 hypothesized that individuals who are exposed to the MFP political communication and message themes are more likely to be influenced by it and will adopt similar attitudes and beliefs. This effect may be strong among eligible Thai voters who already share some of the MFP's values and ideology, as they may be more receptive to the party's message and more likely to seek out like-minded individuals. This also leads to HP#2 which hypothesized that the MFP's message themes may appeal to different generations in different ways and the impact of these message themes on Thai voter's perceived political ideology may vary based on their generation.

2.2.4 Political Communication Theory

According to Blumler (2015), the political communication process is complex and has five features which are multilevel, evolving, society-spanning, pivots on the politics-media axis, and normative. In 1991, the process underwent a technological change that expanded the media's reach and citizens' opportunities to participate. Theorists have extensively studied political communication and developed several theories. The earlier limited-channel television spurred foundational legacy

theories still relevant today. With digital communication and the internet's abundance, scholars have revised old theories and created new ones.

2.2.4.1 Theories of Media Effects

Three important cognitive theories of political communication effects include agenda setting theory, priming theory, and framing theory. These theories have shed light on the ways in which journalism has organized, interpreted, and shaped portrayals of politics which set boundaries for public discourse. Correlations between media agendas and audience agendas have been modest, and the impact of media on message receivers is difficult to establish definitively. Media malaise theory suggests that frequent criticisms of politicians and portrayals of crisis and conflict breed mistrust in government and alienation from politics, especially among less educated voters (Blumler, 2015).

2.2.4.2 Theories about the politics-media axis

Blumler (2015) stated that the relationship between politics and media has been extensively studied, with various theories proposing different perspectives on this axis. The theory of press-state relations suggests that the news reflects the dominant views expressed by elites, resulting in diverse media coverage when there is open debate, but narrow coverage when elites agree on an issue.

The mediatization of politics theory suggests that the media's distinct ways of viewing the world increasingly influence politics. This is because the media has become the primary source of information about politics, and political institutions and political actors are guided by media rather than political logic (Blumler, 2015).

2.2.4.3 Theories of Voice

Theories of voice are freshly minted in the digital era. Blumler (2015) suggested that there are two aspects of “voice”. One aspect is about the voices that are expressed and heard, which has led to the emergence of theories such as the hyperlinked society, connective action, spill-over effects, and the hybrid media system. The other aspect concerns the implication of vernacular discourse enabled by online communication, leading to debates about the potential for incivility and the potential for enriching democratic dialogue through deliberative democracy.

2.2.4.4 Theories of Actors’ Roles

Scholars have developed typologies and variables to better understand how political campaigns are affected by new media, and they have also examined the impact of new media on journalism and the increasing commercialization of the media. In addition, there has been a shift from a mass communication paradigm to a participation paradigm, paving the way to theorizing about how people engage with and navigate new opportunities for activity through media. Party centered theory of professionalized campaigning is one of the theories of actors’ roles that outlines a set of variables, such as resources, incentives, and ideology, that may determine the extent to which political parties prioritize online campaigning and innovate in their use of it (Blumler, 2015).

2.2.5 Political Marketing Theory

It is not possible to avoid incorporating a marketing approach while campaigning for political office. Marketing has a growing impact on politics and politicians are utilizing the same technological tactics and methods that businesses use to promote their brands and products to market themselves and their ideologies

(Newman & Perloff, 2004).

There are two noticeable differences between how marketing is utilized in business and politics. The primary contrast lies in the philosophy behind each. In business, the aim is to make profits, while politics strive for the efficient operation of democracy. Political success is sometimes achieved by a small margin, whereas in business, the difference between success and failure can be significant. Additionally, while businesses often follow marketing research results, politicians' philosophy can influence the extent to which it is followed. Despite these differences, practitioners from both fields are attempting to combine marketing strategies. As a result, there are many similarities between the two markets, including the use of standard marketing tools such as research, segmentation, targeting, positioning, strategy development, and implementation. Voters can be viewed as consumers in the political marketplace, and the same marketing models and theories used in the commercial marketplace can be employed. Finally, both political and business operate in competitive markets and need to rely on similar approaches to winning (Newman & Perloff, 2004).

2.2.5.1 Marketing and Democracy

The role of marketing in politics has become increasingly important in the reshaping of political ideology. The success of political campaigns relies heavily on the use of marketing tools such as polling, market segmentation, and targeting. Political parties are becoming less important in shaping ideology, and the power is being transferred to the media. Advances in telecommunications and interactive technology have the potential to bring significant changes to the electoral process. Success in politics is measured by the ability of a leader to move public opinion in the desired direction (Newman & Perloff, 2004).

In order to fully understand political marketing, it is important to consider how individuals process political messages and how this translates into effective marketing strategies. This involves examining the social psychology of attitudes and political persuasion. By using a source-message-channel-receiver model with cognitive elaborations, psychological research can provide insight into the effects of political marketing (Newman & Perloff, 2004).

2.2.5.2 Candidate Characteristics

Various characteristics of political communicators, such as expertise, trustworthiness, physical attractiveness, and nonverbal displays of emotion, can influence how voters evaluate political candidates. The context of the political campaign and the contrast with previous candidates can also impact the evaluation. Politicians who can effectively express core emotions may have a greater influence on voters' attitudes. Communicator effects can serve as persuasive arguments or peripheral cues, and that the personal traits of candidates can also influence vote choice in an era of candidate-centered marketing (Newman & Perloff, 2004).

2.2.5.3 Message Characteristic

There's little evidence to support the idea that subliminal messages in political advertising can influence political attitudes or behavior. Subliminal messages are often not noticed because they are overshadowed by more powerful images and words in the advertisement. Even if a subliminal message is noticed, there is no guarantee that it will be processed as intended (Newman & Perloff, 2004).

Newman and Perloff (2004) also mentioned that the mere exposure effect is more likely to have an effect in low-involvement elections where voters have little effect on candidates. However, this effect is not a panacea and may not work

when attitudes towards candidates are strong or moderate. Positive information can still have an impact and the influence of negative information must be qualified to consider the role played by optimistic messages.

According to symbolic politics theory, individuals develop affective responses to symbols in childhood and early adulthood, which can be triggered by political communicators through catchphrases and simplified symbolic terms. This approach can be effective but raises ethical concerns. However, there are limitations to symbolic politics theory, including understanding the impact of non-symbolic factors such as self-interest and assuming that partisan political behavior is primarily due to base human motives. Framing and accessibility theories explain how symbolic messages achieve effect by making values salient or linking them with certain policy alternatives and priming relevant categories to make them more accessible and influential (Newman & Perloff, 2004).

The inoculation theory is different from other persuasion approaches in that it aims to create immunity to persuasion. Candidates use this theory to prevent their supporters from switching sides by acknowledging and then refuting criticism made against them. It is suggesting that political inoculation works, indicating that anticipating and preempting attacks can prevent supporters from leaving and possibly attracting undecided voters. The effectiveness of inoculation effects seems to vary depending on factors such as political party affiliation, education level, and time elapsed between inoculation and attack (Newman & Perloff, 2004).

2.2.5.4 Channel and Context

Newman and Perloff (2004) suggested that simple messages are more effective on television while complex ones are more effective in print and that

politicians often keep their televised speeches simple to appeal to a broader audience. The internet, with its interactive capabilities, offers new avenues for persuasion. Positive moods can inhibit the systematic processing of political messages, while negative moods can bias systematic processing toward misleading rhetoric.

2.2.5.5 Receiver Factors

Preexisting political attitudes, selective processing of information, and party identity affect how individuals receive political messages. Individuals tend to assimilate the positions of preferred candidates and contrast the views of opposed candidates, with these effects being stronger among those who are highly involved and whose attitudes are strong or important. Political candidates often tailor their messages to their audience's attitudes, and party identity is still a potent psychological force that affects how individuals interpret political messages. Involvement is also an important factor, with low involvement encouraging reliance on peripheral cues and simple messages, and high involvement encouraging central processing and commitment to viewpoints. However, even politically involved citizens may be biased as fail to be objective when confronted with messages that are highly incompatible with their values (Newman & Perloff, 2004).

The above literature review of these two theories led to the development of the following hypothesis:

HP#3: Perceived political ideology has a differently significant impact on future election decision of Thai voters in four distinct generations.

As each generation groups have its own unique experiences and values shaped by the social, cultural, and political events of their time, it is speculated that the way different generations perceived political ideology will have a different impact


on their future election decision.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of this study has been developed based on an exploratory sequential strand of mix-methods research to examine not only the correlation between attitude homophily and exposure to particular message theme of the MFP's progressive political communication, and the impact of exposure to the MFP's message theme on Thai voters' perceived political ideology, but also the impact of Thai voters' perceived political ideology on their future election decisions.

As shown in Figure 2.4, this framework focuses on investigating whether attitude homophily is positively correlated with exposure to the MFP's political communication as well as to investigate whether the message themes occurred in the political communication of the MFP on social media platforms such as MFP official Facebook page, and the MFP official Twitter account have a significant impact on Thai voters' in four distinct generation groups with different perceived political ideology based on the Political Compass which will, in turn, influence their future election decisions. Below is the conceptual framework which will be used in this research.

Figure 2.4: Conceptual Framework



This conceptual framework will be the foundation for the researcher to understand how the political communication of the MFP with agenda setting theory reaches the audience through social media channels and to understand which message themes were used in the MFP's political communication. The interrelation of the audiences' ideology and level of exposure can be speculated. To better understand the causal relationship of all examined variables, the UGT, Political Communication Theory, and Political Marketing Theory are also applied in this research.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY


This thesis aims to explore the message themes that emerged in the Move Forward Party's political communication and the effects it has on the perceived political ideology and current election voting decisions of the audiences in four different generations and different political positions based on the Political Compass diagram. This chapter provides an explanation of the overall research methodology, including research design, research methods, target population and sampling, and data collection procedure. Measurement and pretest, data analysis, together with validity and reliability are also described.

3.1 Research Design

This research uses an exploratory mix-method design, incorporating two research methods conducting both qualitative and quantitative strands which enable the exploration and description of existing phenomena that extend the explanation from either qualitative or quantitative approach alone (Creswell & Clark, 2011).

This research methodology is developed based on the mixed methods, using the exploratory design. It employs textual analysis, a qualitative method, to discover message themes that occurred in the Move Forward Party's political communication, and survey, a quantitative method, to find the interrelationship and the effects that the MFP's political communication has on Thai citizens in different generations and political position (See Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Exploratory Design



Source: Creswell, J. W., & Clark, V. L. P. (2011). *Designing and conducting mixed methods research*. Los Angeles: Sage.

The process of this research is divided into two stages, beginning with a qualitative approach: a textual analysis of the Move Forward Party's political communication, followed by a quantitative approach: an online survey of the samples.

3.2 Qualitative Approach: Textual Analysis

In the first part of this research, a qualitative method of textual analysis is employed with 20 selected key documents from the Move Forward Party's online political communication posted between March 1, 2021 and August 31, 2022, on two major social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter (see details in Table 3.1).

3.2.1 Target Population and Sample Selection

The Move Forward Party regularly tweets on its official Twitter account as well as actively posting on its official Facebook Page. The MFP's Facebook page has over 550,000 followers (See Figure 3.2) and over 390,000 followers on the MFP's Twitter account (See Figure 3.3). The number of followers on these two platforms is much higher than the MFP's YouTube subscribers (over 26,000 subscribers) and the MFP's Line official account friends (over 46,000 friends). Therefore, the key documents selected for this study were from the party's official account on Facebook and Twitter.

Figure 3.2: The Move Forward Party Facebook Page



Source: *Move Forward Party*. (2020). Retrieved from <https://facebook.com/MoveForwardPartyThailand/about>.

Figure 3.3: The Move Forward Party Twitter Account



Source: *Move Forward Party*. (2020). Retrieved from <https://twitter.com/MFPThailand>.

Table 3.1: The Move forward Party Official Social Media Accounts

No.	Account Name	Platform	No. of Subscribers
1.	พรรคก้าวไกล–Move Forward Party	Facebook	550K
2.	พรรคก้าวไกล–Move Forward Party	Twitter	399.6K

Source: 1) *Move Forward Party*. (2020). Retrieved from [https://facebook.com/](https://facebook.com/MoveForwardPartyThailand/about)

[MoveForwardPartyThailand/about](https://facebook.com/MoveForwardPartyThailand/about).

2) *Move Forward Party*. (2020). Retrieved from [https://twitter.com/](https://twitter.com/MFPThailand)

[MFPThailand](https://twitter.com/MFPThailand).

Selected content for textual analysis are tweets and posts that have high engagements ranked within the top 10 of the MFP’s posts from each platform.

The 20 selected key documents were based on these two media sources as follows.

1) The MFP Facebook Page (10 Posts)

2) The MFP Twitter (10 Tweets)

3.2.2 Data Collection Procedure

The sample selection procedure includes two steps:

The first step involves searching Facebook for the MFP’s official Facebook Page. Then, use the tool called post filter to look for ten posts with the highest engagements including numbers of views, likes, and shares, posted between March 1, 2021 and August 31, 2022.

The second step is searching Twitter for the MFP’s official Twitter account. Then type “until: 2022-08-31 since: 2021-03-01” in the search box from

‘mfpThailand’ to look for the top tweets of the MFP with the highest views and engagements.

3.2.3 Key Documents

As this research focused on the political communication of the Move Forward Party, social media posts of the MFP’s official accounts, including Facebook page, and Twitter were used for the textual analysis. This study covered the top 10 highest engagement posts from MFP’s Facebook page and the top 10 highest views and engagement tweets from MFP’s Twitter account between March 1, 2021 and August 31, 2022. The selected contents for this study, ranking from the highest total engagements on Facebook followed by Twitter, are the following contents. Table 3.2 presents sampled data from Facebook whereas Table 3.3 presents data from Twitter.

Table 3.2: Sampled Data from Facebook for Textual Analysis

No.	Date	Content Title	No. of Engagement
1	November 17, 2021	Why do we have Senators? Go forward with single council (see Figure 3.4)	238,200
2	July 7, 2021	MP Taopiphop Limjitrakorn–Taopiphop Limjitrakorn speaks in the middle of the parliament (see Figure 3.5)	163,700
3	February 18, 2022	This is the opposite side of people who receives # elephant tickets (see Figure 3.6)	116,200


(Continued)

Table 3.2 (Continued): Sampled Data from Facebook for Textual Analysis

No.	Date	Content Title	No. of Engagement
4	December 14, 2021	Why does the Constitutional Court exist? (see Figure 3.7)	76,700
5	August 21, 2021	Why does the budget for the Monarchy needs reform? (see Figure 3.8)	75,700
6	November 10, 2021	I want Thai judicial process to work for the public and not exercise the power under the royal name to oppress on the freedom of the people (see Figure 3.9)	52,000
7	July 5, 2021	Chor Pannika Wanich from the Progressive Movement live broadcasting Pita Limcharoenrat (see Figure 3.10)	49,500
8	December 24, 2021	The meeting of the executive committee of the Move Forward Party has a unanimous resolution to let Petch Karoonpon run for Lak Si (see Figure 3.11)	45,100
9	December 8, 2021	Listen to Amarat clearly summarize in 2 minutes (see Figure 3.12)	44,400
10	November 11, 2021	I speak with a sense of shame to be a junior of seniors who serve dictatorship (see Figure 3.13)	43,900

The first sampled data is from a Facebook video posted on November 17th, 2021, with 238,200 total engagements titled “Why do we have Senators? Go forward with the single council” #DismantlePrayuthRegime Jirat Thongsuwan–Jirat Thongsuwan MP for Chachoengsao District 4, The Move Forward Party.

Figure 3.4: Facebook Sample#1



Source: Move Forward Party. (2021). *Why do we have Senators? Go forward with single council*. [Video attached] [Status update]. Retrieved from https://fb.watch/fR3_bBik7u.

The second sampled data is from a Facebook video posted on July 7th, 2021, with 163,700 total engagements titled “MP Taopiphop Limjitrakorn–Taopiphop Limjitrakorn speaks in the middle of the parliament! I want Prayuth to use my phone for one day. So, he will know how much people suffer to the point of death in this crisis!!” #MoveForward #NationalAssyembly #Covid


Figure 3.5: Facebook Sample#2



Source: Move Forward Party. (2021). *MP Taopiphop Limjitrakorn–Taopiphop Limjitrakorn speaks in the middle of the parliament!*. [Video attached]
 [Status update]. Retrieved from <https://fb.watch/jWIKQTVLJI/>.

The third sampled data is from a Facebook video posted on February 18th, 2022, with 116,200 total engagements titled “This is the opposite side of people who receive #ElephantTickets. If you don’t enter the palace, you won’t be thriving but broken instead. Another piece of work from a parasitic regime that devours all institutional organization of the country for stability, prosperity, and sustainability of a few people in this country” #BadCopsThriveGoodCopsNeedAsylum #HumanTrafficking #MoveForward #NationalAssybmly”


Figure 3.6: Facebook Sample#3



Source: Move Forward Party. (2022). *This is the opposite side of people who receives #ElephantTickets*. [Video attached] [Status update]. Retrieved from <https://fb.watch/jWm7JPBPsx/>.

The fourth sampled data is from a Facebook video posted on December 14th, 2021, with 76,700 total engagements titled “Why does the Constitutional Court exist? Spending a budget of 368 million Baht per year. Is there any ruling that benefits this country and its people? Find out with Jirat Thongsuwan–Jirat Thongsuwan”

Figure 3.7: Facebook Sample#4



Source: Move Forward Party. (2021). *Why does the Constitutional Court exist?*.

[Video attached] [Status update]. Retrieved from
<https://fb.watch/jYM6AzsoLI/>.

The fifth sampled data is from a Facebook video posted on August 21st, 2021, with 75,700 total engagements titled “[Why does the budget for the Monarchy need reform?]”


Figure 3.8: Facebook Sample#5



Source: Move Forward Party. (2021). *Why does the budget for the Monarchy needs reform?*. [Video attached] [Status update]. Retrieved from <https://fb.watch/jYMzWbQyQq/>.

The sixth sampled data is from a Facebook video posted on November 10th, 2021, with 52,000 total engagements titled “I want Thai judicial process to work for the public and not exercise power under the royal name to oppress on the freedom of the people Amarat Chokepamitkul - Amarat Chokepamitkul #ConstitutionalCourt”

Figure 3.9: Facebook Sample#6




Source: Move Forward Party. (2021). *I want Thai judicial process to work for the public and not exercise the power under the royal name to oppress on the freedom of the people.* [Video attached] [Status update].

Retrieved from <https://fb.watch/jYN0z-liVE/>.

The seventh sampled data is from a Facebook video posted on July 5th, 2021, with 49,500 total engagements titled “Chor Pannika Wanich from the Progressive Movement live broadcasting Pita Limcharoenrat, the party leader and member of parliaments from the #MoveForwardParty join the trip to evacuation center in Bang Phli Yai subdistrict administration to help and facilitate citizens affected by the #KingKaewFactoryFire and press the demand on the government to expedite the resolution of the problem as soon as possible”

Figure 3.10: Facebook Sample#7



Source: Move Forward Party. (2021). *Chor Pannika Wanich from the Progressive Movement live broadcasting Pita Limcharoenrat*. [Video attached]
 [Status update]. Retrieved from <https://fb.watch/kT5uWrgrI-/>.

The eighth sampled data is from a Facebook picture posted on December 24th, 2021, with 45,100 total engagements titled “[The meeting of the executive committee of the Move Forward Party has a unanimous resolution to let Petch Karoonpon run for Lak Si – Chatuchak re-election]”

Figure 3.11: Facebook Sample#8



Source: Move Forward Party. (2021). *The meeting of the executive committee of the Move Forward Party has a unanimous resolution to let Petch Karoonpon run for Lak Si.* [Image attached] [Status update]. Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/MoveForwardPartyThailand/photos/a.104388194526543/461659722132720>.

The ninth sampled data is from a Facebook video posted on December 8th, 2021, with 44,400 total engagements titled “Listen to Amarat clearly summarize in 2 minutes. The state steps on people’s heads, favoring the capitalists #MoveForward #SaveChana #SaveChana”


Figure 3.12: Facebook Sample#9



Source: Move Forward Party. (2021). *Listen to Amarat clearly summarize in 2 minutes.* [Video attached] [Status update]. Retrieved from <https://fb.watch/jYVoDANOUo/>.

The tenth sampled data is from a Facebook video posted on November 11th, 2021, with 43,900 total engagements titled “I speak with a sense of shame to be a junior of seniors who serve dictatorship. I would like to remind all seniors to stop serving illegal power that does not belong to the people. Rangsiman Rome–Rangsiman Rome. #ConstitutionalCourt”

Figure 3.13: Facebook Sample#10



Source: Move Forward Party. (2021). *I speak with a sense of shame to be a junior of seniors who serve dictatorship*. [Video attached] [Status update].

Retrieved from <https://fb.watch/jYVivi6HKm/>.

Table 3.3: Sampled Data from Twitter for Textual Analysis

No.	Date	Content Title	No. of Views (Engagement)
11	August 21, 2021	Who did not follow, listen to this 4-minute clip @RangsimanRome has summarized the main points (See Figure 3.14)	1,000,000 (52,364)
12	March 16, 2021	Can't keep your posture? Are you proud?" (See Figure 3.15)	300,500 (16,173)
13	May 20, 2021	1 million Baht couldn't manage it well, how can we trust the government to take out 7 hundred billion baht more (See Figure 3.16)	296,500 (4,185)
14	November 17, 2021	Why do we have Senators? Go forward with single council (See Figure 3.17)	244,800 (18,902)
15	April 4, 2021,	Please beware!!! The government is drafting an information law (covering people's eyes issue) (See Figure 3.18)	166,200 (8,875)
16	April 26, 2021	While the number of the sick and the death from COVID-19 are increasing every day, Prayuth's cabinet are stealing the 45,000 million baht loan budget and sharing it among the ruling parties members (See Figure 3.19)	129,000 (7,163)

(Continued)

Table 3.3 (Continued): Sampled Data from Twitter for Textual Analysis

No.	Date	Content Title	No. of Views (Engagement)
17	July 21, 2022	Asked about contractor selection, corruption on monument, he couldn't answer (See Figure 3.20)	79,900 (5,999)
18	August 17, 2021	Bangkok CCTV footage recorded an event on 16 th August 2021 in front of Soi Prachasongkroh 14 (See Figure 3.21)	69,200 (5,008)
19	July 21, 2022	Prayuth is WATCHING YOU!" (See Figure 3.22)	64,700 (4,517)
20	August 27, 2021	Censure Debate Dismantle Parasite Regeim (See Figure 3.23)	64,500 (3,725)

The eleventh sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on August 21st, 2021, with 1,000,000 views and 52,364 engagements titled "Who did not follow, listen to this 4-minute clip @RangsimanRome has summarized the main points #MoveForward reform #MonarchyBudget"


Figure 3.14: Twitter Sample#1



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2021). *Who did not follow, listen to this 4-minute clip @RangsimanRome has summarized the main points.* [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1429119896789553154?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg.

The twelfth sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on March 16th, 2021, with 300,500 views and 16,173 engagements titled “Can’t keep your posture? Are you proud?”

Figure 3.15: Twitter Sample#2



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2021). *Can't keep your posture?*

Are you proud?. [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from

https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1371714101496324096?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg.

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The thirteenth sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on May 20th, 2021, with 296,500 views and 4,185 engagements titled “1 million million baht couldn't manage it well, how can we trust the government to take out 7 hundred billion baht more which will be the burden of citizens and to let them manage #65budget of 3.1 million million baht that is about to enter the national assembly? The Move Forward Party invites you to listen to MP Mai @SirikanyaTansa1 explain for better understanding. #MoveForward #65Budget #LoanMoney”

Figure 3.16: Twitter Sample#3



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2021). *1 million million baht couldn't manage it well, how can we trust the government to take out 7 hundred billion baht more.* [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1395333488165928960?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg.

The fourteenth sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on November 17th, 2021, with 244,800 views and 18,902 engagements titled “Why do we have Senators? Go forward with single council #DismantlePrayuthRegimeJirat Thongsuwan @OfficialJirat”

Figure 3.17: Twitter Sample#4



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2021). *Why do we have Senators? Go forward with single council.* [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1461001737859334152?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg.

The fifteenth sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on April 4th, 2021, with 166,200 views and 8,875 engagements titled “Please beware!!! The government is drafting an information law (covering people’s eyes issue)”

Figure 3.18: Twitter Sample#5



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2021). *Please beware!!!*

The government is drafting an information law (covering people's eyes issue). [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1378490497157586944?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg.

The sixteenth sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on April 26th, 2021, with 129,000 views and 7,163 engagements titled “While the number of the sick and the death from COVID-19 are increasing every day, Prayuth’s cabinet are stealing the 45,000 million baht loan budget and sharing it among the ruling parties members.”

Figure 3.19: Twitter Sample#6



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2021). *While the number of the sick and the death from COVID-19 are increasing every day, Prayuth's cabinet are stealing the 45,000 million baht loan budget and sharing it among the ruling parties members.* [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1386512855512457216?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg.

The seventeenth sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on July 21st, 2022, with 79,900 views and 5,999 engagements titled “Asked about contractor selection, corruption on the monument, he couldn’t answer. Instead, he verbally attacks the panelist on his heights and accuses him of infringing the monarchy!”


Figure 3.20: Twitter Sample#7



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2022). *Asked about contractor selection, corruption on monument, he couldn't answer.* [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1549980322543964160?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg.

The eighteenth sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on August 17th, 2021, with 69,200 views and 5,008 engagements titled “Bangkok CCTV footage recorded an event on 16th August 2021 in front of Soi Prachasongkroh 14. Over 10 men with guns and sticks attacked protesters, threatened civilians, and shot a 14-year-old boy”

Figure 3.21: Twitter Sample#8



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2021). *Bangkok CCTV footage recorded an event on 16th August 2021 in front of Soi Prachasongkroh 14.* [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1438723440358281217?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg_

The nineteenth sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on July 21st, 2022, with 64,700 views and 4,517 engagements titled “Prayuth is WATCHING YOU!”


Figure 3.22: Twitter Sample#9



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2022). *Prayuth is WATCHING YOU!* [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1550059412571578368?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg.

The twentieth sampled data is from a Twitter video posted on August 27th, 2021, with 64,500 views and 3,725 engagements titled “#CensureDebate #DismantleParasiteRegeim”

Figure 3.23: Twitter Sample#10



Source: Move Forward Party. [@MFPThailand]. (2021). *#CensureDebate*
#DismantleParasiteRegeim. [Video attached] [Tweet]. Retrieved from
https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1431232779316916235?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg.

3.2.4 Data Analysis

The data analysis of this phase involves identifying occurred themes from the selected samples of political communication (10 selected posts from Facebook and 10 selected posts from Twitter) of the MFP, using the Constant Comparative Method by Glaser (1965), to answer RQ#1, What are the key message themes of political communication of the Move Forward Party (MFP) from March 1, 2021

to August 31, 2022?, before moving on to the quantitative part of the research with the survey method which the top five occurred message themes was used to develop the questionnaire.

According to Glaser (1965), there are four stages in the Constant Comparative Method which include 1) Comparing incidents applicable to each category, 2) Integrating categories and their properties, 3) Delimiting the theory, and 4) Writing the theory. These four stages were applied to the data analysis process of this study.

3.2.5 Reliability and Validity

For the validity of the political communication posted on Facebook by the Move Forward Party, all the selected posts were collected based on the number of engagements from the official Facebook page of the MFP.

For the validity of the political communication tweeted on Twitter by the MFP, all the selected tweets were collected based on the number of views and engagements from the official Twitter account of the MFP.

To ensure the reliability of this research, inter-coder reliability is used for this study to identify patterns and emerging themes that occurred in the MFP political communication based on the political compass. A strategic planner from an advertising agency served as a second coder and accounted for 30 percent of the 20 materials of this analysis then the results of the analyses from both coders were compared with one another. The reliability of the inter-coder is 85 percent, which signifies that this study is reliable (Tang, 2018).

3.3 Quantitative Approach: Survey

According to Hoffman and Young (2013)., the survey research normally employed for political communication was used for examining attitudes, cognitions, and behaviors, allowing us to compare many variables in order to identify a better conclusion. In this study, the survey method was used as a tool to examine the interrelationship and effects of the level of exposure to the MFP's political communication and the political ideologies of the four generation groups based on the concept of selective exposure, uses and gratification, and an elaboration likelihood model.

Survey research was selected as an appropriate quantitative method for this study as it is designed to deal more directly with the nature of people's thoughts, opinions, and feelings (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister & Jeanne, 2011, p. 138). The questionnaire is the primary instrument of the quantitative part of this research, the data collected from the survey were analyzed to discover whether there is influence, effect, and interrelationship between generation groups, political standpoints, the level of exposure to the Move Forward Party's political communication and the perceived political ideology of Thai citizens.

As for this research, the target population for the survey was Thai citizens aged between 18 years old to 70 years old, of four generations (Gen Z aged 18-25 years old, Gen Y aged 26-41 years old, Gen X aged 42-57 years old, and Baby Boomers aged 58-70 years old), both male, female, and LGBTQ+, who have been exposed to the online political communication of the Move Forward Party from the MFP's official accounts via social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter within the past 3 months.

The sampling method of this survey is a Quota Sampling technique which equally divides the samples into four generation groups which will be explained in the upcoming section.


3.3.1 Target Population and Sample Selection

For the survey section of this research, the target populations were Thai citizens aged between 18-77 years old who had access to the internet and social media, which was divided into four generation groups as follows,

- 1) Generation Z (Aged 18-25 years old)
- 2) Generation Y (Aged 26-41 years old)
- 3) Generation X (Aged 42-57 years old)
- 4) Baby boomers (Aged 58-70 years old)

The sample size was calculated using G*Power 3.1 which is the sample size calculating software based on the formula of Cohen (1977), with 0.15 in Effect size f^2 , 0.05 error probability, and 95% confidence interval, the sample size is equal to 74 (See Figure 3.24).

Figure 3.24: G*Power Sample Size Calculation



Source: Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. *Behavior Research Methods*, 41, 1149–1160.

The power analyses generated from this setting by G*Power 3.1 are as follows: t tests-Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, single regression coefficient

Analysis:	A priori: Compute required sample size		
Input:	Tail(s)	=	One
	Effect size f^2	=	0.15
	α err prob	=	0.05
	Power (1- β err prob)	=	0.95
	Number of predictors	=	3
Output:	Noncentrality parameter δ	=	3.3316662
	Critical t	=	1.6669145
	Df	=	70
	Total sample size	=	74
	Actual power	=	0.9509717

In addition to this, the survey participants must have access to at least one of the social media channels such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and/ or Line within the survey period. If a participant does not meet the criteria, the survey should not be continued.

The scope of study for this research is to examine Thai citizens aged 18-77 years old, who, in the past 3 months, have been exposed to the online political communication of the Move Forward Party via social media channels such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. The samples were divided into four groups based on their generations which are as follows:

- 1) Generation Z: 18-25 years old
- 2) Generation Y: 26-41 years old
- 3) Generation X: 42-57 years old
- 4) Baby boomers: 58-70 years old

A total of 240 samples were collected, which was higher than the sample size result generated by G*Power 3.1. Due to time and cost efficiency, budget, and manpower, the samples were selected using the Quota Sampling technique, which is a non-probability sampling method. For this study, the quota sampling is divided into 3 steps as follows.

Step 1: The quota of the samples was equally divided into six clusters by their geographic regions, namely Central Thailand, Northern Thailand, Northeastern Thailand, Eastern Thailand, Western Thailand, and Southern Thailand.

Step 2: Within each geographic region, the age of the samples is divided into 4 subgroups to equally select samples from each generation group for each geographic region, namely Generation Z, Generation Y, Generation X, and Baby Boomers.

Step 3: The quota sampling technique, a non-probability sampling method, was used to select the total number of 240 samples, equally divided into 60 samples from each of the 4 generation groups, and a total of 40 persons from each geographic region as displayed in the table below:

Table 3.4: Total Number of Samples from Quota Sampling

Geographic Region	Gen Z	Gen Y	Gen X	Baby Boomers	Total
Central	10	10	10	10	40
North	10	10	10	10	40
Northeast	10	10	10	10	40
East	10	10	10	10	40
West	10	10	10	10	40
South	10	10	10	10	40
Total	60	60	60	60	240

A total of 60 representatives from each of the generation groups were selected into a sample for the survey on the basis of pre-specified characteristics of the generation groups. With the combination of three stages of samplings, the determined number of samples can be attained.

3.3.2 Research Instrument

A survey technique is employed for this part of the quantitative approach where the instrument of the research was a self-administered online questionnaire using SurveyMonkey which consists of seven sections as shown below:

Section A: Personal Data

In the first section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked about their age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, and geographic region.

Section B: Social Media Exposure

Six questions were asked about respondents' most frequently used social media channels and the level of social media exposure in general.

The first three questions are a multiple-choice question with six choices of media platforms: 1) Facebook, 2) YouTube, 3) Twitter, 4) Line, 5) TikTok, 6) Instagram, and 7) Other (please specify).

The later three questions employed a 5-five point-scale, arranging from 1 = Short (Less than 30 minutes/ day); 2 = Quite short (30-60 minutes/ day); 3 = Moderate (>1 hour-2 hours/ day); 4 = Quite long (>2-3 hours minutes/ day); and 5 = Long (>3 hours/ day). This scale is an adaptation based on research titled “Exposure to News and Political Participation via Social Media of Generation Y in Bangkok.” (Saengthong, 2021) which used a 5-points Likert Scale to examine the political participation and level of political news exposure of Generation Y in Bangkok.

Section C: Perceived Political Ideology

The respondents were asked about their perceived political ideology based on four positions of the political compass. They were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree) to the following nine statements:

Table 3.5: Questionnaire Items for Perceived Political Ideology

No.	Statements	Political Ideology
1	I believe in redistribution of wealth.	Authoritarian Left (Costello et al., 2020)
2	I believe in redistribution of social status.	
3	I believe in justification of creating a fair world.	
4	I advocate social hierarchy.	Authoritarian Right (Altemeyer, 1981)
5	I naturally submissive to my authority figures.	
6	I often act aggressively in the name of the authority.	
7	I believe in freedom of individuals.	Libertarian Left (Narveson, 2008)
8	I believe in social equality.	
9	I support free-market capitalism.	Libertarian Right (Baradat, 2015)
10	I support reversal of the modern welfare state.	

Section D: Exposure to Message Strategies (Message Themes) of the MFP

Political Communication

The respondents were asked how often they were exposed during the past three months to the occurred message themes of the MFP's political communication, Theme A, Theme B, Theme C, Theme D, and Theme E, identified from the Textual Analysis. Answers include a 5-point scale ranging from 0 = Never; 1 = Rarely (1-2 times); 2 = Sometimes (3-4 times); 3 = Often (5-6 times); and 4 = Always (7 times more).

Section E: Attitude Homophily

The format of discovering the attitude homophily in this section is an adaptation based on a previous study where Triawan (2020) examines attitude homophily for Mark Wiens with eight items based on Lee & Watkins's format. (Triawan, 2020; Lee & Watkins, 2016, p. 5756). As for this study, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement for the following eight items using the Five-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree).

- 1) The MFP thinks like me.
- 2) The MFP is like me.
- 3) The MFP is similar to me.
- 4) The MFP shares my values.
- 5) The MFP has a lot in common with me.
- 6) The MFP behaves like me.
- 7) The MFP expresses attitudes similar to mine.
- 8) The MFP has thoughts and ideas that are similar to mine.

Section F: Previous Election Decision

The respondents were asked about their previous general election decision to discover which political party they voted for in the 2019 general election. Multiple choices including the MFP, other major political parties (Palang Pracharat Party, Pheu Thai Party, Future Forward Party, Democrat Party, Bhumjaithai Party, Thai Liberal Party, Chatthaipattana Party, New Economics Party, Prachachart Party, and Puea Chat Party), vote for other parties, and not voting for any party were given.

Section G: Current Election Decision

In this section, the respondents were asked about the potential decision for the next general election to vote for the MFP. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement for the following three statements using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree.

1) In the current General Election (2023) I voted for "The MFP" in both ballots

2) In the current General Election (2023) I voted for "The MFP" only in the Party Lists ballot

3) In the current General Election (2023) I voted for "The MFP" only in the Members Elected on a Constituency basis ballot.

4) In the current General Election (2023) I did not vote for "The MFP" in any of the ballots

3.3.3 Data Collection Procedure for Survey

Once the final version of the questionnaire was pretested and the election was concluded, potential Thai voters were contacted via social media channels such as Facebook group, Line group, and Twitter for their participation in this research. Once the samples were accepted to participate in the survey, the link to a self-administered questionnaire, using the service of SurveyMonkey, was sent to the samples for their participation. To ensure that the samples were qualified for this study, two screening questions were asked before the samples could move forward to other sections of the survey which each participant had one week to complete. Once the data collection was completed, all the data were thoroughly checked and cleaned. Then the SPSS

program was used as the statistical software to analyze the data collected and test the proposed research hypotheses.

3.3.4 Instrument Pretest

Before the actual data collection, the questionnaire was pretested with 65 persons, which was 27% of the total sampling size, to ensure the validity and reliability of this measurement. The question(s) or response item(s) that were reported to be unclear or difficult to understand were adjusted accordingly.

These adjusted questions are as follows.

Q1. Label the generation groups' names after the age ranges.

Q21. Gave more explanation on the Free-market capitalism

Q22. Gave more explanation on the modern welfare state

Q35. Changed the item to "I voted for the MFP in both ballots"

Q36. Changed the item to "I voted for the MFP only in the Party Lists ballot"

Q37. Changed the item to "I voted for the MFP only in the Members Elected on a Constituency basis ballot"

Reliability tests of all the scales were also conducted so that the item(s) that were problematic were removed and/or adjusted.

3.3.5 Data Analysis

The survey data collected was analyzed to examine the causal relationship between each variable stated in the conceptual framework. (MFP political communication, level of exposure, generation groups, and audience's political orientation.) HP#1 was tested using Pearson Correlation statistic, while HP#2, and HP#3 were tested using Linear Regression statistics in the SPSS software to determine if:

HP#1: Thai voters' attitude homophily is positively correlated with exposure to political communication and message themes of the Move Forward Party.

HP#2: Exposure to the MFP's message themes have a differently significant impact on perceived political ideology of Thai voters in four distinct generations.

HP#3: Perceived political ideology has a differently significant impact on current election decision of Thai voters in four distinct generations.

3.3.6 Reliability and Validity of Survey

To assure the reliability, all scales of the measurement was thoroughly tested by the Reliability Analysis. The Index of Item-Objective Congruence (IOC) was used to find the validity of the contents. The questionnaire was checked by three experts including, one communication scholar, one political communication expert, and one strategic planning expert.

The Item-Objective Congruence (IOC) evaluation of the items in the questionnaire is based on the score ranging from -1 to +1.

Incongruent = -1


Questionable = 0

Congruent = +1

Items with score lower than 0.5 were revised and items that scores higher than or equal to 0.5 were reserved.

3.4 Summary

Once the textual analysis and the survey were completed, the data collected from both qualitative and quantitative methods were combined and analyzed to provide answers to HP#1, HP#2, and HP#3 for a better understanding of how the MFP political communication and the level of exposure affects the political ideology of Thai voters.



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CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

This chapter provides findings of this research. It consists of results from the mixed-method research (textual analysis and survey). In addition to the results regarding the occurred themes of the MFP's political communications on social media, descriptive statistics of the coded online data and the survey respondents, together with the examined variables were reported. Finally, inferential statistics were used to test the proposed research hypotheses.

4.1 Findings of the Textual Analysis

The total of 20 online political communications of the Move Forward Party between March 1st, 2021, and August 31st, 2022 were coded by two coders--the major investigator as the first coder, and his colleague as the second coder, which included top 10 posts with most engagements from Facebook, and top 10 tweets with most engagements from Twitter.

The analysis results showed that the political communication of the Move Forward Party between March 1st, 2021, and August 31st, 2022, via official Facebook and Twitter accounts of the MFP contained a total of 13 themes. The sampled political communications contain the minimum of one theme, and the maximum of five themes, which the frequency of themes reflects the main topics of the contents. Details of the occurred themes of each MFP contents are shown in the Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Textual Analysis Results

MFP Contents	Occurred Themes
Content#1	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-Authoritarian 2. Advocates Constitutional Reform 3. Anti-Coup d'état
Content#2	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government
Content#3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency 2. Anti-Injustice 3. Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality 4. Anti-Authoritarian
Content#4	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency 2. Anti-Authoritarian
Content#5	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tax Reformation 2. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency
Content#6	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-Authoritarian 2. Anti-Injustice 3. Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality

(Continued)

Table 4.1 (Continued): Textual Analysis Results

MFP Contents	Occurred Themes
Content#7	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government 2. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency 3. Report incident
Content#8	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Re-election campaigning 2. Anti-Authoritarian
Content#9	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government 2. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency 3. Anti-Injustice 4. Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality 5. Anti-Capitalism
Content#10	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-Article 112 Law 2. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency 3. Anti-Coup d'état 4. Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality 5. Anti-Injustice

(Continued)

Table 4.1 (Continued): Textual Analysis Results

MFP Contents	Occurred Themes
Content#11	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tax Reformation 2. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency
Content#12	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government 2. Report incident
Content#13	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency 2. Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government
Content#14	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-Coup d'état 2. Anti-Authoritarian 3. Advocates Constitutional Reform
Content#15	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency 2. Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality
Content#16	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency 2. Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government
Content#17	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government
Content#18	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Report incident

(Continued)

Table 4.1 (Continued): Textual Analysis Results

MFP Contents	Occurred Themes
Content#19	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government 2. Criticizing the Army 3. Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality 4. Anti-Injustice
Content#20	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government 2. Anti-Capitalism 3. Anti-Injustice

4.1.1 Message Themes

The 13 message themes which occurred in the political communication of the Move Forward Party via Facebook and Twitter accounts between March 1st, 2021 and August 31st, 2022 were presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Frequency of Occurred Themes

Frequency of Occurred Themes		
Occurred Themes	Frequency	Contents
Theme A: Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency	10	#3, #4, #5, #7, #9, #10, #11, #13, #15, and #16.
Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government	9	#2, #7, #9, #12, #13, #16, #17, #19, and #20.
Theme C: Anti-Injustice	6	#3, #6, #9, #10, #19, and #20.
Theme D: Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality	6	#3, #6, #9, #10, #15, and #19.
Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian	6	#1, #3, #4, #6, #8, and #14
Theme F: Anti-Coup d'état	3	#1, #10, and #14
Theme G: Tax Reformation	2	#5, and #11

(Continued)

Table 4.2 (Continued): Frequency of Occurred Themes

Frequency of Occurred Themes		
Occurred Themes	Frequency	Contents
Theme H: Report Incident	2	#7 and #18
Theme I: Anti-Capitalism	2	#9 and #20
Theme J: Advocates Constitutional Reform	2	#7 and #18
Theme K: Anti-Article 112 Law	1	#10
Theme L: Criticizing the Army	1	#19
Theme M: Re-election Campaigning	1	#8

These 13 occurred message themes are described as followed.

4.1.1.1 Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency (Theme A)

This message theme had the highest frequency (10 times) among all the occurred themes in the MFP political communication, which found in content number #3, #4, #5, #7, #9, #10, #11, #13, #15, and #16. This message theme often occurred in contents that questioned the practice of Prayuth's government on matters deemed to be suspicious of possible corruption by the government, ministers, or officers while supporting transparency.

4.1.1.2 Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government (Theme B)

This message theme of the MFP occurred 9 times in the selected documents which found in content #2, #7, #9, #12, #13, #16, #17, #19, and #20.

This message theme occurred in contents that attack the Prime Minister, Prayuth Chan-o-cha, and his ministers on their managerial ability and the way he and his team dealt with national matters.

4.1.1.3 Anti-Injustice (Theme C)

This message theme of the MFP occurred 6 times in the selected documents which found in content #3, #6, #9, #10, #19, and #20. This message theme occurred in contents that expressed feelings against the injustice of the government, the law enforcements, the court, and the constitutional court in matters such as the misused of article 112 law and the way the government use law enforcement against the oppositions.

4.1.1.4 Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality (Theme D)

This message theme of the MFP occurred 6 times in the selected documents which found in content #3, #6, #9, #10, #15, and #19. Similar to message theme C, this message theme occurred in contents that expressed feelings against the injustice of the government, the law enforcements, the court, and the constitutional court and publicly called out with demands for human rights, freedom of the people and the social equality.

4.1.1.5 Anti-Authoritarian (Theme E)

This message theme of the MFP occurred 6 times in the selected documents which found in content #1, #3, #4, #6, #8, and #14. This message theme

occurred in contents that criticized the unelected senators and the way Prayuth's government is formed under the remnant of the coup d'état which also led by Prayuth Chan-o-cha.

4.1.1.6 Anti-Coup d'état (Theme F)

This message theme of the MFP occurred 3 times in the selected documents which found in content #1, #10, and #14. This message theme occurred in contents that are against coup d'état both in the past, the present and the future.

4.1.1.7 Tax Reformation (Theme G)

This message theme of the MFP occurred 3 times in the selected documents which found in content 2 times in content #5, and #11. This message theme occurred in contents called for reformation of tax which deemed to be inefficient and have so many loopholes for potential corruption in order to put tax budget into better use.

4.1.1.8 Report Incident (Theme H)

This message theme occurred twice in content #7 and #18 of the studied MFP political communication. In content #7, Pannika Wanich was reporting an incident of the factory explosion in Samut Prakan. She mainly reported the situation from the disaster shelter, interviewing with the victim, interviewing the MP, Wuttinan Boonchoo, and interviewing the party leader, Pita Limcharoenrat.

The second occurrence of this message theme was in content #18 where the video showed a CCTV footage of the police shooting at the protesters where a teenager had been shot and later died.

4.1.1.9 Anti-Capitalism (Theme I)

There were two MFP political content that contained the Anti-Capitalism theme. This message theme occurred in content #9 and #20. In content #9, Amarat Chokepamitkul was speaking in the parliament criticizing the Prime Minister and the government about the Chana incident where the PM promised to stop the Chana Industrial Estate project in Songkhla province, but the project was still running. Later the upset Chana citizens took to the street which the clash between the police and the protesters occurred. The post suggested that the Prime Minister and the government were using this project to favor the capitalists.

In content #20 the video was criticizing the government for its incompetency regarding the handling of the COVID-19 situations as well as criticizing the government tied capitalists for capitalized the distribution of vaccines situation as a mean to make profits, leaving venerable citizens to die.

4.1.1.10 Advocates Constitutional Reform (Theme J)

This message theme was found twice in content #1 and #14 of the studied MFP political communication. Both contents were the same video of a MP from the Move Forward Party calling out for a constitutional reform in order to reinstall the fuller democracy for Thailand which posted on different social media channels.

4.1.1.11 Anti-Article 112 Law (Theme K)

The Anti-Article 112 Law occurred once in content #10, where a Move Forward Party's MP, Rangsiman Rome were speaking in the parliament about the misused of the Article 112 to attack the opposed activists and unfairly jailed these individuals as well as criticizing the court for manipulating the justice system to favor

the authority.

4.1.1.12 Criticizing the Army (Theme L)

This message theme occurred in one of the MFP political communication content, content #19, where Picharn Chaowapatanawong criticized the government for the use of Pegasus spyware against its own citizens mainly targeting the political oppositions from the MFP party as well as the activists who opposed the regime. This operation was conducted by the army hence Picharn criticized the army for it.

4.1.1.13 Re-election Campaigning (Theme M)

This message theme was found once in content #8 of the studied MFP political communication. This content was posted during the re-election of Laksi district where Karoonpon Tieansuwan was announced to be the candidate of the re-election for the Move Forward Party. The content also persuaded Thai voters who were eligible to participate in the re-election as this was the opportunity to change the future of the country.

4.1.2 Political Compass Positions Represented in the MFP Message Themes

As for each of the 20 selected documents from the Move Forward Party's political communication via social media between March 1st, 2021 and August 31st, 2022, the analysis results reveal that the 13 message themes represented four out of five political positions—1) Authoritarian left, 2) Authoritarian right, 3) Libertarian left, 4) Libertarian right, and 5) Neutral—as shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.

Table 4.3: Political Compass Positions of the Occurred Themes in the MFP's Political Communication

Occurred Message Themes in the MFP's Political Communication	Political Position Based on the Political Compass Diagram				
	Authoritarian		Libertarian		Neutral
	Left	Right	Left	Right	
Theme A: Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency			/	/	
Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government					/
Theme C: Anti-Injustice			/	/	
Theme D: Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality			/	/	
Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian			/	/	
Theme F: Anti-Coup d'état			/	/	
Theme G: Tax Reformation			/		
Theme H: Report Incident					/
Theme I: Anti-Capitalism	/		/		
Theme J: Advocates Constitutional Reform			/		
Theme K: Anti-Article 112 Law			/		
Theme L: Criticizing the Army					/
Theme M: Re-election Campaigning					/

According to Table 4.4, the majority of the political positions occurred in the MFP political communication was the *Libertarian-Left* which accounted for 47.5% of the selected documents, followed by the *Libertarian-Right* at 26.1%, this is possibly due to the similarity believes of the *Libertarian-Left* and the *Libertarian-Right* where the differences are the economic views on free-market capitalism and when the contents did not specifically talk about economic views, it is hard to distinguish the two positions. It is also found that some of the studied contents did not represent any of the political positions, which the researcher identified as “Neutral”, accounted for 21.1%. The contents categorized as Neutral were the contents that did not specifically take any position on the political compass diagram such as contents that reported news and incidents or contents that were campaigning for re-election candidate.

Table 4.4: Percentage of the Political Compass Position Represented in the MFP Political Communication

The Political Compass position		Frequency	Percentage
Authoritarian	Left	1	5.26
	Right	0	0.00
Libertarian	Left	9	47.37
	Right	5	26.32
Neutral		4	21.05
Total		19	100.00

The top five occurred message themes in this discovery as shown in Table 4.5 were used to develop the questionnaire for the survey part of this study.

Table 4.5: The Top Five Occurred Message Themes

Message Theme	Description
1. Theme A	Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency
2. Theme B	Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government
3. Theme C	Anti-Injustice
4. Theme D	Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality
5. Theme E	Anti-Authoritarian

4.2 Findings of the Survey Research

This section describes results of data analysis regarding descriptive statistics on characteristics of the respondents, and the examined variables, together with inferential statistics performed to test the proposed research hypotheses.

4.2.1 Results of Descriptive Statistics on Respondents' Personal Information

Based on the samples who are 240 Thai voters aged between 18 years old to 77 years old, both male, female, and LGBTQ+, and have been exposed to the online political communication of the Move Forward Party from the MFP's official accounts via social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter within the past 3 months, analysis results describe respondents' characteristics (age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, and geographic regions) in terms of frequency and percentage as shown in Table 4.6-Table 4.11.

As this study employed the quota sampling method, the samples were selected by age quota, equally divided into four generation groups of 60 samples in each one which equals to 25.00% from each generation group. The total number of the samples were 240 (n = 240).

Table 4.6: Frequency and Percentage of Respondents' Age

Age	Frequency	Percent
18-26 Years Old (Gen Z)	60	25.00
27-42 Years Old (Gen Y)	60	25.00
43-58 Years Old (Gen X)	60	25.00
59-77 Years Old (Baby Boomers)	60	25.00
Total	240	100.00

Table 4.7 showed that the majority of the respondents are female, with 125 respondents, accounted for 52.08%, followed by male, with 97 respondents, accounted for 40.42%. Meanwhile, 18 respondents are LGBTQ+, accounted for 7.50% of the total.

Table 4.7: Frequency and Percentage of Respondents' Gender

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Female	125	52.08
Male	97	40.42
LGBTQ+	18	7.50
Total	240	100.00

As shown in Table 4.8, majority of the respondents are single or never married, accounted for 44.58%, followed by respondents who are married, accounted for 42.92%. Respondents who are widowed came third at 9.58% and respondents who are divorced accounted for 2.92% of the total respondents.

Table 4.8: Frequency and Percentage of the Respondents' Marital Status

Marital Status	Frequency	Percent
Single/ Never Married	107	44.58
Married	103	42.92
Widowed	23	9.58
Divorced	7	2.92
Total	240	100.0

The education level of the respondents is showed in Table 4.9 that the highest frequency of the education level is respondents who has bachelor's degree (49.58%), followed by respondents with high school diploma (15.42%) in second, and respondents with lower than high school diploma (14.58%) in third. The rest are respondents with master's degree (6.25%), followed by respondents with doctoral degree (2.50%)

Table 4.9: Frequency and Percentage of Respondents' Education Level

Education Level	Frequency	Percent
Bachelor's degree	119	49.58
High school diploma	37	15.42
Lower than high school diploma	35	14.58
Vocational certificate	28	11.67
Master's degree	15	6.25
Doctoral degree	6	2.50
Total	240	100.00

The occupations of the respondents, as showed in Table 4.10, demonstrated that most respondents are company employee (21.25%), followed by freelancers (16.25%), business owners (14.58%), self-employed (12.92%), and students (12.50%). The rest of the respondents' occupations are retired (10.42%), followed by government and public enterprise officers (6.25%), unemployed (3.75%), and other occupations (2.08%)

Table 4.10: Frequency and Percentage of Respondents' Occupation

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
Company employee	51	21.25
Freelancer	39	16.25
Business owner	35	14.58
Self-employed	31	12.92
Student	30	12.50
Retired	25	10.42
Government/ Public enterprise officer	15	6.25
Unemployed	9	3.75
Others (Please Specify)	5	2.08
Total	240	100.00

As this study employed quota sampling method which equally divided the samples into four generation groups from six geographical regions, Table 4.11 showed that the respondents equally came from each region which included Central region (16.7%), North region (16.7%), Northeast region (16.7%), East region (16.7%), West region (16.7%) and South region (16.7%).

Table 4.11: Frequency and Percentage of Respondents' Geographical Region

Geographic Region	Frequency	Percent
Central	40	16.67
North	40	16.67
Northeast	40	16.67
East	40	16.67
West	40	16.67
South	40	16.67
Total	240	100.00

4.2.2 Results of Descriptive Statistics on Respondents' Social Media

Exposure

Table 4.12 showed the frequency and percentage of the respondents' most used social media ranked from the first most used to the third most used platform. These platforms included Facebook, Line, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, and TikTok. The respondents' most used social media ranked # 1 is Facebook (48.33%), followed by Line (19.2%), Twitter (10.42%), TikTok (9.17%), YouTube (8.75%), and Instagram (2.92%). The rest of the respondents used social media other than the given choices (1.25%)

As for the respondents' most used social media ranked # 2, the most used social media is still Facebook (24.58%), equally followed by Line (20.83%), and YouTube (20.83%). The rest of ranked #2 most used social media are TikTok (15.00%), Instagram (12.08%), Twitter (6.25%), and other social media (0.42%).

The respondents' most used social media ranked # 3 is Line (22.50%), followed by YouTube (21.67%), Facebook (17.92%), and closely followed by TikTok (17.50%). The rest of the social media are Instagram (13.33%), Twitter (5.00%) and other social media other than the given choices (2.08%)

Table 4.12: Frequency and Percentage of the Top Three Most Used Social Media

Rank # 1		Rank # 2		Rank # 3	
Platform	Frequency (Percent)	Platform	Frequency (Percent)	Platform	Frequency (Percent)
Facebook	116 (48.33)	Facebook	59 (24.58)	Line	54 (22.50)
Line	46 (19.17)	Line	50 (20.83)	YouTube	52 (21.67)
Twitter	25 (10.42)	YouTube	50 (20.83)	Facebook	43 (17.92)
TikTok	22 (9.17)	TikTok	36 (15.00)	TikTok	42 (17.50)
YouTube	21 (8.75)	Instagram	29 (12.08)	Instagram	32 (13.33)
Instagram	7 (2.92)	Twitter	15 (6.25)	Twitter	12 (5.00)

(Continued)

Table 4.12 (Continued): Frequency and Percentage of the Top Three Most Used

Social Media

Rank # 1	Rank # 2	Rank # 3	Rank # 1	Rank # 2	Rank # 3
Platform	Frequency (Percent)	Platform	Platform	Frequency (Percent)	Platform
Others	3 (1.25)	Others	1 (0.42)	Others	5 (2.08)
Total	240 (100.00)	Total	240 (100.00)	Total	240 (100.00)

Table 4.13 demonstrated the amount of time that the respondents spent on the three most used social media. As for the social media rank # 1, 33.33% of the respondents spent longer than three hours per day, followed by respondents who spent more than two to three hours per day at 28.75%. 26.67% spent moderate amount of time which equals to more than one to two hours per day while the rest spent quite short and short time which equal to 8.33% and 2.92% respectively.

As for time spent on social media ranked # 2, 35.83% of the respondents spent longer than 3 hours per day, followed by respondents who spent more than two to three hours per day at 25.42%. 18.75% spent moderate amount of time while the rest spent quite short and short time which equal to 12.08% and 7.92% respectively.

As for time spent on social media ranked # 3, 32.50% of the respondents spent longer than 3 hours per day, followed by respondents who spent quite long amount of time per day at 23.33%. 18.33% spent moderate amount of time per day, while the rest spent quite short and short which equal to 17.92% and 7.92%

respectively.

Table 4.13: Frequency and Percentage of the Amount of Time Spent on the Top Three Most Used Social Media

Amount of Time Spent	Media Rank #1	Media Rank #2	Media Rank #3
	Frequency (Percentage)	Frequency (Percentage)	Frequency (Percentage)
(Long (>3 hrs/ day))	80 (33.33)	86 (35.83)	78 (32.50)
Quite Long (>2–3 hrs/ day)	69 (28.75)	61 (25.42)	56 (23.33)
Moderate (>1–2 hrs/ day)	64 (26.67)	45 (18.75)	44 (18.33)
Quite short (30–60 mins/ day)	20 (8.33)	29 (12.08)	43 (17.92)
Short (Less than 30 mins/ day)	7 (2.92)	19 (7.92)	19 (7.92)
Total	240 (100.00)	240 (100.00)	240 (100.00)

Table 4.14 presented the reliability of the measurement in terms of internal consistency between the scale items. The Cronbach's Alpha value is found to be greater than .70 without removal of any items within the scale. This means that the measurement of this variable of the survey is reliable.

Table 4.14: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Cronbach's Alpha of Time Spent on Social Media

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	No. of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Time spent on social media	240	9.6083	2.92957	3	.832

4.2.3 Results of Descriptive Statistics on the Examined Variables

4.2.3.1 Respondents' Perceived Political Ideology

The perceived political ideology of the respondents is divided into four quadrants based on the Political Compass diagram. The results of frequency and percentage of each quadrant are shown in Table 4.15 and 4.16.

Mean scores of the following tables are interpreted based on the mean score interpretation by Konsongsaen (2021) as follows.

Very low level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 1.00-1.80$)

Low level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 1.81-2.60$)

Moderate level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 2.61-3.40$)

High level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 3.41-4.20$)

Very high level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 4.21-5.00$)

Table 4.15: Mean and Standard Deviation of Questionnaire Items Measuring
Perceived Political Ideology Based on the Four Quadrants

Items Measuring Perceived Political Ideology	N	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Authoritarian-Left				
(Q13) I believe in redistribution of wealth	240	3.9208	.84709	High level
(Q14) I believe in redistribution of social status	240	3.9250	.77257	High level
(Q15) I believe in justification of creating a fair world	240	4.1542	.74118	High level
Total	240	4.0000	.66317	High level
Authoritarian-Right				
(Q16) I advocate social hierarchy	240	2.7208	1.25477	Moderate level
(Q17) I naturally am submissive to my authority figure	240	2.4583	1.13444	Low level
(Q18) I often act aggressive in the name of the authority	240	2.6292	1.28395	Moderate level
Total	240	2.6028	1.00236	Low level

(Continued)

Table 4.15 (Continued): Mean and Standard Deviation of Questionnaire Items

Measuring Perceived Political Ideology Based on the Four
Quadrants

Items Measuring Perceived Political Ideology	N	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Libertarian-Left				
(Q19) I believe in the freedom of individuals	240	4.3043	.77836	Very high level
(Q20) I believe in social equality	240	4.3625	.78015	Very high level
Total	240	4.3333	.72271	Very high level
Libertarian-Right				
(Q21) I support free-market capitalism where everyone has unlimited freedom to run businesses	240	3.8833	.96103	High level
(Q22) I do not support the idea of modern welfare state where all citizens welfare is equally distributed by the government	240	2.8875	1.36293	Moderate level
Total	240	3.3854	.84857	Moderate level

Table 4.16 reveals that the respondents have very high level of agreement with the values and believes of the *Libertarian-Left* political ideology ($\bar{x} = 4.33$, $SD = 0.72$), moderate level of agreement with the values and believes of the *Libertarian-Right* political ideology ($\bar{x} = 3.39$, $SD = 0.84$), high level of agreement with the values and believes of the *Authoritarian-Left* political ideology ($\bar{x} = 4.00$, $SD = 0.66$), and low level of agreement with the values and believes of the *Authoritarian-Right* political ideology ($\bar{x} = 2.60$, $SD = 1.00$).

The Cronbach's Alpha value of the Authoritarian-Left, the Authoritarian-Right, and the Libertarian-Left are found to be greater than .70 without removal of any items within the scale. This means that the measurement of these three variables of the survey is reliable. However, the Cronbach's Alpha value of the Libertarian-Right is found to be lower than 0.70 which means that the measurement for Libertarian-Right variable is not reliable.

Table 4.16: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Cronbach's Alpha of Perceived Political Ideology

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	No. of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Perceived Political Ideology					
Authoritarian-Left	240	4.0000	.66317	3	.794
Authoritarian-Right	240	2.6028	1.00236	3	.752
Libertarian-Left	240	4.3333	.72271	2	.837
Libertarian-Right	240	3.3854	.84857	2	.069

4.2.3.2 Respondents' Exposure to the MFP's Message Themes

The mean scores of respondents' exposure to each of the top 5 message themes of the Move Forward Party are showed in Table 4.17.

Table 4.17 demonstrates that the respondents mostly have high level of exposure to the message themes of the Move Forward Party's political communication which the mean scores can be interpreted such that the respondents are often exposed to all message themes of the MFP, Theme A: Anti-Corruption and Promote Transparency ($\bar{x} = 2.64$, $S.D. = 1.081$), Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government ($\bar{x} = 2.71$, $S.D. = 1.078$), Theme C: Anti-Injustice ($\bar{x} = 2.70$, $S.D. = 1.147$), Theme D: Advocate Human Rights and Social Equality ($\bar{x} = 2.81$, $S.D. = 1.100$), and Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian Regime ($\bar{x} = 2.58$, $S.D. = 1.228$).

Table 4.17: Mean and Standard Deviation of Exposure to MFP's Message Theme

Message Themes	N	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Theme A: Anti-Corruption and Promote Transparency	240	2.6375	1.08134	Medium Level of Exposure
Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government	240	2.7083	1.07770	Medium Level of Exposure

(Continued)

Table 4.17 (Continued): Mean and Standard Deviation of Exposure to MFP's

Message Theme

Message Themes	N	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Theme C: Anti-Injustice	240	2.7000	1.14694	Medium Level of Exposure
Theme D: Advocate Human Rights and Social Equality	240	2.8083	1.09999	Medium Level of Exposure
Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian Regime	240	2.5833	1.22787	Medium Level of Exposure

Table 4.18 presented reliability of the measurement in terms of internal consistency between the scale items. The Cronbach's Alpha value is found to be greater than .70 without removal of any items within the scale. This means that the measurement of exposure to message themes in this survey is reliable. Table 4.19 shows breaking down of respondents into each of the four generations.

Table 4.18: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Cronbach's Alpha of Exposure to Message Themes

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	No. of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Exposure to Message Themes	240	2.6875	.93818	5	.888

Table 4.19 demonstrated the analysis of each generation, Gen Z respondents are always exposed to Theme D ($\bar{x} = 3.25$, $S.D. = .932$), and Theme C ($\bar{x} = 3.22$, $S.D. = .958$), often exposed to Theme B ($\bar{x} = 3.08$, $S.D. = 1.013$), Theme E ($\bar{x} = 3.07$, $S.D. = 1.056$), and Theme A ($\bar{x} = 2.88$, $S.D. = 1.027$) respectively.

Gen Y respondents always exposed to Theme D ($\bar{x} = 3.25$, $S.D. = .968$), often exposed to Theme A ($\bar{x} = 3.05$, $S.D. = 1.096$), Theme C ($\bar{x} = 3.05$, $S.D. = 1.119$), Theme E ($\bar{x} = 2.85$, $S.D. = 1.176$), and Theme B ($\bar{x} = 2.75$, $S.D. = 1.216$) respectively.

Gen X respondents are often exposed to Theme D ($\bar{x} = 2.63$, $S.D. = 1.008$), Theme A ($\bar{x} = 2.55$, $S.D. = .811$), Theme C ($\bar{x} = 2.53$, $S.D. = .929$), Theme B ($\bar{x} = 2.48$, $S.D. = 1.066$), and sometimes exposed to Theme E ($\bar{x} = 2.38$, $S.D. = 1.121$).

Baby Boomer respondents are often exposed to Theme B ($\bar{x} = 2.52$, $S.D. = .911$), sometimes exposed to Theme D ($\bar{x} = 2.10$, $S.D. = 1.069$), Theme A ($\bar{x} = 2.07$, $S.D. = 1.118$), Theme E ($\bar{x} = 2.03$, $S.D. = 1.301$), and Theme C ($\bar{x} = 2.00$, $S.D. = 1.089$) respectively.

This analysis demonstrated that each distinct generation is exposed to each message theme differently. Gen Z respondents have the highest level of exposure

to the MFP's top five message themes, followed by Gen Y, Gen X, and Baby Boomer respondents respectively.

Table 4.19: Mean and Standard Deviation of Exposure to MFP's Message Theme in Each Generation

	Gen Z			Gen Y			Gen X			Baby Boomers		
	n	\bar{x}	S.D.	n	\bar{x}	S.D.	n	\bar{x}	S.D.	n	\bar{x}	S.D.
Theme A: Anti-Corruption and Promote Transparency												
	60	2.88	1.027	60	3.05	1.096	60	2.55	.811	60	2.07	1.118
Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government												
	60	3.08	1.013	60	2.75	1.216	60	2.48	1.066	60	2.52	.911
Theme C: Anti-Injustice												
	60	3.22	.958	60	3.05	1.199	60	2.53	.929	60	2.00	1.089
Theme D: Advocate Human Rights and Social Equality												
	60	3.25	.932	60	3.25	.968	60	2.63	1.008	60	2.10	1.069
Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian Regime												
	60	3.07	1.056	60	2.85	1.176	60	2.38	1.121	60	2.03	1.301

4.2.3.3 Respondents' Attitude Homophily

Table 4.20 and Table 4.21 showed the frequency and percentage of the questionnaire items measuring attitude homophily. Among the eight items, Q28 ($\bar{x} = 3.64$, $SD = 1.13$) and Q30 ($\bar{x} = 3.64$, $SD = 1.17$) got the highest mean, followed by Q34 ($\bar{x} = 3.62$, $SD = 1.23$) and Q35 ($\bar{x} = 3.62$, $SD = 1.25$), respectively.

Table 4.20: Mean and Standard Deviation of Scales Measuring Attitude Homophily

Items Measuring Attitude Homophily	N	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Q28 The MFP thinks like me	240	3.64	1.13052	High level
Q29 The MFP is like me	240	3.54	1.11585	High level
Q30 The MFP is similar to me	240	3.64	1.17053	High level
Q31 The MFP shares my values	240	3.58	1.19710	High level
Q32 The MFP has a lot in common with me	240	3.56	1.14472	High level
Q33 The MFP behaves like me	240	3.42	1.14682	High level
Q34 The MFP expresses attitudes similar to mine	240	3.62	1.23494	High level
Q35 The MFP has thoughts and ideas that are similar to mine	240	3.62	1.24882	High level
Overall mean of attitude homophily	240	3.5760	1.08628	High level

Table 4.21 broke the analysis down into each generation, the analysis demonstrates that Gen Z respondents have the highest level of agreement in terms of attitude homophily towards the MFP ($\bar{x} = 4.19$, $S.D. = .560$), followed by Gen Y respondents ($\bar{x} = 4.15$, $S.D. = .664$), Gen X respondents ($\bar{x} = 3.43$, $S.D. = .920$), and Baby Boomer respondents ($\bar{x} = 2.54$, $S.D. = 1.146$) respectively.

Table 4.21: Mean and Standard Deviation of Attitude Homophily in Each Generation

Attitude	Gen Z			Gen Y			Gen X			Baby Boomers		
	n	\bar{x}	S.D.	n	\bar{x}	S.D.	n	\bar{x}	S.D.	n	\bar{x}	S.D.
Homo-phily	60	4.19	.560	60	4.15	.664	60	3.43	.920	60	2.54	1.146

Table 4.22 presented the reliability of the measurement in terms of internal consistency between the scale items. The Cronbach's Alpha value is found to be greater than .70 without removal of any items within the scale. This means that the measurement of attitude homophily in this survey is reliable.

Table 4.22: Reliability Analysis of Attitude Homophily

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	No. of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Attitude Homophily	240	3.5760	1.08628	8	.976

4.2.3.4 Respondents' Past Election

Table 4.23 showed the frequency and percentage of the past general election decision of the respondents. Sixty-six respondents voted for the Future Forward Party in the 2019 general election which accounted for 27.50% of the total respondents followed by 44 respondents who voted for Pheu Thai Party which accounted for 18.33%. The number of respondents who voted for the Democrat Party were 30 (12.50%), followed by respondents who voted for Palang Pracharath Party which accounted for 28 respondents (11.67%). Seventeen respondents (7.08%) stated

that in the past general election, they voted for other political party not listed in the questionnaire, 16 respondents (6.67%) said that they did not vote for any of the political party, while 13 respondents (5.42%) stated that they did not vote in the 2019 general election due to age disqualification. The rest of the respondents voted for the following parties, 10 respondents (4.17%) voted for the Thai Liberal Party, 7 respondents (2.92%) voted for the Bhumjaithai Party, 5 respondents (2.08%) voted for the New Economics Party, 2 respondents (0.83%) voted for the Charthai Pattana Party, 2 respondents (0.83%) voted for Puea Chat Party, and none of the respondents voted for Prachachart Party (0.00%).

Table 4.23: Frequency of the Past Election Decision (2019)

Political Party	Gen Z	Gen Y	Gen X	Baby Boomers	Total Frequency	Percent
Future Forward Party	26	28	7	5	66	27.50
Pheu Thai Party	3	9	19	13	44	18.33
Democrat Party	0	7	8	15	30	12.50
Palang Pracharath Party	1	3	5	19	28	11.67
Voted for other party	4	5	7	1	17	7.08
Did not vote	10	1	4	1	16	6.67
Did not vote (disqualified)	13	0	0	0	13	5.42
Thai Liberal Party	1	3	4	2	10	4.17
Bhumjaithai Party	1	1	1	4	7	2.92
New Economics Party	0	1	4	0	5	2.08

(Continued)

Table 4.23 (Continued): Frequency of the Past Election Decision (2019)

Political Party	Gen	Gen	Gen	Baby	Total	Percent
	Z	Y	X	Boomers	Frequency	
Chartthaipattana Party	0	2	0	0	2	0.83
Puea Chat Party	1	0	1	0	2	0.83
Prachachart Party	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Total	60	60	60	60	240	100.00

4.2.3.5 Respondents' Current Election

Table 4.24 presents mean and standard deviation of respondents' current election (May 2023). Mean ($\bar{x} = 3.57$, $SD = 1.47$) of the two items (Q37 and Q40) measuring respondents' voting decision for the current election (May 2023) reveals that respondents have quite high level of voting decision.

This table also presented the reliability of the measurement in terms of internal consistency between the scale items. The Cronbach's Alpha value is found to be greater than .70 with the removal of two items within the scale. The removed items (Q38, and Q39) were the statements asking if the participants only voted for one of the two ballots for the MFP while Q37, and the reversed score of Q40 were the statement asking the participants if they voted for the MFP in both ballots. This means that the measurement of this variable of the survey asking whether the participants voted for the MFP or not is reliable.

Table 4.24: Mean and Standard Deviation, and Reliability of the Current General Election Decision

Questionnaire Items	n	Mean	S.D.	No. of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Original Scales: (Q37, Q38, Q39, and Q40)	240	2.78	.92377	4	.586
Adjusted Scales: (Q37 and Q40)	240	3.57	1.46789	2	.857

4.3 Hypothesis Testing Results

This section reports hypothesis testing results of the following hypotheses.

4.3.1 Research Hypothesis#1

HP#1: Thai voter's attitude homophily is positively correlated with their exposure to political communication and message themes of the Move Forward Party.

Pearson's Correlation Coefficient was used to test this hypothesis.

The correlation interpretation measurement for this research is based on Sugiyono (2013) where 0.000–0.199 means a very weak relationship, 0.200–0.399 means a weak relationship, 0.400–0.599 indicates a moderate relationship, 0.600–0.799 means a strong relationship, and 0.800–1.000 indicates a very strong relationship.

The result of the analysis, as shown in Table 4.25, indicates that the attitude homophily and the exposure to MFP's message themes have a positive correlation across all generation groups. The strongest relationship is found in Gen Y respondents ($r = .744^{**}$), followed by Gen X respondents ($r = .700^{**}$), Baby Boomer respondents ($r = .668^{**}$), and Gen Z respondents ($r = .647^{**}$). Therefore, the results supported this hypothesis.

Table 4.25: Correlation Coefficients between Attitude Homophily and Exposure to the MFP's Political Communication

	Attitude Homophily	MFP's Political Communication				
		Theme A	Theme B	Theme C	Theme D	Theme E
Theme A	.583** <.001					
Theme B	.456** <.001	.638** <.001				
Theme C	.680** <.001	.658** <.001	.586** <.001			
Theme D	.693** <.001	.599** <.001	.535** <.001	.753** <.001		
Theme E	.583** <.001	.510** <.001	.635** <.001	.624** <.001	.625** <.001	

$p^* < .05$, $p^{**} < .01$, $p^{***} < .001$

The Pearson Correlation Coefficient analysis results showed that the Attitude Homophily and all Message Themes are positively correlated as all the Sig. (2-tailed) valued at <.001 which are below .05, therefore, this analysis concluded that the attitude homophily is positively correlated with exposure to political communication and message themes of the Move Forward Party as hypothesized.

When running the Regression Analysis to double check this hypothesis, it was found that approximately 20 to 33 percent of variances of attitude homophily

can be explained by exposure to almost all themes of the MPF's political communication (See details in Table 4.26).

Table 4.26: Results of Regression Analysis of Attitude Homophily Predicted by Exposure to the MPF's Political Communication

Predictors	B	S.E.	beta	<i>t</i>
Theme A	.198	.063	.197**	3.126
Theme B	-.117	.064	-.116**	-1.842
Theme C	.238	.069	.251***	3.439
Theme D	.321	.068	.325***	4.704
Theme E	.174	.055	.197**	3.146

$R^2 = .564$, $df = 5$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$

4.3.2 Research Hypothesis# 2

HP#2: Exposure to the MFP's message themes had a differently significant impact on the perceived political Ideology of Thai voters in four distinct generations.

Testing of this hypothesis regarding the impact of exposure to MFP's message themes on perceived political ideology across generations yielded varied results (see details in Table 4.27). Based on the Linear Regression analysis results, as for Gen Z respondents, exposure to MFP's message themes accounts for 32.9% of the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .329$, $p < .001$), 8.1% of the Authoritarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .081$, $p < .05$), 33.5% of the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .335$, $p < .001$), and -1.4% of the Libertarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = -.014$, $p > .05$).

As for Gen Y respondents, exposure to MFP message themes accounts for 15.9% of the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .159, p < .001$), 16.1% of the Authoritarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .161, p < .001$), 18.6% of the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .186, p < .001$), and 0.4% of the Libertarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .004, p > .05$).

As for Gen X respondents, exposure to MFP's message themes accounts for 1.5% of the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .015, p > .05$), 5.2% of the Authoritarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .052, p < .05$), 7.5% of the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .075, p < .05$), and -1.7% of the Libertarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = -.017, p > .05$).

As for Baby Boomer respondents, exposure to MFP's message themes accounts for 18.5% of the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .185, p < .001$), 5.9% of the Authoritarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .059, p < .05$), 9.6% of the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .096, p < .05$), and -1.1% of the Libertarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = -.011, p > .05$).

The analysis demonstrated that exposure to MFP's message themes played a significant role in Gen Z respondents, particularly with the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .329, p < .001$) and the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .335, p < .001$). As for Gen Y respondents, exposure influenced the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .159, p < .001$) and the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .168, p < .001$). Gen X respondents showed a small impact, while Baby Boomer respondents exhibited a slightly higher significant impact, especially with the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .185, p < .001$). Accordingly, hypothesis #2, exposure to the MFP's message themes had a different impact on the perceived political Ideology of Thai voters

in four distinct generations, is accepted based on these findings.

Table 4.27: Regression Analysis Results of Perceived Political Ideology among Four Generations of Thai Voters as Predicted by Exposure to MFP's Message Themes

Generation	Political Ideology	B	S.E.	beta	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²
GEN Z	Authoritarian-Left	.470	.086	.583***	5.469	.329
	Authoritarian-Right	-.419	.169	-.310*	-2.487	.081
	Libertarian-Left	.369	.067	.589***	5.545	.335
	Libertarian-Right	-.054	.136	-.053	-.401	-.014
GEN Y	Authoritarian-Left	.260	.075	.416***	3.481	.159
	Authoritarian-Right	-.413	.118	-.418***	-3.505	.161
	Libertarian-Left	.364	.095	.448***	3.811	.186
	Libertarian-Right	-.140	.125	-.146	-1.121	.004
GEN X	Authoritarian-Left	.148	.108	.177	1.367	.015
	Authoritarian-Right	-.292	.142	-.261*	-2.056	.052
	Libertarian-Left	.303	.126	.301*	2.404	.075
	Libertarian-Right	-.019	.135	-.018	-.138	-.017
Baby Boomers	Authoritarian-Left	.353	.093	.446***	3.796	.185
	Authoritarian-Right	-.314	.145	-.274*	-2.169	.059
	Libertarian-Left	.252	.094	.333**	2.690	.096
	Libertarian-Right	-.072	.123	-.076	-.582	-.011

4.3.3 Research Hypothesis#3

HP#3: Perceived political ideology has a differently significant impact on election decision of Thai voters in four distinct generations.

This hypothesis investigated the influence of perceived political ideology on the voting choices of Thai citizens across different generations, produced diverse outcomes. According to the findings from the Linear Regression analysis, in the case of Generation Z, the Authoritarian-Left ideology explains 51.8% of the present election decisions ($R^2 = .518, p < .001$), the Authoritarian-Right ideology makes up 2.5% ($R^2 = .025, p > .05$), the Libertarian Left ideology constitutes 47.7% ($R^2 = .477, p < .001$), and the Libertarian-Right ideology has a contribution of -1.5% ($R^2 = -.051, p > .05$).

For Generation Y, the Authoritarian-Left ideology contributes to 13.5% of the current election decisions ($R^2 = .135, p < .01$), the Authoritarian-Right ideology comprises 0.9% ($R^2 = .009, p > .05$), the Libertarian-Left ideology makes up 18% ($R^2 = .180, p < .001$), and the Libertarian-Right ideology has a contribution of -1.7% ($R^2 = -.017, p > .05$).

In the case of Generation X, the Authoritarian-Left ideology has a negative impact of -1% on the current election decisions ($R^2 = -.010, p > .05$), the Authoritarian-Right ideology constitutes 3.6% ($R^2 = .036, p > .05$), the Libertarian-Left ideology makes up 2.5% ($R^2 = .025, p > .05$), and the Libertarian-Right ideology contributes 1% ($R^2 = .010, p > .05$).

Lastly, for the Baby Boomers generation, the Authoritarian-Left ideology explains 19.7% of the current election decisions ($R^2 = .197, p < .001$), the Authoritarian-Right ideology constitutes 15% ($R^2 = .150, p < .001$),

the Libertarian-Left ideology makes up 10.9% ($R^2 = .109, p < .01$), and the Libertarian-Right ideology contributes 2.2% ($R^2 = .022, p > .05$).

For Gen Z, both the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .518, p < .001$) and the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .477, p < .001$) significantly influenced their decisions, while the Authoritarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .025, p > .05$) and the Libertarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = -.051, p > .05$) had small to no significant impact. Gen Y was similarly affected by the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .135, p < .01$) and the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .180, p < .001$), with small to no significant impact from the Authoritarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .009, p > .05$) and the Libertarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = -.017, p > .05$). Gen X showed no significant impact from perceived political ideology on their election decisions, the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = -.010, p > .05$), the Authoritarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .036, p > .05$), the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .025, p > .05$), and the Libertarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .010, p > .05$). Conversely, Baby Boomers were significantly influenced by the Authoritarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .197, p < .001$), the Authoritarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .150, p < .001$), and the Libertarian-Left ideology ($R^2 = .109, p < .01$), while the Libertarian-Right ideology ($R^2 = .022, p > .05$) had no significant impact. Accordingly, Hypothesis #3 is accepted, underscoring distinctive influences on election decisions among Thai voters in the four generations based on perceived political ideology.

Table 4.28: Regression Analysis Results of Election Decision among Four Generations of Thai Voters as Predicted by Perceived Political Ideology

Variable	Political Ideology	B	S.E.	Beta	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²
Gen Z	Authoritarian-Left	.853	.106	.725***	8.024	.518
	Authoritarian-Right	-.143	.090	-.204	-.1587	.025
	Libertarian-Left	1.052	.142	.697***	7.408	.477
	Libertarian-Right	-.047	.120	-.052	-.394	-.015
Gen Y	Authoritarian-Left	.712	.223	.387**	3.195	.135
	Authoritarian-Right	-.186	.151	-.159	-1.228	.009
	Libertarian-Left	.603	.169	.425***	3.573	.180
	Libertarian-Right	.018	.157	.015	.115	-.017
Gen X	Authoritarian-Left	.194	.304	.083	.639	-.010
	Authoritarian-Right	-.398	.222	-.230	-1.797	.036
	Libertarian-Left	.392	.248	.203	1.580	.025
	Libertarian-Right	.312	.245	.165	1.271	.010
Baby Boomers	Authoritarian-Left	1.1120	.282	.459***	3.931	.197
	Authoritarian-Right	-.677	.200	-.405**	-3.378	.150
	Libertarian-Left	.892	.310	.353**	2.872	.109
	Libertarian-Right	-.399	.262	-.197	-1.572	.022

The analysis revealed that Gen Z ($\bar{x} = 4.43$, S.D. = 0.81) have the highest level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current election, followed by Gen Y ($\bar{x} = 4.21$, S.D. = 1.03), Gen X ($\bar{x} = 3.23$, S.D. = 1.39), and Baby Boomers ($\bar{x} = 2.42$, S.D. = 1.56) as interpreted using the mean score interpretation by Konsongsaen (2021).

Table 4.29 illustrated interesting discoveries regarding the past (2019) and current (2023) election decision of Thai voters in four distinct generations reveal that among previous Palang Pracharath Party voters, baby boomer respondents ($\bar{x} = 1.63$, $S.D. = 1.15$) have low level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current election (May 2023), Gen X respondents ($\bar{x} = 2.70$, $S.D. = 1.79$) have medium level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current election (May 2023). On the contrary, Gen Z respondents ($\bar{x} = 4.00$, $S.D. = .0$) and Gen Y respondents ($\bar{x} = 4.17$, $S.D. = 1.04$) have high level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current general election (May 2023). This could be interpreted that the previous Palang Pracharath voters in Gen Z and Gen Y are more likely to change their minds and voted for the MFP than Thai voters in Gen X and Baby Boomers. However, on average, participants who previously voted for the Palang Pacharath Party ($\bar{x} = 2.18$, $S.D. = 1.50$) have a low level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current general election (2023).

Table 4.29: Mean and Standard Deviation of Previous Palang Pracharath Party Voters

Agreed to Vote for the MFP in the Current Election (May 2023)

Generation of Respondents	N	Percent	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Gen Z	1	3.57	4.00	.00	High level
Gen Y	3	10.71	4.17	1.04083	High level
Gen X	5	17.86	2.70	1.78885	Moderate level
Baby Boomers	19	67.86	1.63	1.15280	Very low level
Total	28	100.00	2.18	1.50440	Low level

Table 4.30 demonstrated that among previous Pheu Thai Party voters, voters in Gen Z ($\bar{x} = 4.50$, $S.D. = .866$) have a very high level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current general election (2023). Voters in Gen Y ($\bar{x} = 3.89$, $S.D. = 1.024$) have a high level of agreement to vote for the MFP. In contrary, voters in Baby Boomers ($\bar{x} = 3.31$, $S.D. = 1.13$), and voters in Gen X ($\bar{x} = 2.95$, $S.D. = 1.14$) have a moderate level of agreement to vote for the MFP respectively. On average, participants who previously voted for the Pheu Thai Party ($\bar{x} = 3.35$, $S.D. = 1.164$) have a moderate level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current general election (2023). This could be interpreted as the previous Pheu Thai voters in Gen Z and Gen Y are likely to change their minds and voted for the MFP than Thai voters in Gen X and Baby Boomers.

Table 4.30: Mean and Standard Deviation of Previous Pheu Thai Party Voters Who Agreed to Vote for the MFP in the Current Election (May 2023)

Generation of Respondents	N	Percent	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Gen Z	3	6.82	4.50	.86603	Very high level
Gen Y	9	20.45	3.89	1.02402	High level
Gen X	19	43.18	2.95	1.14133	Moderate level
Baby Boomers	13	29.55	3.31	1.12802	Moderate level
Total	44	100.00	3.35	1.16429	Moderate level

Table 4.31 demonstrated that among previous Future Forward Party voters, Thai voters in Gen Z ($\bar{x} = 4.73$, $S.D. = .587$), Gen Y ($\bar{x} = 4.57$, $S.D. = .716$), and Gen X ($\bar{x} = 4.50$, $S.D. = .707$) have a very high level of agreement to vote for The MFP in the current general election (2023). In similar direction, Baby Boomers ($\bar{x} = 4.10$, $S.D. = 1.746$) who previously voted for the Future Forward Party in the past election (2019) have a high level of agreement to vote for The MFP in the current general election (2023). On average, participants who previously voted for the Future Forward Party ($\bar{x} = 4.59$, $S.D. = .779$) have a very high level of agreement to vote for the Move Forward Party in the current general election (2023). This illustrated that previous Future Forward Party voters did not change their minds in the current election and highly likely to vote for the MFP.

Table 4.31: Mean and Standard Deviation of Previous Future Forward Party Voters Who Agreed to Vote for the MFP in the Current Election (May 2023)

Generation of Respondents	N	Percentage	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Gen Z	26	39.39	4.73	.58704	Very high level
Gen Y	28	42.42	4.57	.71640	Very high level
Gen X	7	10.61	4.50	.70711	Very high level
Baby Boomers	5	7.58	4.10	1.74642	High level
Total	66	100.00	4.59	.77910	Very high level

Table 4.32 illustrated that among previous Democrat Party voters, voters in Gen Y ($\bar{x} = 4.64$, $S.D. = .748$) have a very high level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current election (2023). Voters in Gen X ($\bar{x} = 3.88$, $S.D. = 1.664$) have a high level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current election. Baby Boomers ($\bar{x} = 2.60$, $S.D. = 1.775$) have a low level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current election. On average, participants who previously voted for the Democrat Party have a moderate level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current general election ($\bar{x} = 3.42$, $S.D. = 1.752$). This demonstrated that previous voters for the Democrat Party may have changed their minds and voted for the MFP in 2023 election.

Table 4.32: Mean and Standard Deviation of Previous Democrat Party Voters Who Agreed to Vote for the MFP in the Current Election (May 2023)

	N	Percent	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Gen Z	0	0.00	N/A	N/A	N/A
Gen Y	7	23.33	4.64	.74801	Very high level
Gen X	8	26.67	3.88	1.66369	High level
Baby Boomers	15	50.00	2.60	1.77482	Low level
Total	30	100.00	3.42	1.75226	High level

Table 4.33 illustrated the participants who have never voted before in the past election (2019) due to age disqualification (New Voters) are very highly likely to vote for the MFP in their first election ($\bar{x} = 4.81$, $S.D. = .560$). All participants in this criterion are Gen Z who have never voted prior to the current election (2023).

Table 4.33: Mean and Standard Deviation of New Voters who Agreed to Vote for the MFP in the Current Election (May 2023)

	N	Percent	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
New Voters	13	100.00	4.81	.56045	Very high level
Total	13	100.00	4.81	.56045	Very high level

4.4 Conclusion


In terms of textual analysis on the message themes occurred in the MFP political communication via social media channels, the top five occurred themes discovered were the following:

- 1) Theme A: Anti-Corruption and Advocates Transparency
- 2) Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government
- 3) Theme C: Anti-Injustice
- 4) Theme D: Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality
- 5) Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian

The message themes found in the analysis represented the Libertarian-Left (47.5%), followed by the Libertarian-Right (26.1%), Neutral (21.1%), and the Authoritarian-Left (5.3%) with top five themes based on the frequency of occurrence represented the Libertarian-Left ideology in the Political Compass diagram. No message themes representing the Authoritarian-Right ideology were discovered from the selected contents in this study.

In terms of the survey, the analyses of inferential statistics were conducted and presented in this chapter which showed the significant correlation between the studied variables. It is found that the results from the analyses supported all the

research hypotheses as proposed in the conceptual framework stated in chapter 2. The next chapter, which is the final chapter, contains the summary of hypotheses, findings discussion, future research recommendation, and further application.



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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The aim of this research is to discover the causal relationship between the Move Forward Party's political communication, attitude homophily, Thai voters' perceived political ideology, and the election decision of Thai voters in the 2023 general election. In this chapter, the summary and discussion of findings, research limitations, and recommendations for further applications and future research are presented.

5.1 Summary of Findings

In the first stage of this research, the message themes of the Move Forward Party's political communication were explored. The sample documents were collected between March 1st, 2021, and August 31st, 2022 from the official Facebook and Twitter accounts of the MFP. Then the top 10 posts from each platform with the highest engagements were selected as data samples for the textual analysis. The result demonstrated that the top five themes that occurred in the MFP political communication via social media platforms were 1) anti-corruption and advocates transparency, 2) criticizing the Prime Minister and the government, 3) anti-injustice, 4) advocates human rights, freedom, and social equality, and 5) anti-authoritarian. Details of them are given as follows.

Theme A: Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency: This message theme occurred in ten of the studied contents which question the practice of Prayuth's government on matters deemed to be suspicious of possible corruption by the

government, ministers, or officers while supporting transparency.

Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government: This message theme occurred in nine of the studied contents which accused and attacked the Prime Minister and related ministers on their managerial ability and the way he and his team ineffectively dealt with national matters.

Theme C: Anti-Injustice: This message theme occurred in six of the studied contents that expressed feelings against injustice in matters such as the misuse of Article 112 law and the way the government uses law enforcement against the opposition.

Theme D: Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality: This message theme occurred in six of the studied contents. This message theme accused the government of injustice and called out demands for human rights, freedom of the citizens, and social equality.

Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian: This message theme occurred in six of the studied contents that criticized the roles and actions of the unelected senators and the way Prayuth's government was formed under the remnant of the coup d'état which was also led by Prayuth Chan-o-cha.

In sum, the results from the textual analysis of the MFP's political communication showed that the majority of the message themes that occurred in its political communication represented the Libertarian-Left ideology based on the Political Compass.

In the second stage of this research, the online survey was conducted with Thai voters in four distinct generations. The quota sampling technique was used to collect respondents equally from five regions of Thailand with equally distributed age

groups based on the generations, which a total of 240 respondents were collected, composed of females (52.1%), males (40.4%), and respondents identified themselves as LGBTQ+ (7.5%) respectively. In terms of generation groups, the respondents were composed of Gen Z (Aged 18-26 Years old), Gen Y (Aged 27-42 Years Old), Gen X (Aged 43-58 Years Old), and Baby Boomer (Aged 59-77 Years Old) at equally 25% each. The marital status of the respondents comprised Single/ Never Married (44.6%), followed by Married (42.9%), Widowed (9.6%), and Divorced (2.9%) respectively.

Pearson Correlation was conducted to test HP # 1 and the result suggests that attitude homophily is positively correlated with their exposure to political communication and message themes of the Move Forward Party across all generation groups. The strongest relationship is found in Gen Y respondents ($r = .744^{**}$), followed by Gen X respondents ($r = .700^{**}$), Baby Boomer respondents ($r = .668^{**}$), and Gen Z respondents ($r = .647^{**}$), respectively. Therefore, the results supported this hypothesis.

Table 5.1: Correlation between Attitude Homophily and Each Message Theme

	Theme A	Theme B	Theme C	Theme D	Theme E
Attitude	.583**	.456**	.680**	.693**	.583**
Homophily	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001

$p^{*}<.05$, $p^{**}<.01$, $p^{***}<.001$

Once broken down into each generation, the correlation between the exposure message themes and perceived political ideology is found to have a positive relationship with all generations, Gen Y (.744**), Gen X (.700**), Baby Boomers

(.688**), and Gen Z (.647**), respectively as shown in Table 5.3.

Linear Regression was conducted to test HP # 2, and HP # 3. For HP # 2, Exposure to MFP's message themes played a significant role in Gen Z respondents, especially with Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .329, p < .001$) and Libertarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .335, p < .001$). As for Gen Y respondents, exposure influenced Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .159, p < .001$) and Libertarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .168, p < .001$). Gen X respondents showed a small impact, while Baby Boomer respondents exhibited a slightly greater significant impact, especially with Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .185, p < .001$). Accordingly, HP # 2, exposure to the MFP's message themes had a significant impact on the perceived political ideology of Thai voters in four distinct generations, is accepted regarding these findings.

Table 5.2 shows how each message themes have differently significant impacts on the perceived ideology of Thai voters. The Libertarian-Left ideology demonstrated a more pronounced significance to all the MFP message themes than other ideologies. This could be due to the fact that the MFP message themes represent the Libertarian-Left position in the Political Compass which is situated in the same quadrant followed by the Authoritarian-Left ideology

Table 5.2: Regression Analysis Results of Exposure to the MFP Message Themes and Perceived Political Ideology

	B	S.E.	beta	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²
Theme A: Anti-corruption and Promote Transparency					
Authoritarian-Left	.343	.111	.210**	3.096	.312
Authoritarian-Right	-.257	.065	-.238***	-3.975	
Libertarian-Left	.390	.104	.261***	3.755	
Libertarian-Right	-.104	.072	-.1440	-1.440	
Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government					
Authoritarian-Left	.332	.122	.204**	2.728	.167
Authoritarian-Right	-.135	.071	-.125	-1.898	
Libertarian-Left	.251	.114	.168*	2.206	
Libertarian-Right	-.147	.079	-.116	-1.861	
Theme C: Anti-Injustice					
Authoritarian-Left	.452	.118	.261***	3.820	.304
Authoritarian-Right	-.207	.069	-.181**	-3.002	
Libertarian-Left	.396	.111	.249***	3.570	
Libertarian-Right	-.123	.077	-.091	-1.593	
Theme D: Advocate Human Rights and Social Equality					
Authoritarian-Left	.358	.117	.216**	3.056	.258
Authoritarian-Right	-.199	.068	-.182**	-2.917	
Libertarian-Left	.367	.110	.241***	3.344	
Libertarian-Right	-.108	.076	-.084	-1.420	

(Continued)

Table 5.2 (Continued): Regression Analysis Results of Exposure to the MFP Message

Themes and Perceived Political Ideology

	B	S.E.	beta	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²
Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian Regime					
Authoritarian-Left	.345	.143	.186*	2.410	.112
Authoritarian-Right	-.054	.083	-.044	-.645	
Libertarian-Left	.282	.134	.166*	2.106	
Libertarian-Right	-.096	.093	-.067	-1.036	

For HP # 3, the results showed that in Gen Z respondents, both Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .518, p < .001$) and Libertarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .477, p < .001$) significantly influenced their decisions, while Authoritarian Right ideology ($R^2 = .025, p > .05$) and Libertarian Right ideology ($R^2 = -.051, p > .05$) had small to no significant impact. Gen Y respondents were similarly influenced by the Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .135, p < .01$) and Libertarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .180, p < .001$), with small to no significant impact from the Authoritarian Right ideology ($R^2 = .009, p > .05$) and Libertarian Right ideology ($R^2 = -.017, p > .05$). Gen X respondents showed no significant impact from perceived political ideology on their current election decision, Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = -.010, p > .05$), Authoritarian Right ideology ($R^2 = .036, p > .05$), Libertarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .025, p > .05$), and Libertarian Right ideology ($R^2 = .010, p > .05$). In contrast, Baby Boomer respondents were significantly influenced by Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .197, p < .001$), Authoritarian Right ideology ($R^2 = .150, p < .001$), and Libertarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .109, p < .01$), while Libertarian Right ideology

($R^2 = .022, p > .05$) had no significant impact. Therefore, HP # 3 is accepted, emphasizing distinct impacts on current election decisions among Thai voters in the four generations based on perceived political ideology.

Table 5.3: Analysis Results of Each Generations

	Attitude Homophily	AL	AR	LL	LR	R^2
Gen Z						
Exposure	.647** ($<.001$)	.583** ($<.001$)	-.310* (.016)	.589** ($<.001$)	-.053 (.690)	
Theme A		.151	-.303*	.207	-.076	.259
Theme B		.220	-.258	.173	.037	.223
Theme C		.298*	-.017	.421**	-.039	.424
Theme D		.293*	-.161	.457***	.067	.522
Theme E		.488***	-.039	.205	.092	.417
Election Decision		.325*	-.173	.380**	-.042	.483
Gen Y						
Exposure	.744** ($<.001$)	.416** ($<.001$)	-.418** ($<.001$)	.488** ($<.001$)	-.146 (.267)	
Theme A		.303*	-.238	.182	-.181	.307
Theme B		.447**	-.239*	.050	-.201	.344
Theme C		.096	-.334**	.285	-.090	.300

(Continued)

Table 5.3 (Continued): Analysis Results of Each Generations

	Attitude Homophily	AL	AR	LL	LR	R^2
Theme D		.178	-.200	.282	-.235	.286
Theme E		.121	-.213	.299*	-.143	.245
Election Decision		.136	-.037	.304*	-.297*	.218
Gen X						
Exposure	.700** ($<.001$)	.177 (.177)	-.261* (.044)	.301* (.019)	-.018 (.891)	
Theme A		-.109	-.189	.369*	.029	.183
Theme B		-.071	-.071	.233	-.124	.058
Theme C		.148	-.157	.129	-.078	.123
Theme D		-.066	-.214	.264	-.037	.134
Theme E		-.060	.007	.117	-.025	.008
Election Decision		-.049	-.291	.041	.196	.111
Baby Boomers						
Exposure	.668** ($<.001$)	.446** ($<.001$)	-.274* (.034)	.333** (.009)	-.076 (.563)	
Theme A		.377**	-.077	.348**	-.089	.456
Theme B		.256	.058	.079	-.213	.105

(Continued)

Table 5.3 (Continued): Analysis Results of Each Generations

	Attitude Homophily	AL	AR	LL	LR	R^2
Theme C		.400**	-.139	.119	-.079	.303
Theme D		.297	-.147	-.034	-.042	.130
Theme E		.144	.070	-.081	-.083	.019
Election Decision		.335*	-.268*	-.004	-.209	.297

Table 5.4: Hypotheses Testing Results

Hypothesis	Description	Testing Results
HP#1	Thai voters' attitude homophily is positively correlated with exposure to political communication and message themes of the MFP.	Accepted
HP#2	Exposure to the MFP's message themes have a differently significant impact on perceived political ideology of Thai voters in four distinct generations.	Accepted
HP#3	Perceived political ideology has a differently significant impact on election decision of Thai voters in four distinct generations.	Accepted

5.2 Discussion

Prior to the 2023 general election in Thailand, the MFP had become increasingly popular with the political communication strategy inherited from its predecessor, the Future Forward Party, which utilized the Political Marketing Communication effectively with explicit policy formulations, engaged in effective member communication, projected an image of the party as a fresh and innovative political entity challenging the established political norms, thereby offering new generations the opportunity to engage in Thai politics and oppose the authoritarian regime (Thanon, 2020). Furthermore, in the modern political landscape, the Internet and social media platforms have become significant political communication tools (Bunyavejchewin, 2010), and the use of social media was incorporated into the political communication strategy of the MFP.

The findings of textual analysis in the first part of this survey revealed that several message themes can be found within one content. A total of 13 message themes were discovered from the 20 selected documents and the majority of these message themes represented Libertarian-Left political ideology (47.5%). Some of the message themes also represented other political ideologies in different Political Compass quadrants with Libertarian-Right accounted for 26.1%, followed by Authoritarian-Left at 5.3%. There are also message themes that do not represent any of the political ideologies in different Political Compass quadrants which accounted for 21.1%. The top 5 themes discovered from the MFP's political communication based on frequency are 1) Theme A: Anti-Corruption and advocates Transparency, 2) Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government, 3) Theme C: Anti-Injustice, 4) Theme D: Advocates Human Rights, Freedom, and Social Equality,

and 5) Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian.

According to West and Turner (2017), agenda setting has 3 parts, setting the media agenda, setting the public agenda, and setting the policy agenda. The Agenda Setting Theory was applied to understand how the MFP's political communication influenced the public agenda and, subsequently, the policy agenda. The MFP's social media strategy effectively set the agenda by focusing on issues such as political reform and social justice, which resonated with the public, particularly younger generations.

These findings showed that the MFP's political communication strategy is set based on the Agenda-Setting Theory where consistency can be found in all three aspects of the agenda-setting, and the majority of the message themes represented in the political communication aligned with the party's political ideology which is the Libertarian-Left ideology based on the Political Compass diagram.

In the survey section, the findings revealed the discoveries between Thai voters' attitude homophily, exposure to the MFP political communication, perceived political ideology, and the current election decision between Thai voters' attitude homophily and exposure to the MFP political communication and its message themes, the analysis revealed that the two variables are positively correlated which supported HP # 1. The analysis indicated that the more Thai voters feel similar to the MFP, the more they choose to be exposed to the MFP's political communication and the message themes via social media platforms, Gen Y respondents ($r = .744^{**}$), Gen X respondents ($r = .700^{**}$), Baby Boomer respondents ($r = .668^{**}$), and Gen Z respondents ($r = .647^{**}$), respectively.

The Selective Exposure Theory is used to explain the positive correlation between attitude homophily and exposure to the MFP's political communication. According to Hart and colleagues (2009), selective exposure refers to how individuals tend to favor information based on their own pre-existing views while avoiding contradictory information. This was evident in the survey results, where respondents with similar political views to the MFP were more engaged with the party's communication.

As for the Uses and Gratification Theory (UGT), West and Turner (2017) suggested that people are active in choosing and using the media for their own satisfaction and needs, and people see the use of media to gratify the needs they have. The survey results supported the UGT's assumption that people actively choose media to satisfy their needs and goals. In this case, the MFP's communication fulfilled the respondents' need for political information that aligned with their values.

In terms of Hypothesis#2, Exposure to MPF's message themes played a significant role in Gen Z respondents, particularly with Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .329, p < .001$) and Libertarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .335, p < .001$). As for Gen Y respondents, exposure influenced Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .159, p < .001$) and Libertarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .168, p < .001$). Gen X respondents showed a small impact, while Baby Boomer respondents exhibited a slightly higher significant impact, especially with Authoritarian Left ideology ($R^2 = .185, p < .001$).

A previous study by Stoker (2014) examined the view of different generation towards politics which discovered that in the USA, younger generations, such as Gen Y, are more liberal on cultural issues such as equality, gender roles, gay rights, and homosexuality compared to older generation like Baby Boomers.

Stoker (2014) stated that due to their political ideology, younger generations tend to favor the liberal leaning Democrat Party compared to the older, more Republican-leaning generations. As for this study, the results also showed that the significant impacts in the libertarian ideology in younger generation are more pronounced than those in the older generations which is similar to the findings of previous study by Stoker (2014).

Moreover, a previous study by Septianto, Northey & Dolan (2019) examined the effects of political ideology and message framing discovered that for the liberals, gain frames messages are more persuasive while loss frames message are more persuasive for the conservatives. Septianto and colleagues (2019) explained that gain-frames messages emphasizes the benefits or positive outcomes for adopting certain behaviors while loss-frames messages focused on the risks and negative consequences for not adopting certain behaviors. As this study did not particularly focus on the message framing styles and effects, the way the MFP framed their message could be part of the impacts of message themes on perceived political ideology as the younger generations are more liberals than the older generations, the message themes of the MFP, combined with the framing effects is possibly more persuasive to them compared to the older generations which could be further examine in the future research.

In terms of Hypothesis # 3, Perceived political ideology has a differently significant impact on the election decisions of Thai voters in four distinct generations. The result showed that perceived political ideology has a differently significant impact on the election decisions of Thai voters from four distinct generations. The result also demonstrated that Baby Boomer respondents (Aged 59-77) made

election decisions differently from the other three groups which are Gen Y respondents (Aged 27-42) who made their decision slightly different from Gen X respondents (Aged 43-58), and Gen Z respondents (Aged 18-26). The conclusion can be drawn that the Thai voters of four distinct generations made their current election decisions differently.

The Political Communication Theory encompasses a wide range of elements, including the roles of political organizations, media, and citizens in the communication process. According to Blumler (2015), political communication is a complex process that involves multiple levels, evolves over time, spans society, and is centered on the interplay between politics and media. This theory also emphasizes the normative aspect of political communication, which is consequential for effective citizenship and democracy.

Theories of Actors' Roles is a theory within the political communication framework highlight the importance of understanding the roles of different actors in political campaigns. It suggested that political parties prioritize online campaigning and innovate in their use of media based on various factors, including resources, incentives, and ideology (Blumler, 2015). This is particularly relevant to HP #3, as it implies that the perceived political ideology of voters can influence their receptiveness to campaign messages and their subsequent election decisions.

Theories of Voice in the digital era, such as the hyperlinked society and connective action, suggest that the expression and reception of political messages have been transformed by online communication. This has led to the formation of collective identities through the framing process of discourse (Blumler, 2015).

In the context of HP #2, and HP #3, these theories would suggest that the perceived

political ideology of voters can be reinforced or challenged through online political communication, potentially affecting their election decisions.

Political Marketing Theory applies marketing principles to political campaigns, emphasizing the importance of understanding voters as consumers in the political marketplace. This theory involves the use of marketing tools such as research, segmentation, targeting, positioning, strategy development, and implementation to win elections (Newman & Perloff, 2004). Political marketing plays a crucial role in reshaping political ideology and the success of political campaigns. It involves gathering target masses around certain ideologies to maintain presence and gain votes. The media, with its power to manipulate the masses, serves certain ideologies in political communication, which can change the direction of voters' ideologies (Newman & Perloff, 2004). This aspect of political marketing theory is directly related to HP # 3, as it suggests that the perceived political ideology of voters can be influenced by the marketing strategies employed by political parties, which in turn can have an impact on voters' election decisions.

The characteristics of political communicators and the messages they convey can significantly influence voters' evaluations of political candidates. Communicator effects can serve as persuasive arguments or peripheral cues, and personal traits of candidates can influence vote choice in an era of candidate-centered marketing (Newman & Perloff, 2004). This implies that voters' perceived political ideologies may affect how they interpret and respond to candidate characteristics and campaign messages, which could lead to differently significant impacts on election decisions across generations.

The choice of communication channels and the context in which political messages are delivered can also affect the effectiveness of political marketing. Simple messages are more effective on television, while complex ones are more effective in print. The Internet offers new avenues for persuasion, and the mood of the audience can influence the processing of political messages (Newman & Perloff, 2004). This suggests that the perceived political ideology of voters may interact with the channel and context of political communication, potentially leading to differently significant impacts on election decisions across generations.

Regarding the Receiver Factors, pre-existing political attitudes, selective processing of information, and party identity affect how individuals receive political messages. Voters tend to assimilate the positions of preferred candidates and contrast the views of opposed candidates, with these effects being stronger among those who are highly involved and whose attitudes are strong or important (Newman & Perloff, 2004). This supports HP #2, and HP #3 by indicating that the attitude homophily, and perceived political ideology of voters, which is shaped by various receiver factors, can have a differently significant impact on their election decisions across generations.

In conclusion, both the Political Communication Theory and the Political Marketing Theory provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the impact of perceived political ideology on election decisions across different generations. These theories suggest that the interplay between political organizations, media, and citizens, as well as the strategic use of marketing tools, can influence voters' ideologies and, consequently, their election decisions. The differences in how

generations perceive political ideology and respond to political communication can lead to varying impacts on their election choices.

During the analysis, interesting discoveries were found regarding previous election decision and current election decision. Participants who previously voted for the Palang Pacharath Party ($\bar{x} = 2.18$, $S.D. = 1.50$) have a low level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current general election (2023), participants who previously voted for the Pheu Thai Party ($\bar{x} = 3.35$, $S.D. = 1.164$) have a moderate level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current general election (2023), participants who previously voted for the Future Forward Party ($\bar{x} = 4.59$, $S.D. = .779$) have a very high level of agreement to vote for the Move Forward Party in the current general election (2023), and participants who previously voted for the Democrat Party have a moderate level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the current general election ($\bar{x} = 3.42$, $S.D. = 1.752$).

This can be concluded that previous Palang Pracharat voters are unlikely to change their minds and vote for the MFP, while previous Pheu Thai and Democrat voters are slightly more likely to change their minds and vote for the MFP, especially in younger generations. The previous Future Forward Party voters are highly likely to be loyal and vote for the MFP in the current election.

New voters are very highly likely to vote for the MFP in their first election ($\bar{x} = 4.81$, $S.D. = .560$). This demonstrated how the MFP's political communication via social media is effective with the younger generation.

Slightly different from the previous study by Wilasang (2022) which examined the factors influencing the 2019 election voting factors between Gen X, Y, and Z, the result demonstrated that, in terms of political party, the election participation of

Gen X impacted the most by political party factor ($\bar{x} = 3.88$, $S.D. = 0.618$), followed by Gen Y ($\bar{x} = 3.55$, $S.D. = 0.586$), and Gen Z ($\bar{x} = 3.52$, $S.D. = 0.705$). However, in the 2023 general election, the MFP as political party factor seems to be more significant factor to Gen Z's election participation and decision. The results demonstrated that most of Gen Z ($\bar{x} = 4.43$, $S.D. = 0.81$) decided to vote for the MFP with 100% new voters ($\bar{x} = 4.81$ $S.D. = .560$) voting for the MFP, higher than Gen Y ($\bar{x} = 4.21$, $S.D. = 1.03$) and Gen X ($\bar{x} = 3.23$, $S.D. = 1.39$). This could be due to the attitude homophily and the exposure to the MFP's political communication over the years which resulted in Gen Z caring more about the political party they voted for.

When comparing between different gender groups, based on Table 5.5, the results showed that in term of attitude homophily of LGBTQ+ towards the Move Forward Party has a high level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 3.99$ $S.D. = .82$), followed by Female ($\bar{x} = 3.63$ $S.D. = 1.05$), and Male ($\bar{x} = 3.43$ $S.D. = 1.51$) which show no significant differences between the three groups.

In term of perceived political ideology, all three gender groups have a very high level of agreement with the Libertarian-Left (Female $\bar{x} = 4.40$, $S.D. = .67$, LGBTQ+ $\bar{x} = 4.28$, $S.D. = 1.14$, Male $\bar{x} = 4.26$, $S.D. = .70$), a high level of agreement with the Authoritarian-Left (Female $\bar{x} = 4.03$, $S.D. = .63$, LGBTQ+ $\bar{x} = 4.02$, $S.D. = .89$, Male $\bar{x} = 3.95$, $S.D. = .66$). The differences lie in the Authoritarian-Right and the Libertarian-Right where male participants have a moderate level of agreement with the Authoritarian-Right ($\bar{x} = 2.62$, $S.D. = 1.05$), followed by female ($\bar{x} = 2.60$, $S.D. = .96$), and LGBTQ+ with a low level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 2.50$, $S.D. = 1.04$). As for the Libertarian-Right, female participants have a high level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 3.49$, $S.D. = .88$), followed by male ($\bar{x} = 3.32$, $S.D. = .81$), and LGBTQ+

($\bar{x} = 3.03$, $S.D. = .74$) with a moderate level of agreement.

According to a previous study by Egan (2012), LGBTQ+ exhibited distinct political behaviors and are more likely to identify themselves as liberals compared to other genders. Egan (2012) emphasized that LGBTQ+ hold distinctive views on issue such as same-sex marriage. This is aligned with the findings of this study which discovered that LGBTQ+ had the highest level of agreement in terms of the attitude homophily towards the MFP, compared to male and female. The attitude homophily also translated into the current general election which LGBTQ+ had a high level of agreement that they voted for the MFP.

As for female, Meisenberg (2021) mentioned that female are generally more liberal than male, particularly in the acceptance of homosexual, which also aligned with the result of this study which discovered that female are more liberal than male.

In term of the current election decision, LGBTQ+ have a very high level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 4.17$, $S.D. = 1.10$), followed by female ($\bar{x} = 3.74$, $S.D. = 1.42$) with a high level of agreement, and Male ($\bar{x} = 3.24$, $S.D. = 1.52$) with moderate level of agreement that they voted for the MFP in the current election. This could be interpreted that the attitude homophily of LGBTQ+ are the most aligned with the MFP and this group is the most likely to vote for the MFP in the current election. This finding also aligned with previous study by Egan (2012) which discovered that in the USA, LGBTQ+ had a strong support for the Democrat (82%), a liberal party over the Republicans (17%) which is a conservative party.

Table 5.5: Mean and Standard Deviation of Male, Female, and LGBTQ+ on Attitude Homophily, Perceived Political Ideology, and The Current Election Decision (May 2023)

Gender	n	Mean	S.D.	Intepretation	
Attitude Homophily					
Male	97	3.43	1.15141	High level	
Female	125	3.63	1.05389	High level	
LGBTQ+	18	3.99	.81787	High level	
Perceived Political Ideology					
	Ideology	n	Mean	S.D.	Intepretation
Male	AL	97	3.95	.65615	High level
	AR		2.62	1.05368	Moderate level
	LL		4.26	.69632	Very high level
	LR		3.32	.80747	Moderate level
Female	AL	12	4.03	.63475	High level
	AR		2.60	.96228	Low level
	LL	5	4.40	.66689	Very high level
	LR		3.49	.88095	High level
LGBTQ+	AL	18	4.02	.88909	High level
	AR		2.50	1.04319	Low level
	LL		4.28	1.14046	Very high level
	LR		3.03	.73709	Moderate level

(Continued)

Table 5.5 (Continued): Mean and Standard Deviation of Male, Female, and LGBTQ+ on Attitude Homophily, Perceived Political Ideology, and The Current Election Decision (May 2023)

Gender	n	Mean	S.D.	Intepretation
Current Election Decision				
Male	97	3.24	1.52260	Moderate level
Female	125	3.74	1.42361	High level
LGBTQ+	18	4.17	1.09813	High level

Note. AL stands for Authoritarian-Left, AR stands for Authoritarian-Right, LL stands for Libertarian-Left and LR stands for Libertarian-Right.

When comparing between different geographical regions, based on Table 5.6, the results showed that in term of attitude homophily, all groups have a high level of agreement (North $\bar{x} = 3.73$, $S.D. = 1.07$, Northeast $\bar{x} = 3.70$, $S.D. = 1.05$, Central $\bar{x} = 3.62$, $S.D. = 1.08$, East $\bar{x} = 3.52$, $S.D. = 1.09$, South $\bar{x} = 3.46$, $S.D. = 1.17$, West $\bar{x} = 3.43$, $S.D. = 1.07$).

In term of percieved political ideology, participants from East ($\bar{x} = 4.50$, $S.D. = .61$), West ($\bar{x} = 4.41$, $S.D. = .50$), Northeast ($\bar{x} = 4.38$, $S.D. = .62$), North ($\bar{x} = 4.36$, $S.D. = .65$), and Central ($\bar{x} = 4.40$, $S.D. = .67$) have a very high level of agreement with the Libertarian-Left ideology. Participants from South have a high level of agreement with the Libertarian-Left ($\bar{x} = 3.95$, $S.D. = 1.06$). As for the Authoritarian-Left, all geographical region groups of participants have a high level of agreement. For the Authoritarian-Right, participants from North ($\bar{x} = 2.88$, $S.D. = .67$), South ($\bar{x} = 2.70$, $S.D. = 1.00$), Northeast ($\bar{x} = 2.63$, $S.D. = .97$), and Central ($\bar{x} = 2.62$,

S.D. = .94) have a moderate level of agreement, while participants from East ($\bar{x} = 2.55$, *S.D.* = 1.05), and West ($\bar{x} = 2.24$, *S.D.* = 1.00) have a low level of agreement. As for the Libertarian-Right ideology, participants from South ($\bar{x} = 3.63$, *S.D.* = 1.04), East ($\bar{x} = 3.58$, *S.D.* = .92), and Northeast ($\bar{x} = 3.41$, *S.D.* = .65) have a high level of agreement while participants from Central ($\bar{x} = 3.39$, *S.D.* = .76), North ($\bar{x} = 3.36$, *S.D.* = .70), and West ($\bar{x} = 2.93$, *S.D.* = .83) have a moderate level of agreement with the Libertarian-Right ideology. This demonstrated that regardless of geographical regions, most of the participants' perceived political ideology aligned with the Libertarian-Left ideology based on the Political Compass diagram while differs in other political ideologies.

In term of the current election decision, participants from Northeast have a high level of agreement in voting for the MFP in the current general election ($\bar{x} = 3.79$, *S.D.* = 1.39), followed by participants from East ($\bar{x} = 3.70$, *S.D.* = 1.54), Central ($\bar{x} = 3.64$, *S.D.* = 1.40), North ($\bar{x} = 3.59$, *S.D.* = 1.53). Participants from West of Thailand have a moderate level of agreement in voting for the MFP ($\bar{x} = 3.73$, *S.D.* = 1.70), followed by participants from South ($\bar{x} = 3.34$, *S.D.* = 1.26).

Table 5.6: Mean and Standard Deviation of Geographical Regions of the participants on Attitude Homophily, Perceived Political Ideology, and The Current Election Decision (May 2023)

Regions	n	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation	
Attitude Homophily					
Central	40	3.62	1.08381	High level	
North	40	3.73	1.07226	High level	
Northeast	40	3.70	1.05410	High level	
East	40	3.52	1.08588	High level	
West	40	3.43	1.07490	High level	
South	40	3.46	1.17450	High level	
Perceived Political Ideology					
	Ideology	n	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Central	AL	40	4.10	.58568	High level
	AR		2.62	.93538	Moderate level
	LL		4.40	.67178	Very high level
	LR		3.39	.75522	Moderate level
North	AL	40	4.10	1.07226	High level
	AR		2.88	.67178	Moderate level
	LL		4.36	.65032	Very high level
	LR		3.36	.69787	Moderate level

(Continued)

Table 5.6 (Continued): Mean and Standard Deviation of Geographical Regions of the participants on Attitude Homophily, Perceived Political Ideology, and The Current Election Decision (May 2023)

Perceived Political Ideology					
	Ideology	n	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
Northeast	AL	40	4.13	.61179	High level
	AR		2.63	.97197	Moderate level
	LL		4.38	.61758	Very high level
	LR		3.41	.64933	High level
East	AL	40	3.52	.40571	High level
	AR		2.55	1.05017	Low level
	LL		4.50	.60975	Very high level
	LR		3.58	.92369	High level
West	AL	40	3.80	.67853	High level
	AR		2.24	1.00139	Low level
	LL		4.41	.50494	Very high level
	LR		2.93	.83349	Moderate level
	Ideology	n	Mean	S.D.	Interpretation
South	AL	40	3.68	.82673	High level
	AR		2.70	.99800	Moderate level
	LL		3.95	1.06096	High level
	LR		3.63	1.03767	High level

(Continued)

Table 5.6 (Continued): Mean and Standard Deviation of Geographical Regions of the participants on Attitude Homophily, Perceived Political Ideology, and The Current Election Decision (May 2023)

Current Election Decision				
Central	40	3.64	1.39591	High level
North	40	3.59	1.52705	High level
Northeast	40	3.79	1.39085	Interpretation
East	40	3.70	1.53923	High level
West	40	3.39	1.69648	Moderate level
South	40	3.34	1.25773	Moderate level

Prior to conducting this study, it was expected by the researcher that newly eligible voters participating in their first election would predominantly support the Move Forward Party (MFP), whereas individuals who had previously voted for the Palang Pracharat Party in 2019 general election would exhibit a decreased likelihood of casting their votes for the MFP in 2023 general election. The discovery of the study corroborated these expectations, revealing a significant inclination among new voters towards the MFP, as indicated by a very high level of agreement ($\bar{x} = 4.81$, $S.D. = .560$). Conversely, voters who had supported the Palang Pracharat Party demonstrated a low level of agreement to vote for the MFP in the subsequent election ($\bar{x} = 2.18$, $S.D. = 1.50$).

The result aligned with a previous study by Yongvongphaiboon, Sawongtrakool, Pongkaew, Chatburanontachai & Yodkeeree (2022) which discovered that the popularity of the Palang Pracharat Party was at a low level of agreement in

term of the voting decision with 39.4% of a total of 400 participants have a very low level of agreement that they will vote for Palang Pracharat Party in the general election. Moreover, the 2023 General Election results showed that the number of voters who voted for the Palang Pracharat Party has declined compared to the previous election (Election Commission of Thailand, 2023).

Table 5.7 demonstrates that the MFP's message themes that have the most significant impact on the 2023 Thailand general election are Theme D: Advocate Human Rights and Social Equality ($R^2 = .426$, $p = <.001$), followed by Theme C: Anti-Injustice ($R^2 = .415$, $p = <.001$). This result showed that the message themes that have significant high impacts on the 2023 general election decision are actually the message themes that contain messages regarding human rights and social equality, and anti-injustice in Thai society, not the anti-monarchy or the anti-article 112 law that the constitutional court uses as a reason for the party dissolution which is an ongoing issue (BBC News, 2024, January 31).

Table 5.7: Regression Analysis of the MFP's Message Themes and the 2023 General Election Decision of Thai Voters

Theme	B	S.E.	beta	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²
Theme A: Anti-corruption and Promote Transparency	.631	.078	.465***	8.099	.216
Theme B: Criticizing the Prime Minister and the Government	.517	.082	.380***	6.334	.144
Theme C: Anti-Injustice	.825	.063	.644***	12.997	.415
Theme D: Advocate Human Rights and Social Equality	.871	.066	.653***	13.289	.426
Theme E: Anti-Authoritarian Regime	.617	.066	.561***	9.294	.266

In term of the impact of attitude homophily, a previous study has discovered a high degree of homophilic behavior and interaction in online political discussions primarily driven by users' political dispositions and sentiments. Users who share similar political views tend to interact more, engage more, and form tighter social ties compared to those with different views which leads to the formation of an ideological echo chamber on social media platforms (Hettiachchi, Arora & Gonvalves, 2023). In this research, we discovered that not only online interaction was impacted by the

attitude homophily, but it also translated into the voting decision of Thai voters as the result shown in Table 5.8

Table 5.8 Regression Analysis of Attitude Homophily and the 2023 General Election Decision of Thai Voters

	B	S.E.	beta	<i>t</i>	R^2
Attitude Homophily	1.110	.050	.822***	22.234	.675

This result can be interpreted such that Thai voters who feel similar to the MFP were not only exposed to more MFP political communication content, but also voted for the MFP in the 2023 General Election ($R^2 = .675, p = < .001$). This confirms the important role of attitude homophily in political communication.

5.3 Limitations of the Study

There are some limitations in this study. Firstly, this study only focused on the online political communication of the Move Forward Party which showed only one aspect of the whole political communication landscape during the election period. Thus, there is no comparison from other political parties' political communication in the same period as Thai voters may compare the message themes of each political party and find the one that's the closest to their perceived political ideology to vote for in the general election.

Secondly, the sample documents were collected between March 1st, 2021, and August 31st, 2022, well before the actual election took place. Hence, the message themes yielded from the samples could be different during the election period which

could reflect more on the participant's attitude homophily, perceived political communication, and election decision once the MFP's political communication could become more intense on the themes and ideology closer to the election. However, it is possible that there could be different themes yielded from the political communication of the MFP during the non-election period.

Thirdly, the sampling process encountered challenges in recruiting participants from the Baby Boomer demographic who had engaged with the Move Forward Party's (MFP) political messaging through social media platforms. This difficulty may be attributed to a variance in the manner in which Baby Boomers consume political news, which is presumed to be distinct from the consumption patterns observed in other generational cohorts.

Lastly, the measurement of political ideology presented complexities, particularly in differentiating between the Libertarian-Left and Libertarian-Right orientations as depicted on the Political Compass diagram. The primary distinction between these two ideologies lies in their economic doctrines: that the Libertarian-Right advocates for capitalist principles, whereas the Libertarian-Left opposes them. This subtle divergence in economic beliefs posed a significant challenge in the operationalization of the ideologies, leading to a predominance of statistically insignificant results for the Libertarian-Right when compared to other political positions represented on the diagram.

5.4 Recommendations for Further Application

The findings of this study provided valuable information which leads to some practical suggestions for five major groups -- political parties, political figures, NGOs, governmental offices, and political communication strategists.

5.4.1 Recommendations for Political Parties

Political parties could benefit from the results of this study by utilizing the strategy used by the MFP, planning with robust and clear message themes that truly represent the political ideology of the party, and keeping the political information consistent in every communication platform.

Attitude Homophily also plays an important role in persuasion, prior to the actual election, political parties could take advantage of political communication and use it as a tool to persuade potential voters in the same direction as the party, thus, it could lead to the more amount of exposure to each party's political communication and message themes which would make the political communication of political parties become more effective.

5.4.2 Recommendations for Political Figures

As for political figures, especially those who are members of political parties, it is important to keep personal message themes and political communication in every channel consistent and aligned with the message themes of the party. This is to avoid confusion among potential voters as well as strengthen the message themes that need to be delivered to the audience which will make the whole political communication or election campaigning become more effective. For individual political figures who are not members of any political party, the strategy of the MFP can be adopted and used for each political figure as well.

5.4.3 Recommendations for NGOs

NGOs could also benefit from the MFP political communication strategy when they need to persuade a mass audience, the relationship between attitude homophily and exposure can be utilized by NGOs to plan an effective communication strategy as NGOs could try to make the masses feel the same way with convincing message themes which will generate more exposure in the future once the audience attitude homophily is aligned with the organization.

5.4.4 Recommendations for Governmental Offices

Governmental offices could also benefit from the result of this study. Similar to NGOs, when they need to persuade a mass audience, the relationship between attitude homophily and exposure can be utilized and developed into an effective communication plan with clear and consistent message themes.

5.4.5 Recommendations for Political Communication Strategists

For political communication strategists, the insights from this study offer a strategic framework to enhance the effectiveness of political communication efforts. The key takeaway is the importance of leveraging attitude homophily in crafting communication strategies that resonate with the target audience's existing beliefs and values such as

5.4.5.1 Develop Targeted Communication Strategies.

Strategists should focus on identifying and understanding the core beliefs, values, and attitudes of their target audience. This understanding can then be used to tailor communication strategies that align with these attitudes, thereby leveraging homophily to enhance message receptivity and persuasion.

5.4.5.2 Craft Consistent and Ideologically Aligned Messages.

Strategists should ensure that all communication, across various platforms and channels, maintains consistency in message themes and is aligned with the political ideology of the party or figure being represented. This consistency helps reinforce the message, reducing confusion among the audience, and strengthening the overall impact of the communication efforts.

5.4.5.3 Engage in Strategic Message Planning.

Strategists should plan communication efforts with a clear understanding of the desired outcomes. Define clear, measurable objectives for each communication campaign and ensure that the message themes are designed to achieve these objectives. This strategic planning helps in creating focused and impactful communication campaigns.

By implementing these recommendations, political communication strategists can enhance the effectiveness of their communication efforts, ensuring that their messages not only reach the intended audience but also resonate deeply, persuading them towards the desired political action or belief.

5.5 Recommendations for Future Research

Future researchers may explore and compare message themes in political communication of various political parties in the same period of time to discover the differences in message themes and political positions of those message themes based on the Political Compass diagram, and whether these differences have differently significant impacts on Thai voters' attitude homophily, exposure to message themes, and election decision.

It could be beneficial for future research to include the integrity of political parties and compare message themes prior to the election and their actions after the election, and to examine the impact of it on Thai voters' attitude homophily and the upcoming election decision.

Qualitative study should be followed up to provide insightful data in addition to the survey research. It would also be interesting to examine whether the impact of political communication campaign on voters' election decision differs in various geographical regions.

Furthermore, future research may explore whether and how media type (traditional vs. digital media) or content format (audio, video, text, picture, mix of all) moderates the impact of political communication on voters' election decision.

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
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APPENDIX




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APPENDIX A

List of Studied Documents





A list of 20 studied documents from Facebook and Twitter with highest views and engagements

Platform	Documents	Link
	<p>1)</p> 	<p>https://fb.watch/fR3_bBik7u/</p>
<p>Facebook</p>	<p>2)</p> 	<p>https://fb.watch/fR4auB78Cs/</p>
	<p>3)</p> 	<p>https://fb.watch/fR7ifRGZur/</p>


	<p>4)</p> 	<p>https://fb.watch/fYHR-yUv4L/</p>
	<p>5)</p> 	<p>https://fb.watch/fYHU7jZcvW/</p>
<p>Facebook</p>	<p>6)</p> 	<p>https://fb.watch/fYHVBkNLbe/</p>
	<p>7)</p> 	<p>https://fb.watch/fYHXfXrOkf/</p>

	<p>8)</p> 	<p>https://www.facebook.com/MoveForwardPartyThailand/photos/a.104388194526543/461659722132720</p>
<p>Facebook</p>	<p>9)</p> 	<p>https://fb.watch/fYIbPKTsfy/</p>
	<p>10)</p> 	<p>https://fb.watch/fYId_lpFJr/</p>
	<p>11)</p> 	<p>https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1429119896789553154?s=20&t=htaqqoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg</p>

	<p>12)</p> 	<p>https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1371714101496324096?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg</p>
<p>Twitter</p>	<p>13)</p> 	<p>https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1395333488165928960?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg</p>
	<p>14)</p> 	<p>https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1461001737859334152?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg</p>
	<p>15)</p> 	<p>https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1378490497157586944?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg</p>

	<p>16)</p> 	<p>https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1386512855512457216?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg</p>
<p>Twitter</p>	<p>17)</p> 	<p>https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1549980322543964160?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg</p>
	<p>18)</p> 	<p>https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1438723440358281217?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg</p>
	<p>19)</p> 	<p>https://twitter.com/MFPThailand/status/1550059412571578368?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg</p>




Twitter	20) 	https://twitter.com/MFPTThailand/status/1431232779316916235?s=20&t=htaqcoR_jTbv0E4ngKLOWg
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











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APPENDIX B







Coding Sheet for Textual Analysis

MFP Contents	Message Themes	Political Compass Position
<p>1.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>2.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>3.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left

<p>4.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>5.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>6.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>7.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral

<p>8.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>9.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>10.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>11.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right

		<input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>12.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>13.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>14.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>15.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right

		<input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>16.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>17.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>18.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>19.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left

		<input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral
<p>20.</p> 		<input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Authoritarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Left <input type="checkbox"/> Libertarian Right <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral

APPENDIX C

Questionnaire

My name is Salas Supalakwatchana, a graduate student of the Master of Communication Arts program in Global Communication at Bangkok University. As partial requirement for my Master's Degree Program in Global Communication at Bangkok University, I am conducting survey research on how the political communication of the Move Forward Party affects the political ideology of Thai citizens. This survey consists of 8 sections and 33 questions which should take you approximately 10 minutes to complete. The questionnaire can be filled only once, and all responses will be kept confidential, and your answer will be used for educational purposes only.

Screening Questions:

1) During the past three months, have you ever seen at least one political communication of the Move Forward Party via social media channels?

2) Are you a Thai citizen aged between 18-77 years old?

If the answer for either one or both questions is "no", please leave this survey.

Instruction: Select the answer box that best represent yourself or fill in the blank space to answer the questions.

Section A: Demographics

Q1) Age

- 1. 11-26 years old
- 2. 27-42 years old
- 3. 43-58 years old
- 4. 59-77 years old

Q2) Gender

- 1. Male
- 2. Female
- 3. LGBTQ+

Q3) Marital Status

- 1. Single / Never Married
- 2. Married
- 3. Widowed
- 4. Divorced

Q4) Education Level

- 1. Lower than High school diploma
- 2. High school diploma
- 3. Bachelor's degree



4. Master's degree

5. Doctoral degree

Q5) Occupation

1. Student

2. Company Employee

3. Freelancer

4. Self-employed

5. Business Owner

6. Government / Public Enterprise officer

7. Retired

8. Unemployed

9. Others (Please specify)

Q6) Which geographic region of Thailand are you living in?

1. Central Thailand

2. Northern Thailand

3. Northeastern Thailand

4. Eastern Thailand

5. Southern Thailand

Instruction: Select the answer box that best describe your social media exposure or fill in the blank space to answer the questions about.

Section B: Social Media Exposure

Q7-Q9 Please rank your top 3 social media platforms that you most frequently used.

Questions	Facebook	YouTube	Twitter	Line	Instagram	TikTok	Other (Please specify)
Q7) Rank#1							
Q8) Rank#2							
Q9) Rank#3							

Q10-Q12 Please rate the following statements based on the 5-points Likert scale:

1 = Short, 2 = Quite short, 3 = Moderate, 4 = Quite Long, and 5 = Long

Statements	Short (1)	Quite short (2)	Moderate (3)	Quite long (4)	Long (5)
Q10) Based on your answers of Q7 (Rank#1), on average, how	<input type="checkbox"/> Less than 30 minutes/	<input type="checkbox"/> 30 - 60 minutes/ day	<input type="checkbox"/> >1 hour – 2 hours/ day	<input type="checkbox"/> >2 – 3 hours/ day	<input type="checkbox"/> >3 hours/ day

<p>much time do you spend on this social media platform?</p>	<p>day</p>				
<p>Q11) Based on your answers of Q8 (Rank#2), on average, how much time do you spend on this social media platform?</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Less than 30 minutes/day</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 30 - 60 minutes/day</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> >1 hour – 2 hours/day</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> >2 – 3 hours/day</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> >3 hours/day</p>
<p>Q12) Based on your answers of Q9 (Rank#3), on average, how much time do you spend on this social media platform?</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Less than 30 minutes/day</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 30 - 60 minutes/day</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> >1 hour – 2 hours/day</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> >2 – 3 hours/day</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> >3 hours/day</p>

Instruction: Instruction: Select the answer box that best describe yourself.

Section C: Perceived Political Ideology

According to the Political Compass diagram, do you agree with these statements?

Please rate the following statements based on the 5-points Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree

Statement	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
Q13) I believe in redistribution of wealth.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q14) I believe in redistribution of social status.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q15) I believe in justification of creating a fair world.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q16) I advocate social hierarchy.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Q17) I naturally submissive to my authority figures.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q18) I often act aggressively in the name of the authority.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q19) I believe in freedom of individuals.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q20) I believe in social equality.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q21) I support free-market capitalism.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q22) I support reversal of the modern welfare state.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Instruction: Select the answer box that best describe your level of exposure to the MFP political communication.

Exposure to Message Themes of the MFP Political Communication

Please answer the following questions based on the 5-point-scale: 0 = Never,

1 = Rarely, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = Often, and 4 = Always

Statement	Never (0)	Rarely (1)	Sometimes (2)	Often (3)	Always (4)
Q23) In the past three months, how often did you see the MFP political communication that advocates message theme A?	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 time	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 times	<input type="checkbox"/> 3-4 times	<input type="checkbox"/> 5-6 times	<input type="checkbox"/> 7 times or more
Q24) In the past three months how often did you see the MFP political communications that advocates message theme B?	<input type="checkbox"/> 0 time	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 times	<input type="checkbox"/> 3-4 times	<input type="checkbox"/> 5-6 times	<input type="checkbox"/> 7 times or more

<p>Q25) In the past three months, how often did you see the MFP political communication that advocates message theme C?</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 0 time</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 times</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 3-4 times</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 5-6 times</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 7 times or more</p>
<p>Q26) In the past three months, how often did you see the MFP political communication that advocates message theme D?</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 0 time</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 times</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 3-4 times</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 5-6 times</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 7 times or more</p>
<p>Q27) In the past three months, how often did you see the MFP political communication that advocates message theme E?</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 0 time</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 times</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 3-4 times</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 5-6 times</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> 7 times or more</p>

Instruction: Select the answer box that best describe yourself.

Section E: Attitude Homophily

Please rate the following statements based on the 5-points Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree

Do you agree with these following statements?

Statement	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
Q28) The MFP thinks like me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q29) The MFP is like me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q30) The MFP is similar to me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q31) The MFP shares my values.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q32) The MFP has a lot in common with me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q33) The MFP behaves like me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Q34) The MFP expresses attitudes similar to mine.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q35) The MFP has thoughts and ideas that are similar to mine.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Instruction: Select the answer box that best describe yourself.

Section F: Past Election Decision

Q36) Which political party did you vote for in 2019 general election?

- Palang Pracharat Party (พรรคพลังประชารัฐ)
- Pheu Thai Party (พรรคเพื่อไทย)
- Future Forward Party (พรรคอนาคตใหม่)
- Democrat Party (พรรคประชาธิปัตย์)
- Bhumjaithai Party (พรรคภูมิใจไทย)
- Thai Liberal Party (พรรคเสรีรวมไทย)
- Chartthai Pattana Party (พรรคชาติไทยพัฒนา)
- New Economics Party (พรรคเศรษฐกิจใหม่)
- Prachachart Party (พรรคประชาชาติ)
- Puea Chat Party (พรรคเพื่อชาติ)

I voted for other parties (โหวตให้พรรคอื่นๆ)

I did not vote for any party (ไม่ได้โหวตให้พรรคไหนเลย)

Instruction: Select the answer box that best describe yourself.

Section G: Current Election Decisions

Please rate the following statements based on the 5-points Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree

Do you agree with these following statements?

Statement	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
Q37) In the current General Election (2023) I voted for "The MFP" in both ballots	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q38) In the current General Election (2023) I voted for "The MFP" only in the Party Lists ballot	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Q39) In the current General Election	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(2023) I voted for "The MFP" only in the Members Elected on a Constituency basis ballot					
Q40) In the current General Election (2023) I did not vote for "The MFP" in any of the ballots	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

** Thank you for your genuine cooperation in answering the survey**

BIODATA

Name: Salas Supalakwatchana

Date of Birth: April 23, 1987

Nationality: Thai

Phone: 084-152-6652

Email: aeatletico@gmail.com

Education:

2009–2012: B.A. (Communication Arts), Bangkok University,
Bangkok, Thailand.

2021–2024: M.A. (Global Communication), Bangkok University,
Bangkok, Thailand.

Working Experience:

2012–2013: Junior Copywriter, Ogilvy, Bangkok, Thailand.

2013–2016: Copywriter, CJ Worx, Bangkok, Thailand.

2016–2017: Copywriter, The Leo Burnett Group, Bangkok, Thailand.

2017–2018: Copywriter, CJ Worx, Bangkok, Thailand.

2018–2020: Creative Group Head, VMLY&R, Bangkok, Thailand.

2021–2022: Creative Group Head, Ogilvy, Bangkok, Thailand.

2022–2023: Creative Group Head, BBDO, Bangkok, Thailand.

2023–2024: Creative Group Head, Masket Communications, Bangkok,
Thailand.