STUDY ON THE IMPACTS OF PROPAGANDA ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL ATTITUDES AMONG VIETNAMESE MILLENNIALS



STUDY ON THE IMPACTS OF PROPAGANDA ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL ATTITUDES AMONG VIETNAMESE MILLENNIALS

Thu Anh Do

This Independent Study Manuscript Presented to

The Graduate School of Bangkok University

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of degree in Communication Arts

2020



© 2020 Thu Anh Do All Rights Reserved

This Independent Study has been approved by the Graduate School Bangkok University

Title: STUDY ON THE IMPACTS OF PROPAGANDA ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG VIETNAMESE MILLENNIALS

Author: Thu Anh Do

Independent Study Committee:

Advisor

Keen Acomater

(Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pacharaporn Kesaprakorn)

Field Specialist

Pakina Sakulu

(Asst. Prof. Dr. Patama Satawedin)

(Mr. Virat Rattakorn) Dean of the Graduate School February 18, 2020

Thu, D. Master of Communication Arts, Jan 2020, Graduate School, Bangkok University.

Study on the Impacts of Propaganda on the Construction of National Attitudes among Vietnamese Millennials.

(154 pp.)

Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Pacharaporn Kesaprakorn, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

The research aims to investigate the impacts of propaganda on the construction of national attitudes among Vietnamese millennials. One hundreds seventy- one Vietnamese millennials had participated in the survey using non-probability sampling techniques and convenience sampling method to target certain population. The survey was conducted in Ho Chi Minh city of Vietnam during October to December, 2018. The means, standard deviation and percentage were being tabulated and analyzed using One-way ANOVA and Regression with the significance level of .05. The result revealed the following points:

1. Vietnamese millennials, having different demographic factors in relations to gender, educational level, income, awareness towards national news, and travel frequency, did not have significant different *national attitudes* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism. However, respondents with difference in occupation, especially those working in governments, had significant different national attitudes compared to those who were working in corporates.

2. Vietnamese millennials' media exposure in regards to media exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and credibility of the media significantly influence their national attitudes. Especially, the credibility of media was key influence on their perceived national attitudes in the fast changing decade of new media.

3. The participants perceived their national attitudes were influenced by their exposure to nationalistic propaganda on 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh and sea security.



Keywords: Nationalism, Nation Branding, National Attitude, Propaganda, Media

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report will not be completed without the great support from all great people surround me.

First of all, I would like to send my special appreciation for Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pacharaporn Kesaprakorn, who was always a patient adviser and guide me through my research. Then, I also take the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all participants, who had spent their time in the survey. Finally, I am particularly grateful to my families and friends who always encouraged and gave me lot of motivation during my journey.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	vi
LIST OF TABLES	x
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Rationale and Problem Statement	1
1.2 Objectives of Study	13
1.3 Research Questions	13
1.4 Significance of the Study	14
1.5 Definitions of Terms	15
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW	18
2.1 Reviews of the Past Studies on National Identity, Propaganda, and Nation	
Branding in Vietnam and Other Countries	19
2.2 National Identity, Collective Identity and Social Identity Theory	27
2.3 National Branding	37

Page

2.4 Propaganda and Magic Bullet Theory	40
2.5 National News, Social Media, Media Exposure	47
2.6 Perception Theory and Media Dependency Theory	50
2.7 Hypotheses	56
2.8 Framework	58
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	59
3.1 Research Design	59
3.2 Population and Sampling Method	60
3.3 Research Instrument	61
3.4 Data Collection Procedures and Pretests	70
3.5 Descriptive analysis of the respondents' overall demographic data	73
3.6 Data Analysis	76
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS	80
4.1 Findings of Descriptive Analysis	80
4.2 Findings of Hypothesis Testing	88

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION	106
5.1 Summary of Descriptive Findings and Discussion	107
5.2 Summary of Hypothesis Testing and Discussion	113
5.3 Conclusion of the Research	117
5.4 Limitations of the Study	119
5.5 Recommendations for Future Application	120
5.6 Recommendations for Future Research	121
BIBLIOGRAPHY	123
APPENDIX	135
BIODATA	145
LICENSE AGREEMENT	146

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: National Attitudes in Hungary	26
Table 2: The comparison of Cronbach's Alpha of general variables in the pretests of 3	0
volunteers and the main survey of 171 respondents who are Vietnamese	
millennials living, working, studying in Ho Chi Minh City,	
Vietnam	71
Table 3: Demographic summary of 171 respondents who are Vietnamese millennials	
living, working, studying in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam	74
Table 4: Criteria for interpreting the exposure to propaganda, daily media exposure,	
media credibility, attitudes toward propaganda, and national attitudes	81
Table 5: The mean and SD of daily exposure to media	81
Table 6: The mean and SD of exposure to propaganda	82
Table 7: The mean and SD of media credibility level	83
Table 8: The mean and SD of attitudes towards 5 statements of President Ho Chi Min	h
and sea security	85
Table 9: The mean and SD of national attitudes, including national feeling, liking, price	de,
preference, superiority, and nationalism	87

Page

Table 1	0: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of gender difference towards	
1	national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	89
Table 1	1: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of occupation difference toward	ls
]	national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	90
Table 1	2: PostHoc test's result of the between-subject effects of occupation difference	ce
1	towards national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	91
Table 1	3: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of educational level difference	
1	towards national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	98
Table 1	4: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of income difference towards	
1	national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	99
Table 1	5: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of care about national issues	
	difference towards national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	100
Table 1	6: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of travel frequency difference	
1	towards national attitudes of Vietnamese Millennials	101
Table 1	7: Regression Analysis of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure comprise	ed of
	exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and media credibility as	
]	predictors of their national attitudes	102
Table 1	8: Regression Analysis of Vietnamese millennials' attitudes towards national	istic
]	propaganda about the 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh and the sea secu	urity
;	as predictors of their national attitudes	105

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The Nation Brand Hexagon	8
Figure 2: A Conceptual Map of Nation Branding	9
Figure 3: National Attitudes Explanatory Model	33
Figure 4: Path Model of Nationalism, National Identity and Well-being of Bulgarian a	and
Romanian Youth	35
Figure 5: Vietnam's Tourism Slogan. (From left to right) The very first time slogan of	
Vietnam launched in 2005, the winning branding in 2011, the latest official	
branding approved in 2012	38
Figure 6: The Jowett/O'Donelle purpose model of propaganda	42
Figure 7: "Study and follow the moral example" of Vietnam's revolutionary leader, H	0
Chi Minh	44
Figure 8: "Five Statements of President Ho Chi Minh"	45
Figure 9: "Islands and ocean are the blood ties of the nation"	45
Figure 10: Media Dependency Conceptual Model	51
Figure 11: Theoretical Framework of the Study	58

Page

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Keywords: Nationalism, Nation Branding, National Identity, Propaganda

1.1 Rationale and Problem Statements

"The nation: it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 2006).

Vietnam's 2000-year historical timeline from ancient to modern periods was filled by continuous wars. Its old Northern land was under the Chinese domination for 1000 years. During that time, there were many strikes against the brutal occupation and civil wars following the rise of different dynasties in China (Lambert, 2015). Hence, Chinese culture and Confucianism had big effect on cultural traditions, language as a part of Vietnamese national culture, and even cuisine. For 1000 years, Vietnam had not only tried hard to fight for its authority over border and sovereignty, but also, at the same time, kept developing its regime in the parallel track with the Northern strong influential power (Nguyen, 2007). However, it is undeniable that Vietnamese cultural canvas was assimilated by Chinese culture and Confucianism not as a religion, but, higher, an ideology of life. Vietnamese adopted the principles of Confucianism and used them to monitor their daily guideline of manners, perceptions, social regulations and social norms (US Department of Navy, 2007).

In the later history of Vietnam, the French, with nearly 100-year colonialism (Lambert, 2015), and the American, with 30-year domination ("South Vietnam", n.d.), came. They called 30 years under the USA army the "Vietnam War" ("South Vietnam", n.d.). Under the colonialism from French, Vietnam adopted the first standard concept of nationalism from the Western ideology (Kim, 2002). The new French wave claimed to change the lifestyle of Vietnamese, especially in the upper and middle class in the society. Even though, the national identity was not fully formed yet and the cultural roots still existed, Vietnam was well known as the most successful French colony (Kim, 2002). Until 1955, when its principle started to fall apart and Vietnam was relieved by the US, Vietnam gained its first nation-state's image recognition by global media as Republic of Vietnam. It officially announced the first president - Ngo Dinh Diem and its national flag ("South Vietnam", n.d.). However, after 1975, South Vietnam was occupied and combined with the Northern part to become a united Vietnam. Once again, Vietnam officially made its independence statement that was agreed officially and by the international community, and, later on, introduced its anthem, flag, and national emblem. It inherited the propaganda during the wars and continued to implement it in all the citizens' steps of life in the later Renovation period known as "market economy with socialistic orientation" strategy starting in 1986 (Hoang, 2015). That historical event continued to insist on the intra-national dissociation in economy and politics until recent time. After Renovation, the South Vietnam adopted more capitalism, while the North

maintained its social economy (Shibai, 2015). Besides, there was a misperception in defining the characteristics of North and South Vietnamese from the generations born in and after the time of Vietnam War. The South Vietnamese did not get over that historical event, when they were put into the 're-education camps' by the winning side. It, later, caused thousands of Vietnamese fled Vietnam by boats. It was considered as the first rift among Vietnamese (AFP, 2015).

Despite the Domino Effect about the falling of Communist countries, Vietnam itself maintained its political oriented ideology of Nationalism and Communism since Independence Day. In order to keep up with this direction, the authority used the same propaganda technics to keep the communal sense among its citizens. In daily life, propaganda has been immensely leveraged by the political evolutional groups to educate Vietnamese about the pride of being Vietnamese and believing in the specific political ideology through national TV channels, radios, education system, governmental organizations, outdoor advertising materials, and national events (Qiuyi, 2016).

In post-war period with an unclear sense of national identity, propaganda sources from school to working life interconnected Vietnamese and their sense of belonging towards their Vietnam and the regime. It persuaded Vietnamese to follow the national orientation of development, formed their national cohesive norms and identities to differentiate it with others, which we had struggled since the Chinese domination of Vietnam since 111 BC (Nguyen, 2007). Vietnamese identities was inherited a lot of cultural and social principles primarily originating from China and from the exchange of cultures within different countries in region. Those culture roots fostered the collectivity among Vietnamese, valued the family ties, and pursued the self-governing right of each village (Andrian, 1988; Kim, 2002). However, the national identity of Vietnamese was strategically fragmented by the French (Andrian, 1988) and had led to be more political than cultural like the past Chinese domination time (Kim, 2002). There were consideration and controversy on varied terms of nationalism, socialism with Marx -Lenin ideology, communism, and the cultural roots happening in the society (Kim, 2002).

Despite the fact that Vietnam has changed a lot since the post-war time, there is no proof that the confusion in defining the national identity is over. Vietnamese keeps putting more efforts to preserve the national culture as a reference to develop national identity (Hoang, 2015). On the other hand, the use of propaganda through all types of media in order to maintain the political ideology makes the cognitive uncertainty harder to be solved. There is an urgent of study on Vietnamese national identity now and in a long run. Essentially, studying about national identity has to take into account the importance of political and economical strategy in national development. Those strategies strongly influence the way national identity is going to be formed and transformed. They need the involvement of cross sectors in the process and leverage various tools to achieve the goal of nation building. Since 2003, Simon Anholt has advanced the idea of nation branding, which borrows the marketing principles and implements them into nation building theory. His concept gave an out-of-the-box angle on the creation and perception of national identity. It is a conjunction between sociology, governmental diplomacy, public relations and marketing. It is important to acknowledge that nation branding can

benefit the country with competitive advantages in global trade and soft power system. A successful nation branding strategy increases the national recognition and delivers certain messages to the outsiders (Anholt, 2013). Later on, in 2014, Anholt deployed and updated his study about nation brand by launching The Good Country. The extent to which a country actively contributed to the human's well-being such as humanitarian aid or environmental care decided the preferable scale inside global communities. In other studies, Dinnie (2012) and Aronczyk (2013) concerned the impact of nation branding on the collective identities, constitutive norms and national consciousness. For Dinnie (2012), citizens could be the ambassadors of their nation. Nation branding process was not only for the outsiders, but also for the citizen within the state. Talking about national identity in the modern world should not dismiss the nation branding strategy (Aronczyk, 2013) or nationalism (Anderson, 2006). Because most of governmental offices misunderstand country branding and tourism marketing, they invested more on how to tell a good story about their country to attract more incoming tourists (Hoang, 2015). In other words, the more tourists a country could attract, the more outstanding identity it held. In fact, nation branding and tourism are not on the same page. That dead end in nation branding strategy was pointed out by Aronczyk (2013) as well in her published book on Branding the Nation: The Business of National Identity that "tourism narratives were more of a literary genre than a factual one, taken seriously only by those who actually entertained a notion of traveling to the place being advertised" (2013). Building up strong national identity was not for tourism purpose, but tourism benefited from an effective nation branding strategy. Therefore, the purpose of my study is not going to

discuss about Vietnam's nation image and identity based on history or traditional culture, but on the more modern and up-to-date perspectives. Furthermore, it requires the review on the demography of core population - the millennials, who face the happening of new media and social changes and are constantly exposed to propaganda message through national media.

Vietnam changed a lot after war, especially after it opened its trade market with socialist orientation (Hoang, 2015). After that national orientation, Vietnamese adopted many new westernized terms such as capitalism, new technology, western media so on. Old Vietnamese and Vietnamese born during and after war quickly pay more attention to economic-related value than the past (Rosen, 2015). However, propaganda still remains as a part of Vietnamese daily life on the street banners, in the textbooks, on national media channels and all national events (Qiuyi, 2016). While the old propaganda holds a historical value as the evidences for Vietnam War (Irvine, 2015), the modern propaganda promotes the spirit of national border security and the solidarity of Vietnamese to develop a prospect country (Qiuyi, 2016). It is sometimes used to communicate the government policies in the restricted number of children per household; or raise awareness on vaccination for newborn babies.

According to a Pew Survey, Vietnamese showed a positive attitude that young generation will have better financial support and gain more economic opportunities (Pew Research Center, 2014). Because of that good background, Vietnamese young generation has more chance to get involved in all types of social change such as raising voice for

environmental issue and national developmental orientation (Rosen, 2015). With the development of new media platforms and advanced technology, they easily get connected, share opinions, and get together to make impact. The Vietnamese millennials make choices with consciousness and are eager to work for organizations, which are committed their works to social good (Nielson, 2016). However, they still receive the repetitive historical lessons through all educational levels from primary to college (Rosen, 2015) to celebrate the independence and promote socialist orientation, nationalist spirit, and unity (Kim, 2002). Even though Vietnamese millennials were not born in wars, they still get to know the concept of propaganda in school by textbooks, ceremonies, and learning national anthem.

There is no evidence, firm conclusion or proper overview of Vietnamese identity in the modern time among the young adults. There are three aspects to examine when doing this study about national identity, which cover nation branding, nationalism, and the use of propaganda in various media.

Anholt, the pioneer in country branding, and national image and reputation building, introduced his Nation Brands Index (NBI) in 2003. And tourism is stated as one of the six dimensions to help the government to plan strategically, measure, and understand their country's stage. Hence, it would be better to see national identity, as variable to have a whole cross-disciplined analysis, not just rely on only tourism's statistics.



The power to attract people to live, work or study in each country and how people perceive a country's quality of life and business environment.

Figure 1: The Nation Brand Hexagon. (Anholt, 2017)

Referring to figure 1, my paper only focuses on 1 dimension: the governance. It will be measured by the internal opinions or Vietnamese's perceptions and thoughts towards the perceived propaganda message, not on the global opinions. It sees the nation building or nation building together with forming national identity happening at the internal process first. That primarily transcends all the citizens' mind, unify them by a mutual sense of belonging, and turn them into a nation's special ambassador (Dinnie, 2008). The citizens now become the core of nation branding process. Then, they will project that national identity to outsiders through daily interaction and behaviors.

In the research article published in the *International Journal of Communication*, Kaneva (2011) presented the possible agendas for the academic study on nation branding and national identity. The future study's approach was suggested to be interdisciplinary.

The Nation Brand Hesegon /0 2000 Simon Anhol

She underlined the roles of governance and economy in nation branding process. Furthermore, if nations were operated as brands, national identity would be the value that hooked the citizens into the nation. According to her conceptual map, nation-branding research could be employed towards 4 different axes of consensus, dissensus, constructivism, and essentialism.




Figure 2: A Conceptual Map of Nation Branding. (Kaneva, 2011)

My paper's topic on the impact of propaganda and national identity matches with the dissensus/constructivism orientation for nation branding in Kaneva's conceptual map. This orientation defined nation branding as commercialization, broadcast and maintenance of a desired national identity. Furthermore, Kaneva asserted the relations and impacts of social power, media use, and historical background upon national identity, and how those intertwined with the nation branding orientation. A nation brand holding a certain set of national identities was developed through various communication media from viral to edu-entertainment. The formation of national identity was primarily decided by the joint of economic sector and 'political elites'.

Ratilainen (2016) did a research about *Perception on Collective National Identities: Reflections on the Unity of Vietnam in 2016* showing an assumption that there might be multiple national identities happening among Vietnamese population. The research was conducted with 11 in-depth interviews. However, the quantity of sample was too low and they came from Da Nang, the third main city in Vietnam. Thus it cannot draw any significant conclusion to the whole population. But, in a positive way, Ratilainen considered Vietnamese national identity in a larger scale that the perception and comparison between the characteristic of Northern and Southern Vietnamese still existed among the young Vietnamese. The point of view strongly depended on where the candidates came from. Additionally, the awareness and protection of the national territory united Vietnamese together under a communal national goal.

Studying identity covers the definitions and relations of individual and collective aspects. And, national identity is a set of collective identities constructing individual self (Smith, 1991). Anderson (2006) defined nation as an 'imagined community' which is purposively invented. Therefore, national identity might be seen as more political in accordance to some circumstances. In the context of Vietnam, the nation has pursued 'One-party system led by Communist Party of Vietnam' ("Politics of Vietnam", n.d.). Despite the fall of other Communist countries, Vietnam nowadays still maintains it regime through the top-down control with propaganda technics. Propaganda is a slice of life and an art in Vietnam (Kim, 2002). It appears in street banners and posters (Qiuyi, 2016), TV channels, educational system (Kim, N. B. N., 2002) and even broadcast system spreading all over cities and the countryside during the time when TV was still rare (McCool, 2006). That propaganda can be found as some neighbor countries such as China or North Korea. Darr's study on the propaganda effect (2011) which was conducted 'door-to-door' in China, including male and female candidates, concluded that there is a strong correlation between the informational media consumption, such as TV and radio, and the national attachment. However, the research result pointed out the negative effect of newspaper and Internet on the effort of preserving national identity among Chinese. The conclusion drawn from Darr's dissertation is similar to the article by Bruck and Manzaria (2013). They stated that modern propaganda purposively delivers certain messages to public. And, because normal media consumers are bombarded with tons of information everyday, they easily dismiss media literacy to criticize the accuracy of content. Thus, the audiences have tendency to carelessly agree on the perceived information (Bruck & Manzaria, 2013). Media and all reaction upon media are also important indicators needed to notice in a Communist country like Vietnam.

Vietnamese millennials take 30 percent of the current population holding specific characteristics (Nielson, 2016). According to Shibai's overview about the life experience of Vietnamese (2015), the current population experienced either the Democracy when they were born and later the Communism, or the Communist social system right when

they were born and raised inside of it. Another experience of the Communism was being born and raised after 1976 when the Communist party was trying to reform not only the economy, but also its political structure. Therefore, most of Vietnamese millennials's overall social experience falls into the third one. Under the Communist educational structure, they perceived historical lessons and messages about national pride, nationalism, patriotism, and solidarity in schools. Those messages are demonstrated on all street billboards, posters, and banners (Qiuyi,2016). However, like countries all over the world, Vietnam is in globalization process. Vietnamese get to know more about new technology and global trends. Nowadays, Vietnamese millennials spend 73% of their time on social media (Nielson, 2016) and 15 hours weekly on their mobiles (Tuoi Tre News, 2015). Similar to millennials around the world, they yearn for more information and new knowledge (Nielson, 2016). Because of the Internet boom with the free load of information, the millennials started questioning about the accuracy of what they had learnt from school (Rosen, 2015). Social identity theory explained that the individuals built their identity in correlation with the group identity and reflecting the intragroup and intergroup relation (Tajfel, Turner, 1986). Therefore, all the opposite information can create cognitive dissonance among the group members. Ratilainen's in depth interviews (2016) showed that all candidates were aware about the social changes, but confused about what to react at the same time. Even though, she noted the interviewees might not stand for the whole population, it should be taken into account when examining about national identity.

1.2 Objectives of the study

This study is not to discuss about nation branding from tourism perspective and for tourism purposes, nor the national identity from the past historical period of Chinese domination of Vietnam. It will explore the process of constitution and maintenance of national identity with involvement of propaganda and media. It focuses on the interrelation between nation branding and national identity as well. From that, its objectives consist of:

- To examine Vietnamese millennials' national attitudes influenced by their demographic factors.
- To study how the media exposure towards different media influence the Vietnamese millennials' national attitudes.
- To explore how Vietnamese millennials' opinions towards nationalistic propaganda message influence their national attitudes.

1.3 Research Questions:

1.3.1 How do Vietnamese millennials's different demographic factors in regard to gender, occupation level, educational level, income level, care about national issues, and travel frequency influence their national attitudes?

1.3.2 How do Vietnamese millennials' media activity in regard to daily exposure on media, media exposure to propaganda, and credibility of media influence their national attitudes?

1.3.3 How do Vietnamese millennials' attitudes towards national propaganda content related to 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh and sea security influence their national attitudes?

1.4 Significance of the study

1.4.1 This study briefly will explore the terms national identity in the aspects of nation branding and propaganda theory, which brings up a modern and up-to-date way of seeing national identity. The findings of this study will be used as a reference to the current stage of Vietnamese millennials' national attitudes and identities. From that, it contributes to the previous research about Vietnamese national identity and to Vietnamese government and private sectors working in media and communication, nation branding, and international relation. Furthermore, it helps to see the dependency level of Vietnamese millennials in decision making of daily life issues, and how each Millennial citizen actively involves, judges, and makes decision in the formation of identity.

1.4.2 At the governmental level, it will give some hints on how Vietnamese identity can be maintained, constructed and reconstructed across the public's mind. The result will be used as a reference to come up with national plan to empower and leverage collective power from Vietnamese millennials to solve national essential issues and to build up the desired nation for all (Rosen, 2015).

1.5 Definitions of terms

1.5.1 Nationalism is an 'ideological movement' to achieve and maintain the 'autonomy, unity, and identity' of a nation. Its core value measures the 'well-being' of a nation. Its movement cultivates a desired image of a nation inside the population's mind. So that, each one living inside assumes to be a part of constructing that nation (Smith, 2010). That community is not real, but defined as 'imagined community' (Anderson, 2006).

1.5.2 Nation Branding is the cross-sectoral application of commercial marketing communication knowledge to develop and reform a more preferable image for a country, so that it is able to compete in global market. It purposively monitors and evaluates the national reputation among not only domestic public, but also global communities just like corporate does with their reputation and product. However, there is a debate among scholars whether nation is treated as a commercial product. The reason is that nation state owns its history, unique culture, and ideology. Therefore, decision makers should take those factors into account to gain the support from different stakeholders when proceeding branding for country (Anholt, 2003). It is currently discussed as an 'extension of nationalism and national identity' (Aronczyk, 2013).

1.5.3 National Identity is one kind of collective identity. It is sociopolitical. It also helps to construct individual self-identity. It connects the feeling of belonging

between individuals and their bigger community - nation. The population inside a nation will share the same language, culture, traditions, norms and beliefs, and consciousness of laws and duties so on (Smith, 1991).

1.5.4 Propaganda was defined as any type of 'informative' and 'persuasive' communication to promote an idea to the targeted groups and subconsciously lead them to pursue certain behaviors, perceptions and attitudes towards a subject (O'Donnell and Jowett, 2015). During wartime, propaganda became biased because it picked up the side. It was taken as political manipulation and provided misleading information to consolidate one side of the truth to the public audiences (Lasswell, 1927). Modern propaganda was similar to public relations in the way of influencing public opinions. They indirectly advocated a motive for the action and reaction of the mass. Propaganda technique was also applied in advertising to frame a particular image and need of a product in consumers' mindset (Bernays, 1928).

1.5.5. Nationalistic Propaganda is the purposive propaganda, which promotes the patriotic feeling and the sense of belonging to a homeland or nation. Nationalistic propaganda captivates the citizens and fosters their advocacy of national goals and activities (Rudiger, 2003).

1.5.6 Millennials are defined as the generation born from 1980s to 2000s. There is still argument about whether people born from 1980s to 1990s are belonged to Generation Y, named after Generation X. However, because the generation born in early 1980s tends to define themselves totally different from generation X and baby boomers,

they prefer to be called millennials. They consider themselves tech geeks, trendsetters and followers, and information technology oriented. The Millennials can adapt quickly to fast changing environment and are eager to join together to solve global issues. In other words, they see themselves as global citizens (Howe & Strauss, 2000).

1.5.7 New media was a term rapidly developed during 1980 - 2000 due to the the Internet's boom, high technology era, and the development of new tech devices. New media 's content is digitalized, and can be shared and retrieved through the Internet. The special characteristic differentiate new media from traditional media is its interaction. On the Internet or technology devices, the users interact with the contents and give feedbacks on them. Online newspaper, online sites, social media, video games, mobile application, Internet TV, any digitalized objects or paradigms are considered as new media. Following the ongoing rise of innovative technology, new media is getting "newer" everyday. Meanwhile, traditional media describes all types of media that are not in digital form, such as print media, broadcast, radio etc. (Lister, Dovey, Giddings, Grant, & Kelly, 2009).

1.5.8 Media exposure is the "physical", "perceptual", or "psychological" experience that audience has towards a message conveyed by any media. When the physical, perceptual, and psychological exposures to media message happen at the same time, they create an "attention" from the audience. In other words, media has impact on the audience. Individuals are exposed differently to the media, hence; receive different levels of media effects (Potter, 2012).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter 2 will prepare literature reviews of past research studies and research journals on nationalism, national identity, and propaganda and media. This chapter also presents concepts, definitions, and theories to construct the hypotheses and the theoretical framework of propaganda, nation branding, national identity, nationalism, social identity theory, silver bullet theory, and media dependency theory, which demonstrates the topic's background and the research objectives. In general, chapter 2 will outline:

2.1 Reviews of the past studies on national identity, propaganda, and nation branding in Vietnam and other countries.

2.2 National identity, collective identity, Social Identity Theory

2.3 Nation branding

2.4 Propaganda and Silver Bullet Theory

2.5 National news, new media, and media exposure

2.6 Perception Theory and Media Dependency Theory

In regard to the literature reviews, research questions and the study's objective, a framework and a list of hypotheses are constituted.

2.1 Reviews of the past studies on national identity, propaganda, and nation branding in Vietnam and other countries

In the introduction, there were three studies about nation branding and tourism marketing of Vietnam. They borrowed the concept of nation branding from Anholt to deploy their topics and to treat nation as a brand with brand image and brand identity (Hoang and Ho, 2013). Some focused more on the tourism-marketing field that discussed about the tourism development strategy, narrative of the country and its people, and how to express that storyline and symbol to attract the attention from outside (Nguyen, n.d.). Besides, they pointed out that national identity was more complicated than original concept of brand identity because each specific nation held its own cultural pattern and historical base (Hoang, Ho, 2013). In their research, Hoang and Ho concluded with the main concern about proper national plan made by the government to strengthen national image and develop tourism.

In order to study the impact of propaganda on the construction of national identity among Vietnamese Millennials, the researcher have reviewed 6 past studies, which contain similar fields such as nationalism, national identity, national attitudes, Vietnamese characteristics, propaganda, and the impacts of media:

- Vietnam cultural policy from the period of penovation: The preservation of cultural identity in the globalization (Hoang, 2015).
- Perception on collective national identities: Reflection on the unity of Vietnam in 2016 (Ratilainen, 2016).

- Vietnamese characteristics of social consciousness and values national character, differences between north and south, and gaps between the Vietnam War generation and the post-war generation (Shibai, 2015).
- The propaganda effect? The Chinese media and national identity (Darr, 2011).
- The media and challenges of national identity in nigeria (Okwuchukwu, Ngozi, & Emmanuel, 2014).
- National sentiments and attitudes toward minorities (Kelemen, 2000)

In "Vietnam Cultural Policy from the Period of Renovation: The Preservation of Cultural Identity in the Globalization", Hoang (2015) presented her research about Vietnam's cultural preservation. She made a strong statement about the importance of right understanding of national identity and culture preservation. Furthermore, she insisted the exchange of neighbouring cultures and the diversity of Vietnamese culture. which inherited the characteristics from different countries such as China, France, and the US. Those diverse cultural characteristics reflected in Vietnamese language, cuisine, social norms, traditional customs, and social values shaped the Vietnam's national identity. It differentiated Vietnam from other countries in the region. In Vietnamese culture, family was always mentioned as a constructive component of 'happiness'. The unity of family members and members within communities played important role. Especially when Renovation period happened, it promoted national solidarity to build up a desired country. During that period, Vietnamese citizens were given freedom and actively participated in the process of preservation and development. However, it also brought a consideration of the freedom's level to approach cultural values. To conclude

her study, Hoang questioned the weakness in cultural administration at governmental level and addressed the danger of globalization and market economy on traditional values, norms, and beliefs.

In the research thesis titled "Perception on Collective National Identities: Reflections on the Unity of Vietnam in 2016", Ratilainen (2016) also mentioned about the unity attribute of Vietnamese and used it as a reflection to understand the collective national identity of Vietnamese. It stated an assumption that Vietnamese population might hold a multiple identity set. Eleven in-depth interviews were conducted. It discussed six assertions on collective national identities by examining the perceived unity among Vietnamese towards their country. Firstly, Ratilainen stated that the governmental control was not only on media, but also on all aspects of life, including national identities. Even though political ideology was pushed from top down, it was proved to contribute to the unity of Vietnam. Secondly, there was a few number of interviewees had full understanding of national laws and their duty for their country. Even though some of them did not totally agree on those regulations, they were all aware to follow national orientation as Vietnamese citizens. At third, border issue and economic growth were two factors supporting the unity inside the society. Fourthly, they all shared the same pride of "thousand years of history", which had been used by the government to maintain the national unity. She also showed the disorientation among Vietnamese on making a change in the society, even though they knew that there were social issues occurring and disagreements on national decision at governmental level. Fifth of all, their cognition of identity was influenced by the economic and social class factors. Besides, the division

between the North and South Vietnam by political ideology did not exist anymore. It was replaced by the Vietnamese's acceptance towards westernization and globalization. The Northern people showed up to be more conservative while the Southern population was eager to adopt Western concepts. In contrast to that conclusion, there were several articles bringing up the division issue within Vietnamese society. In addition, her research pointed out that the sampling might not be used to generalize the whole population because of their age range and their location, all from Da Nang - the third important city of Vietnam. In a positive perspective, her thesis's results raised awareness and delivered some certain hints to consider when studying about Vietnamese national identity in a larger scale.

Contributing to Ratilainen's conclusion, the article Forty years after communist victory in Vietnam; north, south still not reconciled reported a worry among Vietnamese about the past conflict between political ideologies and the disagreement on the winning side's treatment towards South Vietnamese from the losing side still exist (Godfrey, 2015). However, those two angles are still under discussion. Shibai (2015) summarized that the South was more conscious about politics than the North. The South Vietnamese hold a belief that individuals' well-being decided the rise of a country. However, in his study, the South and the North showed the same viewpoint of economic values and economic-related issues. For Vietnamese, social system affected their perceived values to some extent.

In the modern history of fighting for independence and revolution, Vietnamese

Communist party from the Northern part of Vietnam adopted Marxim-Leninism from USSR and, later on after the fall of USSR, followed the consultancy from China to pursue the political ideal goal (Andrian, 1988). It made the authoritarian system in Vietnam more like China than the original Marxim-Leninism. In China, the government used propaganda to communicate with all citizens. "The Great Firewall" was built to control the information flow and set up media use for national security because the authority detect the big threat from the growth of the Internet and new media platforms. Also, the more advanced the technology is, the more efficient the propaganda will be to the audiences (O'Donnell & Jowett, 2015). Studying about the effect of propaganda in China, Darr (2011) conducted a research by visiting each household and directly asking them questions about propaganda, media use, and perception of national identity. He concluded that one's national identity could be constructed and maintained through the way they consume media with propaganda content. For Darr, male candidates showed more awareness and concern about national attachment and identity. The educational level, job status, and age also affected the strength of attachment. Despite of the causeeffect relation between media consumption and national identity, there were other types of media communicating and providing contents against the propaganda, especially newspaper and the Internet. Darr (2011) argued whether news media actually helped out with national identity formation or destroyed it. According to his research results, traditional media such as radio and television consolidated perceived national identity in citizens' mindsets. In contrast, other media like newspaper, online social networks and the Internet did not contribute to the strength of national attachment. Because media,

especially the Internet, in China was under control by the government, most of the media content focused on promoting nationalism. Therefore, media was said to shape and strengthen national identity, and cause the audiences to psychologically attach to certain presented identity. Furthermore, in his sampling, the young and the oldest were strongly exposed to national identity and mostly feel attached to their nation. That could be explained by the fact that young Chinese were still influenced by propagated schooling while the oldest spent most of their spare time on TV and radio.

Another paper elaborated the role of media and the relationship between media use and national identity was The media and challenges of National Identity in Nigeria by Okwuchukwu, Ngozi, and Emmanuel (2014). Socialization in Nigeria happened with the support of education and media. Mass media was always a powerful tool of the government to control and provide the information, bond the authority and the public, and direct the social movements. However, Okwuchukwu, et al. (2014) pointed out the inverse effect of media upon citizens because of the characteristics of media itself. Nation building and the construction of national identity were included in Nigeria's national communication objectives. The expectation was establishing the consciousness and the recognition of national identity, which tied the nation as a whole. Both research from Darr (2011) and Okwuchukwu, et al. (2014) stressed on media's influence, the unity of a country, and the formation of national identity and nationalism. Therefore, it is undeniable that media power and communication are important to nation building. From the two researches, media held within itself propagated content, which aimed to make an impact and acquired media consumers' reactions in return. So, the message contents were

purposively designated. Beyond being a notion to orient the society for a common goal, national identity was essentially related to the strength of a nation.

In National Sentiments and Attitudes Toward Minorities, Kelemen (2000) asserted that individual sense of belonging to a nation could be reflected by their attitudes toward that nation. There were 6 stages of attitudes that nationalism was one of them, and also a final result of all. Those attitudes came from a long process of learning, perceiving, and defining and re-defining all the identities, values, characteristics that a citizen was holding. Strong six stages proved a successful nation building strategy. Kelemen applied a questionnaire of nineteen 5-level Likert scale questions addressing six stages of national attitudes of Hungarian: Feeling, Liking, Pride, Preference, Superiority, and Nationalism.

Table 1: National Attitudes in Hungary.

	S	core 1	2	3	4	5
National feeling	α=.83					
1. I feel I am Hungarian		1	3	12	20	64
2. I feel Hungary is my country		2	3	7	17	71
National liking	α=.776					
3. I like the Hungarian language		1	2	4	19	74
4. I like Hungary		1	4	11	24	60
5. It is good to be a Hungarian		3	8	20	30	39
In general I like Hungarian people		0	3	22	37	38
National pride	α=.788					
7. I am proud of Hungary		4	12	23	28	33
8. I am proud to be Hungarian		3	7	21	27	42
 I am proud of what the Hungarian people achieved 		4	7	27	27	35
National preference	α=.552					
 In general 1 prefer to have Hungarian people as my personal contacts than people from other countries 1.1 prefer to live most of my life in Hungary than in any other country 		20	14	10	17	17
countries 11. I prefer to live most of my		11	14	32	17	
countries 11.1 prefer to live most of my in any other country			1000			26
countries 11. I prefer to live most of my	life in Hungary than α=.65 an people more than ies		1000			26
countries 11. I prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general I like Hungaria people from other countr	life in Hungary than α=.65 an people more than ies	11	15	31	17	26 13
countries 11. I prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general I like Hungari people from other countr 13. In general Hungarian peo- their nationalities	life in Hungary than $\alpha = .65$ an people more than ies sple are better than	11	15	31	17 20	26 13 8
countries 11.1 prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general 1 like Hungari people from other countr 13. In general Hungarian pec- their nationalities 14. Hungary is the best coun	life in Hungary than $\alpha = .65$ an people more than ies sple are better than	11	15 18 18	31 31 25	17 20 14	
countries 11.1 prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general 1 like Hungaria people from other countr 13. In general Hungarian peo- their nationalities 14. Hungary is the best coun Nationalismc=.759 15.1 feel I share common roo	life in Hungary than α =.65 an people more than ies pple are better than try to live in	11 18 35 30	15 18 18 20	31 31 25 30	17 20 14 10	26 13 8 10
countries 11.1 prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general I like Hungaria people from other countr 13. In general Hungarian peo- their nationalities 14. Hungary is the best coun Nationalisma=.759 15.1 feel 1 share common row with other Hungarians	life in Hungary than α =.65 an people more than ies ople are better than try to live in ots, common origins	11	15 18 18	31 31 25	17 20 14	26 13 8 10
countries 11.1 prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general 1 like Hungarin people from other countr 13. In general Hungarian peo- their nationalities 14. Hungary is the best coun Nationalismon 759 15.1 feel 1 share common row with other Hungarians 16.1 feel all Hungarians are	life in Hungary than $\alpha = .65$ an people more than ies ople are better than try to live in ots, common origins members of a big	11 18 35 30	15 18 18 20	31 31 25 30	17 20 14 10	26 13 8 10 22
countries 11.1 prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general 1 like Hungaria people from other countr 13. In general Hungarian pec their nationalities 14. Hungary is the best coun Nationalisma:=.759 15. I feel 1 share common row with other Hungarians 16. I feel all Hungarians are : family which I also belon	life in Hungary than $\alpha = .65$ an people more than ies uple are better than try to live in try to live in ots, common origins members of a big g to	11 18 35 30	15 18 18 20 18	31 31 25 30 25	17 20 14 10 20	26 13 8 10 22 14
countries 11.1 prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general 1 like Hungaria people from other countr 13. In general Hungarian pec their nationalities 14. Hungary is the best coun Nationalisma:=.759 15. I feel 1 share common row with other Hungarians 16. I feel all Hungarians are : family which I also belon	life in Hungary than $\alpha = .65$ an people more than ies uple are better than try to live in try to live in ots, common origins members of a big g to	11 18 35 30 15 19	15 18 18 20 18 24	31 31 25 30 25 26	17 20 14 10 20 17	26 13 8 10 22 14
countries 11.1 prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general I like Hungari people from other countr 13. In general Hungarian peo- their nationalities 14. Hungary is the best coun Nationalismce759 15. I feel I share common roi with other Hungarians 16. I feel all Hungarians are family which I also belon 17. I think all Hungarian peopl Hungary	life in Hungary than $\alpha = .65$ an people more than ies ople are better than try to live in ots, common origins members of a big g to le should live in	11 18 35 30 15 19	15 18 18 20 18 24	31 31 25 30 25 26	17 20 14 10 20 17	26 13 8
countries 11.1 prefer to live most of my in any other country National superiority 12. In general 1 like Hungaria people from other countr 13. In general Hungarian peo- teir nationalities 14. Hungary is the best countries 14. Hungary is the best countries 15. I feel I share common row with other Hungarians are 16. I feel all Hungarians are 16. If it all Hungarians recommender 17. I think all Hungarian peopl	life in Hungary than $\alpha = .65$ an people more than ies pple are better than try to live in try to live in ots, common origins members of a big g to le should live in iix with other nations	11 18 35 30 15 19 33	15 18 18 20 18 24 24 24	31 31 25 30 25 26 20	17 20 14 10 20 17 9	26 13 8 10 22 14 14

(Kelemen, 2000)

In accordance to Kelemen (2000), nationalism and national attitudes, and the perception of national identity decided three aspects: assimilation, discrimination, and tolerance of minorities holding different cultures within Hungary. The minorities had to choose to what level they gave up their native culture and identity to adopt the national identity. From the native Hungarian's angle, the solid and bold set of national attitudes challenged their tolerance in interacting with other culture, especially foreign one. The above table showed that most of the candidates expressed their pride, liking, and feeling for Hungary. However, facing questions related to preference, superiority, and

nationalism, participants expressed their diverse opinions. In table 1, the Cronbach Alpha for nineteen questions was .856, indicating that the scale was highly reliable. Although, Hungarians liked and were proud of their language and nationality, they did not consider their country was better than other countries. They also shared their open mind about whether Hungarian should live inside or outside the country. The number of interviewees supporting the fourth and fifth stages of national attitudes dropped gradually, and got a slight increase at the sixth stage - nationalism.

Vietnam had a long history partially influenced by Confucianism (Nguyen, 2007). Finding national identity was always a concern of Vietnamese intellectuals. In the history, Vietnamese national identity was primarily based on culture roots (Kim, 2002), which were built up surround village power to decide all the norms, values, and customs (Andrian, 1988). Traditional village-centric organization caused difficulty for the French when they found their colonization in Vietnam. Therefore, the French strategically established their own ideology and culture in Vietnam as an effort to defeat the conventional Vietnamese cultural norms and values. Nationalism was spread among the new intellectuals. National identity, which held political than cultural characteristics, was gradually formed (Kim, 2002). There was a dismissal in the importance of village-centric governance and custom. The fragmentation still continued after the end of Vietnam War. However, because of the urbanization, modern Vietnam was not village-centric anymore.

2.2 National identity, collective identity and social identity theory

Identity is a concept of self. It answers the question of who you are as a person.

27

National identity can be understood clearly in accordance to social science as a form of social identities that construct the image of a country as a Nation. It explains an individual in the relationship with bigger group composed of many individuals and represents the individual's sense of belonging towards a group (Nakayama & Martin, 2010). In social organization and population management, the world was divided geographically by countries. Building knowledge about national identity will shape the understanding of any given current society people are living in. In the last decades, globalization led to the cross trading of goods and cultures, and the migration for work and living between countries. The widespread of globalization trends has an impact on identity (Nakayama & Martin, 2010).

According to Smith (1991), national identity is a kind of collective identity and contains nationalism as one of its form. Additionally, nationalism is a social movement, which implies all structured activities and strategies hold by groups targeting social and political issues (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). National identity, hence, was stated as "a main goal of nationalist movements, along with national autonomy and unity, given that people seek to create, preserve and die for" (Smith, 1991). National identity partially helps to construct individual self-identity in comparison to other group members and people from outside of the group. Clear national identity strongly connects the feeling of belonging between individuals and their bigger community - the nation - as a whole (Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001). The population of a certain country will share the same language, culture, traditions, norms and beliefs, and consciousness of laws and duties and so on. Because the formation of national identity is detected as a 'collective phenomenor', it is crucial to

understand the cycle, impact, and rise of social movements. That, national identity is not a natural core but socially constructed within the specific social circumstance (Anderson, 2006). The citizens living in a nation and holding specific sets of national identities are conscious about their binding factors to their 'fellow-members' even though they never met (Anderson, 2006). Also, the formation of national identity somehow means that the citizens have to give up some of their 'attachment' to other groups such as their local community, in order to pursue a bigger national goal and be a constitutive member of nation creation (Citrin, et al., 2001). Therefore, defining the strength of population nation attachment can reveal the identity set which they perceive to define themselves as being a citizen. Understanding collective identity is essential to explain and analyze the pattern of human behaviour within a group. During the process of forming collective identities, group members construct their system of beliefs, principles, and their commitment level to the group. As the result, the individuals decide their collective behaviour towards a certain event (Melucci, 1995). National identity is strongly influenced by the changing environment with many 'social movements' inside of it. The stronger national identity is, the better the population knows how to react towards changes. Group members with obscure national identity and loose national attachment will easily leave their belief-system when absorbing or facing new things (Taifel & Turner, 1986).

National identity, collective action, and social movement interplay under the Social Identity Theory proposed by Tajfel and Turner in 1986. Social identity like national identity is a concept of self since a person can have multiple identities. In other words, individual is defined by a collective set of identities. According to Social Identity Theory, humans contextually gather to create groups. But humans can only define themselves by referring their attachment to particular groups they think they belong to. By obeying and maintaining the group's norms and values, they affirm their group membership. Individuals' identities and the relationship with their groups reinforce each other (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Hence, national identity needs to be empirically studied through times during varied social movements that mostly affect the construction of groups. Observing the collective actions and reactions of social groups reveal the set of identities individuals are holding. This is noted out when conducting the research for my survey. There must be questions to explore about the population's behaviour when they grow up with propaganda from school to outer life. Another key point of social identity theory is the recognition process. All the terms such as 'self', 'us', in-group, and out-group are comprised in that process. That process starts with categorization, moves to identification, and ends with comparison. During categorization, individual explores the group, and learns to adopt their norms and values. Then, individuals consider themselves as a group member or not. Group members perform proper reactions related to what they have learnt before. Individuals' identities are built up in this stage. Because each person can belong to different groups depending on circumstances, they have tendency to bounce with new identities of other groups. The comparison challenges whether to adopt the new and give up the old identities. There are three variables happening in the cognition process. In categorization and identification, the ingroup members are evaluated how they define the characteristics of their group and the strength of their

group membership.

However, these concepts of national identity are developed by the western scholars. In the situation of Vietnam as a Southeast Asia country with a particular culture and development history, Vietnam's national identity has been heavily defined by its cultural roots and, especially, its village-centric. The "social organization" - village was the core unit and had autonomy to implement shared norms, beliefs and traditions down to all villagers (Andrian, 1988). Meanwhile, the whole of Vietnam was still strongly influenced by Confucian ideology in all aspects from governance and social norms to education, literature and poem (US Department of Navy, 2007). The 'attachment' to the bigger groups like neighboring community and villages was a must within Vietnamese society. However, the French colonization with its new governance hierarchy threatened all those cultural and spiritual bonds between residents and their villages (Kim, 2002). When the Vietnam War happened and after Vietnam gained its independence in 1975, propaganda played a key role in re-promoting the unity of Vietnam and the citizens' responsibility for national development. Propaganda posters mostly conveyed political messages and national identities surround Communism ideology. There were several propaganda teams who entered the fields and villages to perform dramas and sing. They celebrated the victories of revolutionary force and promoted nationalism and, later, Socialism and Communism among villagers and citizens who fled to villages from the big cities (Friedman, 2006). Forming the new identity set following is not just a collecting process, but also an eliminating decision. That requires individuals to give up some of the old and adopt some of the new, ignore the subgroup's identities to embrace

the bigger goals. Especially, a nation indicates a big group comprised of overlapped subgroups (Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001).

University of St. Andrews (n.d) found out that there are relations among identity, attitudes, and behaviour of both individuals and groups. The perceived identity will explain the attitude in term of its implication, intensity, and patterns. Following that, the perceived identity and attitudes lead the human behaviour. The human behaviour factor orients the growth and wealth of a nation. Studying one's national attitude towards a country might somehow interpret their acknowledged source of national identity. Dekker, Malova, and Hoogendorn (1997) presented the Dekker - Malova model of nationalism in which national attitudes towards a country are measured by six indicators, including nationalism, feeling, liking, pride, preference, and superiority. Those six indicators varied in terms of effect (negative, neutral, and positive) and their intensity. The Dekker-Malova model of nationalism with six stages of national attitudes will be applied into this study in order to explore the set of national identities of Vietnamese Millennials. That model was still applied into current researches to elaborate the national attitudes or national identity of countries across the world.




Figure 3: National Attitudes Explanatory Model.

Source: Dekker, Malova, & Hoogendorn (2003).

Figure 3 represented one's national attitude establishment process. Dekker, Malova, and Hoogendorn explained this process in other words as national socialization (2003). National socialization happened within each individual from the early childhood until grown up stage. Along national socialization, individual experienced oriented education, which brought up stories of national heroes, national achievements, and famous nationals. Or, they were exposed to political information from spirit leaders and politicians. For building and maintaining a nation, all citizens within a country needed to go through and fulfill six stages (Feeling, Liking, Pride, Preference, Superiority, and Nationalism) of national attitudes. Along the way, personal sense of identity, which national identity was a part of it, was constituted. At the very young age, one was motivated by family and school to love their country (the first and second stage) by experiencing the food and language, old stories, anthems, or visiting attractions. From that foundation, individual had tendency to search for more "positive self-identity" to develop their attachment to nation or, higher, nationalism (Dekker, et al., 2003). National socialization is also a process of forming self-identity. A positive self-identity will contribute to the achievement of national socialization. In order words, positive national attitudes are successfully established. In the research to examine the national attitudes among ethnic groups within three nation states - Slovakia, Netherlands, and Spain, Dekker, et al. (2003) measured all six stages, the national socialization process, and selfidentity. They concluded that citizens, who hold positive self-identity in the first, second and third stages, felt belonging to the nation. They saw similarity among other citizens. However, groups, who continue going through fourth and fifth stage and building up their nationalism, tended to distant themselves to outgroup, minorities, or have xenophobia to other countries. The explanatory model and Dekker-Malova's national identity model are often applied to test nationalism and national identity of citizens in countries, in which hold diverse minorities or migration groups or citizens in different countries that share the same development orientation and historical events.




Figure 4: Path Model of Nationalism, National Identity and Well-being of Bulgarian and Romanian Youth.

Source: Dimitrova, Buzea, Ljujic, & Jordanov (2013)

Applying Dekker-Malova model of national attitudes, Dimitrova, Buzea, Ljujic, and Jordanov (2013) used it to explore the relationship between individual's well being, national identity, and nationalism among the youth of Bulgaria and Romania. They found out that there was a strong positive correlation between nationalism and national identity. A person will yearn for more positive sense of identity to build up the first national feeling and national liking like a base of nationalism (Dekker, et al., 2003). According to Dimitrova, et al. (2013), the stronger national identity led to the better a person's psychological status. All nations aimed to achieve "subjective well-being", which was the result of negative and positive effect. The falling down of Communism caused the downside of the economic. It forced Romanian and Bulgarian youth going through a tough time. Moreover, during 1990s, there was an immigration wave into the two countries. That increased the quantity of minorities. A nationwide transformation in economy, society and history happened in Vietnam. Vietnam only achieved and maintained its independence for 40 years. Even though Vietnam did not face the immigration issue from other nationalities into the country, Vietnam's national identity was claimed fragmented during French colonialism (Andrian, 1988). There was a merge between the new and the old in the society. Vietnamese had to quickly adapt to the new regime, and social and political orientation in the Renovation period (Hoang, 2015). Vietnamese young generation faced many issues of defining national identity and selfidentity matching with social norms. In the survey, questions to examine six stages of Vietnamese Millennials' attitudes towards propaganda message, social context and national issues will be strategically asked. A questionnaire will ask the interviewees to list which images of national identities represent the most accurately to the Vietnamese. At the end, the two results can be used to compare and see whether there is any difference between what they subconsciously think and how they are going to act.

2.3 Nation branding

According to Anholt (2003), nation branding borrows the marketing communication techniques. In the perspective of marketing and commercial branding, a brand can be represented by visual things such as logo, the product, image, mascots, television commercials, or ambassadors; sound such as thematic melody or songs; corporate environment or company's culture; company public relations and corporate social responsibility programme (Anholt, 2013). It is simple to realize that each country projects some particular first impression and promises to deliver unique values to the outsiders (Dinnie, 2008). When it comes to nation brand, it becomes more complicated because of the social, historical, and cultural characteristics of the nation. Among them, the social orientation of nation will play a key role because it includes human. Besides, the establishment of a nation and its relations with other nations are complicated as well. Therefore, treating a country like a commercial brand is not enough.

Originally, the important objective of branding is to create a unique identity in visual, emotional, or musical forms to help the brand to be spotted out among the market. The national identity through the process of nation branding is the desired result that the government and nation leaders aim for. In the circumstance of Vietnam, nation branding appears as a new term. And it was misled by the government. That, Vietnam nation branding was handed over to tourism industry. From 2005 to present, Vietnamese government has struggled to launch the logo and slogan for tourism (Mock, 2013) and work seriously in order to identify the country's value set for future development

(Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency, 2017). In 2011, Vietnam National Administration of Tourism ran a pitch in order to find a new branding for Vietnam. However, the winning proposal was not approved by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (Vietnam National Administration of Tourism, 2011). There was never any consensus in collaboration of national cross sectors to achieve the cohesive result. It led to the confusion of the tourism official slogan (Mock, 2013) and the mistaking tourism slogan as national motto. The failure showed that the experts focus more on the narrative rather than preserve the unique cultural values to make them stand out. Aronczyk (2013) used to ask in her book "Why use tourism as a vehicle for collective identity-making?" Her opinion addressed the missing gap of tourism marketing. Stories from the advertisement may not present the real experience of the country.



Figure 5: Vietnam's Tourism Slogan. (From left to right) The very first time slogan of Vietnam launched in 2005, the winning branding in 2011, the latest official branding approved in 2012.

Source: Mock (2013)

The process of establishing a set of collective identities among the citizens happens together with surrounding social activities. Are there any interplay or contradiction between two identity establishing processes? Do the citizens feel any cognitive dissonance when being influenced by two sides? According to Anholt (2003), nation branding is how the reputation and image of a nation are going to be designated, monitored, and evaluated. Through the process of branding, people inside a country was propagated with a desired national image that partially bond their emotion to their homeland (Anholt, 2013). At the same time, the citizens will hold expectation towards the government. That explains why the citizens are counted as one dimension in Anholt-GfK Nation Brand Index. Additionally, considering a nation as a brand allows the nation leaders to establish its own identity, values, cultures etc. The branding process is a 'longterm commitment'. However, nation brand is different than commercial brand in term of ownership. It belongs not to any specific managing board, but to the whole citizen (Dinnie, 2008). Thus, in the branding process to promote national image, the strategists must notice the citizens as key stakeholder who constructs the nation, actively contribute to image creation, but, at the same time, is influenced by branding strategy as well. Instead of putting this force aside, nation-branding experts currently count them in. No one can play a better role of nation brand ambassador than its own citizens (Dinnie, 2012). As mentioned in chapter 1, because of the focus of my study and the time constraint, we are going to look at the 'people' dimension of the Anholt-GfK Nation Brand Index and implement people into other theory. Furthermore, we are going to analyze whether the ongoing nation branding process, propaganda message, and citizens' cognition are oriented to the same direction, and whether there are any dissonance among the Vietnamese Millennials' cognition.

2.4 Propaganda and Magic Bullet Theory

During the modern history of mankind, propaganda became a powerful tool used by several countries such as the Nazi state, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Lasswell (1927) mentioned constantly about the political intent of propaganda when defining about it. According to him, propaganda communicates to manipulate. Special symbols are used to shape the collective attitudes of individuals, so that they are going to acknowledge the same direction and respond in the ways that propagandists have planned before. After Lasswell, O'Donnell and Jowett (2015) refused to criticize negativity and positivity of propaganda, but studied in the perspective of communication that critically analyzes the message, the context, the audiences, and, the most important element, their responses upon the messages. The two researchers repeated the 'intent' of propaganda through several historical events. Through their explanation, because of wars and religions, propaganda did not keep it neutrality anymore. It appeared negatively in the public perception as a mind-control and brainwash technics. The Oxford dictionary explains the term propaganda as "Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view" (Propaganda, n.d.). By that, propaganda was negatively seen as a manipulation and no longer merely a communication tool by eliminating all opposite points of view (Lasswell, 1927). However, in 1950s, Jaques Driencourt asserted, "everything is propaganda". In his opinion, modern world is

composed by political and commercial activities. Those activities persuaded the public audiences with their own evidences. Naturally, for Jaques, mankind born in the modern world hold political and economical attributes, which made them easily manipulated and agreed on strategically planned message (Ellul, 1973). Ellul (1973) additionally insisted on Jaques Driencourt's opinion and pointed out that propaganda should be considered as a "socio-political phenomenon", not just be criticized in the morality term. He addressed on the relationship between propaganda and media, and the importance of being aware of the fast developing technological society.

An event involving senders, message, and audiences can be understood as a communicative process. Propaganda is a linear 'informative communication' because the audience's response is not towards to message, but expresses through actions following what the senders desire at the beginning (O'Donnell & Jowett, 2015). It represents the Magic Bullet Theory known as Hypodermic Needle Theory by Lasswell's book Propaganda Technique in the World War published in 1927, which focuses on the process of injecting a specific idea into audiences' mind by using media. The audiences consume the media passively and vulnerably. In other words, "the magic bullet theory graphically assumes that the media's message is a bullet fired from the media gun into the viewer's head" (Berger, 1995). This theory adds on to the statement of Lasswell about the social order management function of propaganda. It also supports the identification of the mass population's tendency that they inherently yearned for guidance and stimuli to behave and organize themselves (Ellul, 1973). Therefore, under some special circumstances such as wars, propaganda and media tools can support the leader to

achieve the unity of the mass (Lasswell, 1927), and created single-minded crowd (O'Donnell & Jowett, 2015). However, because not everyone can have equal access to media, the intended message has different impacts on different groups of audiences. By considering the propaganda technics as communicative and persuasive strategy, this study will refer the communication model. The roles of the information source (senders), the channels, the message's content, and the audiences (receivers) should be examined. However, because the limitation and the sensitivity of the topic, we are going to focus on the content of message and the audience's' viewpoint, not the governmental control, nor arguing about the truth of information.




Figure 6: The Jowett/O'Donelle purpose model of propaganda.

Source: O'Donnell & Jowett (2015)

First of all, the research will analyze the propaganda message's content, form,

carriers. According to Lasswell (1927), the propaganda message can be transferred in varied form such as visual, spoken or written language, and music. In order to increase the impact, propagandist will make use of all media channels, for instance TV, radio, street banners so on (Ellul, 1973). My research conducted in Vietnam will focus on the propaganda's visual and written forms carried by street banners and educational materials in the textbooks. By being exposed to the message, which sense of national identities do Vietnamese Millennials can detect from that?

In an article presented by Srichampa (2006), Vietnamese propaganda after Renovation period covered 9 important topics: (1) Celebrate the independence and unity of Vietnam, (2) Compliment the Communist party and President Ho Chi Minh, (3) Together develop national economy, (4) Collaborate to solve ongoing social issues, (5) National security alert, (6) Promote international collaboration and relations, (7) Guiding to build up social values, (8) Promote some global trends for social good. In compare to previous periods, the topics about national protection and gratitude to President Ho Chi Minh and Communist party are kept in the agenda. Additionally, Ratilainen (2016) figured out that territorial security including territorial sea and sovereignty of islands was the communal worry among the Vietnamese interviewees. Therefore, in my questionnaire, I am going to use the sample propaganda banners, which contain that two topics, territorial security (Figure 9) and national ideal directions following President Ho Chi Minh's words of wisdom (Figure 7 and 8). Figure 7 presents the promise of Vietnamese Millennial to take President Ho Chi Minh as an idol and follow his ideology. Figure 8 states five key advices of President Ho Chi Minh which are to love your nation

and your people; to study hard and work hard; to maintain strong solidarity and good discipline; to keep good sanitary habit; and to stay humble, genuine, and courageous. Figure 9 is the message reminding of the bloody ties between nation and its sea territory.



Figure 7: "Study and follow the moral example" of Vietnam's revolutionary

leader, Ho Chi Minh.

Source: Qiuyi (2016)



Figure 8: "Five Statements of President Ho Chi Minh". (VNU University of

Economic and Business, 2013).



Figure 9: "Islands and ocean are the blood ties of the nation".

Source: Pham (2014)

Secondly, the study will measure the propaganda's efficiency whether it successfully conveys the message. Ellul (1973) showed his belief about the truth in an effective propaganda. In his opinion, propaganda could only be effective if it was based on some ideas already existing within the community and right in trend with the social movements. Therefore, we are not going to stick with the question whether the propaganda is good or bad, true or lie. Another thing is that successful propaganda is required to be consistent and solid over time. It is essential to calculate its frequency of appearing in public, or, in the other words, the citizens' exposed frequency to propaganda message. Vietnamese Millennials grow up in a world of freedom of expression and access to information; hence, they will have certain perceptions towards every issue in life, even their nation. They have tendency to be exposed to unlimited media, not just the one containing propaganda message. There is a concern whether the messages detected from propaganda nail the same sense of attitude of Millennials towards nation.

Thirdly, sufficient propaganda does not only aim each individual as a single target or directly to the mass, but considers all individuals gathering in a collective group who always interact and influence upon each other (Ellul, 1973). Our study group is Millennials who were born in the high technology era and quickly adopt new media trend. The development of advanced technology and new communication platform is supposed to amplify the widespread of propaganda message. However, the Internet world gives Millennials more unlimited access to all kinds of information sources. Hence, they are exposed to different sides of one issue and gradually build up their acknowledgement of media literacy to critically compare between all sources. It consequently makes the persuasion process harder for propagandist.

2.5 National news, new media, and media exposure

Exposure is the state and the context that a person receives, interacts, or directly or indirectly connects to the sources of information (Sullivan, 2009). The sources of information can get the audiences by different media form and through various media channels. Media exposure of each audience differs in relation to the personal background, the frequency, the duration, and the media content.

Stăiculescu and Nădrag (2008) studied about the role of new media and its impact on the society. According to their point of view, traditional media, such as television and printing, focuses on delivery of highly credible information while the new media encourages the interaction of its audiences with the involvement of most advanced technologies. New media is defined as the "successful integration of interpersonal communication and mass communication" (Chen, 2012). It empowers the media consumers to have equal power to media producers in selecting the information and being exposed to the messages upon their needs, interests, and gratifications. This emergence of new media urges traditional media to change itself by adding diverse channels and let the audiences to choose what they want to watch (Stăiculescu & Nădrag, 2008). However, there is always controversy about the media consumers' real control of exposed information and whether traditional media still has certain agenda for its audiences.

Another important point about traditional media and new media is that the information flow and layers of interactivity. Traditional media was seen to be controlled by the "political groups" (Stăiculescu & Nădrag, 2008). The high-credibility of traditional media makes its the key communication tool serving national scale for broadcasting and announcing national news. That is considered as one-way and top-down communication. In contrast, new media carries inside the globalization attribute. It means that new media had tendency to connect faster, despite distance and intercultural context (Chen, 2012). Additionally, people involved in new media are media users, not media consumers anymore. They interact towards the media message and also with other media users (Chen, 2012). Therefore, by using new media, media users can access to different layers of information sources. They have a chance to be exposed to other users' activities, to compare, and to develop their media literacy.

National news in Vietnam are broadcasted on television by official national broadcaster VTV, following by other famous channels like VTC, HTV. For radio, Vietnam has one main well-known VOV. For newspaper, there are 10 famous mainstream ones - Báo Đảng, Công An, An Ninh Thủ Đô, Hà Nội Mới, Lao Động, Nhân dân, Sài Gòn Giải Phóng, Thanh Niên, Tiền Phong, Tuổi Trẻ (Media of Vietnam, n.d.). Because of the new media social change and high-technology devices, online newspapers and online social platforms such as Facebook and Youtube become more familiar with Vietnamese media users especially the Millennials with 73% spending their time for social media (Nielson, 2016). Hence, national news are not only spread out by national channels, but also on the Internet.

On the construction of national identity, Tsai (2016) found out that Taiwanese national newspapers across the country had a significant impact on the Taiwanese perceived identity. In his paper, he mentioned about "media ideology". It led to the fact that each mass media channel set particular agenda such as which stories they covered and how they covered them to its audiences. Tsai argued about the interplay between mass media and the national identity. Audiences being exposed to a specific media content hold certain national identity accordingly (Tsai, 2016). This logic supports the concept of Anderson about national identity and nation building. That a nation is "socially constructed community" and national identity is "not fixed" (Anderson, 2006). On the other hands, because of the globalization attribute of new media in the modern life and the freedom of choice and access to media, media users refer to the type of information which support their perception of national identity. In other words, each individuals develop and hold in them their preferred set of identities. Thus, they choose media, which comfort their belief (Darr, 2011). Consequently, their media exposure is selective and not eventual. Depending on the perspectives, there is always an argument whether media comes first to create identity or identity is a concrete value that searches for suitable media to strengthen it. However, when vast changes happen everyday in the modern world, the interplay between human and media occurs. One keeps affecting and changing one another.

2.6 Perception Theory and Media Dependency Theory

Perception is defined as "an active process of practical contacting the information and, later on, selecting, organizing, and decoding it. This process happens through senses and the information comes from the environment around this person" (West & Turner, 2014, p. 497). It appears in several communication theories such as Cognitive Dissonance Theory, Agenda Setting Theory, Spiral of Silence, Symbolic Interaction Theory (to understand the relation between the mind, self and the society), etc. From being exposed to selected information, an individual gradually establishes a set of perceptions or selective perception. This, later, forms an attitude, which consequently leads to a behaviour (West & Turner, 2014, p. 114). Selective Perception Theory states that individual chooses media agenda to protect their viewpoint. Selective Perception Theory denied the top-down impact of media, or mass media in specific. And by that, it recognizes the active role of media users. Applying this to my study of propaganda message on media, it could be said that Vietnamese Millennials differing in the degree of nationalism and national attitudes would have different reasons to find the 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh and message of ocean territory protection strong and essential to them.

Media Dependency Theory (MDT) was first introduced by Defleur and Ball-Rokeach in 1976. MDT examines the impacts of mass media on target audiences. It indicates that media, audiences and social system are in dependence relationship with each other (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1976).




Figure 10: Media Dependency Conceptual Model. (DeFleur, & Ball-Rokeach, 1976).

In Media Dependency Theory (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1976), people as media audiences always search for more information on media to support their decision making process. It does not mention whether media consumers are active or passive, but criticizes based on three degrees of dependency. Those degrees vary from:

• Audience totally depends on media for satisfaction of individual needs;

• When facing changes, especially fast changes or changes that require people to adjust or change, audience will yearn for more information on different media. Informational media supports and consults individual in time of changes; • Audience becomes active and not only depends on media to explain his/her concerns and consolidate their beliefs, practices and behaviours. The substitute sources reduce the level of media dependency.

According to DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1976), the higher level of centrality of information functions is to the audience need, the stronger impact the media deliver. Audiences tend to perceive these information sources useful and falls into one of three possibilities including cognitive effect, affective or behavioral one. In a group relationship, the audiences' media exposure influences their sense of belonging towards groups. Moreover, group members will use communication media to reassure their group's perceived values. As a consequence, audience behavior is changed in relation to the media content and how they use it.

Cho (2009) did a research on media use and dependency effect in Korea and figured out that all college students joining the survey thought "new media as a daily basis". Most of their activities happened online. And the Internet was their "first used" source. Therefore, there is no denial of the media role in today life. In the context of Vietnam, millennials' dependence on both propaganda and new media when facing national issue should be taken into account. Also, there are two primary concerns of how exposure to propaganda influences Vietnamese millennials' formation of national identity, and whether the use of new media, for instance the Internet, changes the way Vietnamese millennials' national attitudes.

Partel (1993) studied about The Political Impact of Media Exposure did an experiment to compare to what extent the interviewees are exposed to TV news and newspaper during the last few weeks. In addition, it also studied of how the loyal viewers of TV news and newspaper portrayed the political candidates based on 3 factors character, leadership and competence. The result pointed out the influence of TV news over newspaper. Moreover, Partel (1993) measured how much audiences of TV news and newspaper are exposed to different types of political contents about the political issues and political candidates. According to the research, even though newspaper provided the same amount of political content, newspaper readers usually searched for entertainment news instead of political one. Therefore, when measuring the media exposure, it is important to take into account which types of information audiences search for in each specific media.

To summarize this chapter, there are some important points from previous studies that need to be taken into accounts during the research:

- The recognition of identity is primarily influenced by the economic and social class factors (Ratilainen, 2016).
- The difference between the North and South Vietnamese by political ideology no more exists. However, the current difference depends on the acceptance towards Westernization and globalization (Ratilainen, 2016).
- The advanced technology makes propaganda more efficient to the target audience (O'Donnel & Jowett, 2015).

- Darr (2011) found out that news media such as television and radio support sense of national identity among public. In the meanwhile, newspaper and the Internet contribute to the decrease of national attachment.
- According to Social Identity Theory, group members holding uncertainty about their national identity and national attachment will easily leave their old belief system when they interact with new social movements (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
- Also, by Social Identity Theory, individuals always define themselves in comparison with the groups they belong to. To understand what national identities Vietnamese Millennials are holding requires observing their collective actions and reactions.
- National identity is a type of collective identity. National identity formation is combined of both collecting and eliminating decision. In order to make a nation and achieve a common goal as a nation, each citizen gives up their sub-groups' identities to some extent (Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001)
- According to Dekker-Malova Model (2003), nationalism, national attitudes and national identity were correlated. Nationalism was a constitutive part of national attitudes but also a result a formation process of national attitudes. National attitudes decided which identity set the citizens were constructing.

Propaganda targets the individuals' attitudes and then expects certain behaviours in return. It is required to be consistent and solid over time (Ellul, 1973). Therefore, propaganda can be seen as a strategy and a method in national socialization. By the emergence of new media, national socialization gains more impact. Individuals have more sources to affirm their positive self-identity. Therefore, the national feeling, liking, and pride are formed faster than with national media. This study will fill the gap in Perception on Collective National Identities by Ratilainen (2016) by examining national identity in various groups (in terms of genders, hometown, education levels, etc.) of Vietnamese millennials. Additionally, it tends to add on Shibai's research (2015) in perspective of nationalism, nation identity and attitude besides the aspect of national characters and the differences between the North and the South Vietnamese. It is hard to conclude national identity set of the current Vietnamese millennials by asking direct questions about which identities represent Vietnamese the most. However, applying Dekker-Malova model (Table 1, figure 3, and figure 4) into the questionnaire will help to reveal what collective attitude sets they hold by seeing propaganda and what their personal feeling by observing other information source. My research plans to draw an overview of how Vietnamese millennials feel, perceive, and form their sense of belonging to Vietnam and the extent to which they are proud of being Vietnamese. Together with new coming social movements, do Vietnamese millennials easily give up on their national identity? This research addresses national identity of Vietnamese millennials in the relation to nationalism, national attitude, and propaganda and media exposure. The survey in chapter 3 will be developed to test the following hypotheses.

2.7 Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Vietnamese Millennials who have different *demographic factors* in relations to gender, educational level, occupation, income, awareness towards national news, travel frequency have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1.1: Vietnamese millennials who have different *gender* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.
Hypothesis 1.2: Vietnamese Millennials who have different *occupation* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.
Hypothesis 1.3: Vietnamese millennials who have different *educational level* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national superiority, and nationalism.
Hypothesis 1.3: Vietnamese millennials who have different *educational level* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national level will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national superiority, and national superiority, and national feeling, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and national liking.

Hypothesis 1.4: Vietnamese millennials who have different *income* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1.5: Vietnamese millennials who have different *care about national issues* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national

feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1.6: Vietnamese Millennials who have different *travel frequency* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 2: Vietnamese millennials' *media exposure* in regard to media exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and credibility of the media significantly influence their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 2.1: The *media exposure to propaganda* of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure is associated with their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 2.2: The *duration* of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure is associated with their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 2.3: The *types of media* on which Vietnamese millennials are using is associated with their *national attitudes*

Hypothesis 3: Vietnamese millennials' *attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda* significantly influence their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 3.1: The *attitude* towards 5 statements of Ho Chi Minh President is associated with their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 3.2: The *attitude* towards sea security is associated with their *national attitudes*.

2.8 Theoretical framework

Vietnamese millennial's *demographic factors* in regard to:

- 1. Gender
- 2. Occupation level
- 3. Educational level
- 4. Income level
- 5. Care about national issues
- 6. Travel frequency

Vietnamese millennial's *media using* in regard to:

- 1. Media exposure to propaganda
- Daily exposure on media
- 3. Credibility of media

Attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda content related to:

1. Sea security

H1

H2

٦

 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh

H3

National Attitudes

- 1. National Feeling
- 2. National Liking
- 3. National Pride
- 4. National Preference
- 5. National Superiority
- 6. Nationalism

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to measure the impact of propaganda on the construction of national identity among Vietnamese. It is also designed to clarify the correlation between the extent, which Vietnamese millennials are exposed to political propaganda and online media, and their perception of national identity. As the result, the interpretation of data will be described using MANOVA and Simple Regression. The research design and results are organized into 5 parts addressing:

- 3.1 Research Design
- 3.2 Populations and Sample Selection
- 3.3 Research Instrument
- 3.4 Data Collection Procedures and Pretests
- 3.5 Data Analysis

3.1 Research Design

This survey research was expected to have the participations of 171 Vietnamese millennials. A sample of participants from target population - Vietnamese millennials will answer the same questionnaire. It will be used as descriptive studies of the larger population.

Firstly, the questionnaire adapt the Nationalism scale as used in the study "Nationalism and Its Explanation" by Dekker, Malova, and Hoogendorn (2003). Dekker, Malova, and Hoogendorn conducted three research pieces about nationalism among Dutch people, Slovaks, and Basque people in their home country from 1994 to 1996, which concluded Cronbach's alpha from .75 to .96. They applied Dekker-Malova's Model of Nationalism to create a table of survey questions describing six stages of national attitude. In my paper, the questionnaire will be translated into Vietnamese. Secondly, two propaganda messages will be shown to the respondents with questions referring to the propaganda model of Jowett and O'Donelle (2015). The questions aim to figure out how the respondents interpret the propaganda messages and whether they feel the propaganda persuasive. Last but not least, according to previous studies on media use to carry propaganda and their effects on audiences' behavior, the habit of using media and exposure to media with propaganda messages should be examined during the research. The results will be compared together to conclude their correlation.

Because of the special political regime in Vietnam, discussing on propaganda and nationalism can be sensitive in circumstances. Therefore, the quantitative approach cannot deeply study the target population with too-political questions as expectation. The research will be conducted in online platform, so that the potential target population will easily and conveniently access to the survey. However, because of the limitation of timeline and cost, the online survey might not reach all the targets within the tentative sampling frame.

3.2 Populations and Sample Selection

The study uses non-probability sampling techniques. It aims to the certain population of Vietnam, who are millennials. This target population covers 30 percent of

Vietnamese population (Nielson, 2016), but not all can be examined and access to the research due to the research limitation. So, participants were selected using convenience sampling method drawn from the population, who are the most available and convenient to take the survey around Ho Chi Minh City. Their birth years are from early 1980s to the end of 2000s. They might currently be living inside or outside Vietnam, but had been raised under Vietnam's educational system in primary school, secondary school, high school, or even in college level. They might currently be working or studying in university. The initial expected quantity is approximately 100 participants within three-week timeframe. But the final number collected was 171 valid answer sheets.

The questionnaire comprised 5 main sections and 2 filtering questions at the beginning to select right sampling. The filtering questions required participants to confirm that they were born during the time period from 1980s to 2000, and grown up in Vietnamese culture. For the offline data collection, the questionnaire form will be delivered at the public spots with high traffic of millennials such as coffee shops, universities, parks so on. The potential participants will be asked the age range first before joining the survey.

3.3 Research Instrument

The research instrument covers 4 main key points, including demographics, nationalism and national attitudes, exposure to propaganda, and media use, which are also 4 sections of the questionnaire consist 46 items.

3.3.1 Filtering question:

Were you born between early 1980s and the end of 2000?

 \Box Yes \Box No

Were you born and raised in Vietnam?

 \Box Yes \Box No

The survey only involved Vietnamese from the millennial generation. Moreover, the sample must be grown up inside Vietnamese society and study under Vietnamese education system, so that they are probably exposed to propaganda message. If "Yes" - the participant is a millennial - our targeted sampling, he/she will be navigated to the next section to start the survey. If respondents answer "No", they will quit the survey. This study of national identity and propaganda effect is conducted for Vietnamese nationality only.

3.3.2 Demographic factors (Independent Variable)

- 1. What is your gender? (Nominal scale)
 - \Box 1. Male \Box 2. Female
- 2. What is your current occupation? (Nominal scale)

 \Box 1. Student

- \Box 2. Governmental employee
- \Box 3. Corporate employee
- \Box 4. Business owner
- \Box 5. Others
- 3. What is your highest educational achievement until 2017? (Ordinal)

 \Box 1. Lower than college degree

 \Box 2. Bachelor degree

 \Box 3. Master degree

 \Box 4. Doctor or higher

4. What is your monthly income (Vietnam dong currency) per month? (Ordinal

scale)

 \Box 1. Lower than or equal to 5 millions VND

 \Box 2. 5 millions to 10 millions VND

□ 3. 11 millions to 20 millions VND

 \Box 4. 21 millions VND or higher

5. I care about Vietnam's national issues. (Nominal scale)

□1. Yes, I care about Vietnam's national issues

□2. No, I don't care about Vietnam's national issues

6. I frequently travel out of your current country in a year (Ordinal scale)

 \Box 1. Rarely (0 or 1 time/year)

 \Box 2. Few times (more than 2 times/year)

 \Box 3. Frequently (At least once per 2 months)

3.3.3 Media Exposure and Dependency Level (Independent variable)

According to Media Dependency Theory (DeFleur, & Ball-Rokeach, 1976), the dependency model describes the relationship between media, audiences, and society. Also, media audiences search for different types of information depending on which media they are using (Partel, 1993). The study of media influence on the audience's perception and knowledge toward a topic continues to attract many researchers. In 2009, Strabac and Aalberg conducted an online survey covering US, UK, Norway, Sweden, Belgium (Flandern) and The Netherlands. Their questionnaire addressed media exposure, their trust and interest in the content by checking whether they can recall recent political news such as politicians' names and faces. Those method could be applied into the following part to measure the frequency, duration and types of media that Vietnamese millennials are exposed to.

1. How often are you exposed to propaganda content last week? (Ordinal scale, ranging from 5 most frequently to 1 never)

Types of media	Most frequently 5	Frequently 4	Sometimes 3	Rarely 2	Never 1
TV				Y	
Radio					
Newspaper			0	7	
Social media			0		

2. On average, how many hours per day do you spend on the following media in the past one month period? (Ordinal scale, ranging from 5 most frequently to 1 never)

Types of media	Most frequently 5	Frequently 4	Sometimes 3	Rarely 2	Never 1
TV					
Radio					
Newspaper					

Social media				
--------------	--	--	--	--

3. To what extent do you feel those following media have credibility? (5-point Likert scale from 5 – Highest credible, 4 – Credible, 3 – Neutral, 2 – Incredible, 1 – Highest incredible)

Types of media	Highest credible 5	Credible 4	Neutral 3	Incredible	Highest Incredible 1
TV			<		
Radio				7	
Newspaper					
Socail media					

3.3.4 Propaganda (Independent Variable)

Three propaganda posters will be shown to participants. They contain propagated messages about territorial sea security and gratitude to President Ho Chi Minh (Figure 6, 7 and 8). Especially, figure 7 is compulsory required in all public schools and universities across Vietnam. It has been taken as the most important lesson for all Vietnamese young generations. It conveys 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh for children and adolescence as follows: (1) Love your nation, love your people; (2) Study hard, work hard; (3) Strong solidarity, good discipline; (4) Keep good sanitary habit; (5) Be humble, genuine, and courageous. The efficiency of propaganda will be measured by how much it achieves three purposes of communication referring to the model of Jowett

and O'Donelle (Figure 5). Those three purposes are "to promote mutual understanding" between the government and Vietnamese millennials, "to promote fulfillment of needs" for the government to Vietnamese millennials, "to promote the objectives" of the government "not necessarily in the best interest" of Vietnamese millennials (Jowett & O'Donelle, 2015). Questions go with multiple choice and 5-point Likert scale answers (from 1- strongly disagree, 2- disagree, 3- neutral, 4- agree, 5- strongly agree).



Translation: "Five Statements of President Ho Chi Minh. Statement 1: Love your nation, love your people. Statement 2: Study hard, work hard. Statement 3: strong solidarity, good discipline. Statement 4: Keep good sanitary habit. Statement 5: Humble, genuine, and courageous."



- I clearly understand the 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh (5-point Likert scale from 1- strongly disagree, 2- disagree, 3- neutral, 4- agree, 5- strongly agree)
- I clearly understand the territorial sea security issue (5-point Likert scale from 1- strongly disagree, 2- disagree, 3- neutral, 4- agree, 5- strongly agree)
- 3. I think that **territorial sea security** is an important national issue (5-point Likert scale from 1- strongly disagree, 2- disagree, 3- neutral, 4- agree, 5- strongly agree).

 I think that pursuing national ideals following 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh is important (5-point Likert scale from 1- strongly disagree, 2- disagree, 3neutral, 4- agree, 5- strongly agree).

3.3.5 Nationalism and national attitudes (Dependent variable)

This section will test the hypothesis 1, which claims that Vietnamese millennials' media exposure to national news is positively correlated with their perceived national identity. Propaganda posters and banners contribute to the national news because they repeat the same political messages outdoor. This paper will calculate the reaction of participants when being exposed to propaganda contents about ocean territory and President Ho Chi Minh. By measuring the extent of nationalism and national attitudes of respondents following six stages - feeling (NF), liking (NL), pride (NP), preference (NPR), superiority (NS), and nationalism (NA) with 5-point Likert scale answers (from 1- strongly disagree, 2- disagree, 3- neutral, 4- agree, 5- strongly agree), the respondents can express their perceived national identity. The questionnaire was adapted from table 2 in Nationalism and Its Explanations by Dekker, Malova, and Hoogendorn (2003), and table 2 in National Sentiments and Attitudes Towards Minorities by Kelemen (2000). Table from Kelemen was deployed from Dekker-Malova model. The national attitude of Roma and Jewry Hungarian showed high reliability with Cronbach $\alpha = .856$ (Kelemen, 2000). Most of the subscales of Dutch, Slovaks, and Basque were fluctuated from .56 up to .83. The Cronbach gradually declined when it came to those questions related to national superiority and nationalism.

- 1. I feel I am a real Vietnamese.
- 2. I feel Vietnam is my country.
- 3. I like Vietnamese language.
- 4. I like Vietnam.
- 5. I like to be Vietnamese.
- 6. I like Vietnamese people.
- 7. I am proud of Vietnam.
- 8. I am proud to be Vietnamese.
- 9. I am proud of what other Vietnamese achieved.
- 10. I prefer Vietnamese people as my personal contacts than people from other countries.
- 11. I prefer to live most of my life in Vietnam than in any other countries.
- 12. I prefer to hold Vietnamese citizenship.
- 13. Vietnamese people are better than people from other countries.
- 14. Vietnamese people are the best.
- 15. Vietnam is the best country to live in.
- 16. Vietnamese nationality is the best.
- 17. I feel all Vietnamese have the same ancestors.
- 18. I feel each Vietnamese is a member of one big family.
- 19. I feel all Vietnamese share the same traditions and culture.
- 20. I want all Vietnamese to live in Vietnam.
- 21. I want Vietnamese not to mix with other nationalities.

- 22. I want people of other nationalities to leave Vietnam.
- 23. I want all Vietnamese to be protected.
- 24. I want Vietnamese not to collaborate with foreign countries.

3.4 Data Collection Procedures and Pretests

The collection process was conducted in 5 weeks period from July to August, 2018 with the questionnaire translated in Vietnamese distributed online and offline to Vietnamese groups at targeted locations and sites. Each conduction took approximately 1 hour to deliver and gather the answer sheets. The actual data for this study were acquired within August, 2018.

Before the main survey, a pretest of 30 samples had been done through online form. The online form format was exactly the same with the questionnaire in order to examine the reactions whether the translation and terms were easy for Vietnamese to understand well. According to the result of pretest and main survey, the variables were grouped as following:

- Exposure to propaganda on TV, radio, newspaper, and social media put into Exposure to propaganda;
- Media exposure to TV, radio, newspaper, and social media put into Media Exposure;
- Credibility of TV, radio, newspaper, and social media put into Credibility of Media;

- Attitude towards propaganda content of President Ho Chi Minh (comprised of understandings and opinions);
- National feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism were combined to define national attitude.

According the first plan, the questionnaire was assigned by sending the online form as well as offline form directly to the respondents by email and inbox message. However, the turn over response was quite low. Therefore, the procedure was adjusted to be conducted in offline approach with individuals and in group at convenient locations for those participants. The total collected answer sheets were 182. However, eleven answer sheets were not fully done. At the result, there were 171 valid answer sheets. Following the completion of the questionnaire, the raw data was input into excel file with a specific code book and imported into SPSS for statistical analysis process. The presentation of results comprises of descriptive demographic data, the research findings, and hypothesis testing results.

The Cronbach's Alpha of each statement were examined to see the reliability of the pretest and main survey of 171 respondents. The results were summarized as following table:

Table 2: The comparison of Cronbach's Alpha of general variables in the pretests of 30 volunteers and the main survey of 171 respondents who are Vietnamese millennials living, working, studying in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

30 respondents of pretest				
Item's name	Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach if Item's deleted		
Exposure to Propaganda	.328	.530		
Media Exposure	.375	.525		
Credibility of media	.377	.486		
Attitude towards propaganda	042	.525		
National Attitude	.871	.586		

171 respondents of main survey

Item's name	Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach if Item's deleted
Exposure to Propaganda	.906	.801
Media Exposure	.863	.801
Credibility of media	.842	.811
Attitude towards propaganda	.565	.704
National Attitude	.985	.738

In SPSS result of the pretest, the total result of Cronbach's Alpha when combining all variables was .588, which was not high according to the standard reliability level. Table 2 showed that the Cronbach's Alpha of each statement group were $\alpha_{\text{ExposureToPropaganda}} = .328$; $\alpha_{\text{MediaExposure}} = .375$; $\alpha_{\text{Credibility}} = .377$; $\alpha_{\text{Attitude_Propaganda}} = -.042$; $\alpha_{\text{NationalAttitude}} = .871$. However, the Cronbach's Alpha if they are deleted ($\alpha_{\text{Exposure_To_Propaganda}} = .530$; $\alpha_{\text{Media_Exposure}} = .525$; $\alpha_{\text{Credibility}} = .486$; $\alpha_{\text{Attitude_Propaganda}} = .525$; $\alpha_{\text{NationalAttitude}} = .586$) pointed that deleting them does not lead to the increase of Cronbach's Alpha.

For the survey of 171 respondents, testing the reliability of exposure to propaganda, media exposure, the credibility of media, attitude towards propaganda, and national attitude showed the result of general Cronbach's Alpha equal to .809, which was quite high. It means that the questionnaire is quite reliable. Among the statement groups, Attitude towards Propaganda content had the lowest Cronbach's Alpha ($\alpha_{Attitude_Propaganda}$ = .565). Deleting the questions will not help to increase the Cronbach's Alpha to .704, which is still lower than the general Cronbach's Alpha ($\alpha_{General}$ = .809).

3.5 Descriptive analysis of the respondents' overall demographic data

The demographic summary of one hundred seventy one Vietnamese millennials taken the questionnaire survey including gender, educational level, occupational status, income level, awareness level of national issue, travel frequency is presented in the following table. The results were analyzed from answers of question 1 to question 6 (View in Appendix).

Table 3: Demographic summary of 171 respondents who are Vietnamese millennials

Items	Frequency	Percentage		
Section 2: Demographic Information				
Gender				
Male	82	48		
Female	89	52		
Total	171	100		
Occupation				
Student	60	35.1		
Government employee	17	9.9		
Corporate employee	79	46.2		
Business owner	9	5.3		
Others	6	3.5		
Total	171	100		
Highest education achievement until 2017		·		
Lower than college degree	0	0		
Bachelor degree	153	89.5		
Master degree	16	9.4		
Doctor or higher	2	1.2		
Total	171	100		

living, working, studying in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.

Lower than or equal to 5 millions VND	62	36.3
5 millions to 10 millions VND	24	14
11 millions to 20 millions VND	71	41.5
21 millions VND or higher	14	8.2
Total	171	100
Care about national issues		i
Yes, I care about Vietnam's national issues	128	74.9
No, I don't care about Vietnam's national issues	43	25.1
Total	171	100
Frequency of travelling out of Vietnam		
Rarely (0 or 1 time/year)	150	87.7
Few times (more than 2 times/year)	18	10.5
Frequently (At least once per 2 months)	3	1.8
Total	171	100

As shown in the Table 3, there were 82 male (48%, N=171) and 89 female (52%, N=171) fully participating in the survey. The results of the participants' occupations show that there were 60 students (35.1%, N=171), 79 corporate employees (46.2%, N=171), followed by 17 government employees (9.9%, N=171), 9 business owners (5.3%, N=171), and 6 others (3.5%, N=171), respectively. According to the findings, majority of respondents achieved college degree (89.5%, N=171), followed by master degree (9.4%, N=171) and PHD degree or higher (1.2%, N=171), respectively. None of

participants (0%) have degree lower than university. The descriptive data also identified that the two highest ranges of participants' incomes were lower than and equal to 5 millions VND (36.3%, N=171) and from 11 millions to 20 millions VND (41.5%, N=171). There was a small number of participants who earned 5 millions to 10 millions VND monthly (14%, N=171); followed by a minority who earned from 21 millions and more (8.2%, N=171). In accordance to the survey, the large number of respondents cared about national issues (74.9%, N=171) while the rest (25.1%, N=171) did not. Regard to the travelling frequency out of the country, the majority rarely travelled within a year (87.7%, N=171), followed by more than 2 times yearly (10.5%, N=171), and only a few participants travelled frequently (1.8%, N=171).

3.6 Data Analysis

3.6.1 Hypothesis 1: Vietnamese millennials who have different *demographic factors* in relations to gender, educational level, occupation, income, awareness towards national news, travel frequency have significant different *national attitudes* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1.1: Vietnamese millennials who have different *gender* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1.2: Vietnamese millennials who have different *occupation* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1.3: Vietnamese millennials who have different *educational level* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1.4: Vietnamese millennials who have different *income* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1.5: Vietnamese millennials who have different *care about national issues* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1.6: Vietnamese millennials who have different *travel frequency* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Independent variables are respondents' demographic factors including gender, occupation, educational level, income level, caring about national issues, and travel frequency (Ordinal and nominal scale). Dependent variable is Vietnamese millennials's national attitude comprised of national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority and nationalism (5-Likert scale). One-Way ANOVA statistical analysis was applied to test this hypothesis. **3.6.2 Hypothesis 2:** Vietnamese millennials' *media exposure* in regard to media exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and credibility of the media significantly influence their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 2.1: The *media exposure to propaganda* of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure is associated with their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 2.2: The *daily exposure to media* of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure is associated with their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 2.3: The *media credibility* of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure is associated with their *national attitudes*

Independent variable is media exposure of Vietnamese in regard to media exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and credibility of the media (5-Likert scale). Dependent variable is Vietnamese millennials' national attitude comprised of national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority and nationalism (5-Likert scale). Analysis of Regression was applied to examine the influence of media exposure on national attitude among Vietnamese millennials.

3.6.3 Hypothesis 3: Vietnamese millennials' *attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda* significantly influence their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 3.1: The *attitude* towards 5 statements of Ho Chi Minh President is associated with their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 3.2: The *attitude* towards sea security is associated with their *national attitudes*.

Independent variable is the attitude towards propaganda content in regard to 5 statements of Ho Chi Minh President and Sea Security (5-Likert scale). Dependent variable is Vietnamese millennials' national attitude comprised of national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority and nationalism (5-Likert scale). Analysis of Regression was applied to examine the influence of attitude towards propaganda of 5 statements of Ho Chi Minh President and Sea Security on national attitude among Vietnamese millennials.



CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

This chapter summarized the findings and interpretation of quantitative data collected through the offline survey of 171 Vietnamese millennials living in Vietnam. The hypotheses will be analyzed by using One-way ANOVA and Regression. The findings in this chapter will be divided into two parts:

- 1. Findings of Descriptive Analysis
- 2. Findings of Hypothesis Testing

4.1 Findings of Descriptive Analysis

These findings below showed the frequencies of media exposure, exposure to propaganda content, the credibility of media, the attitudes towards propaganda, and the national attitudes by observing 171 respondents.

The exposure to propaganda, media exposure level, the credibility of media, attitude towards propaganda, and national attitude are measured by 5-Likert scale and by examining the mean of national attitude ranging into 3 levels from high, medium, or low by using the following formula:

Sum range = (Highest score - lowest score) / Numbers of levels

Mean range = (Highest likert scale- Lowest likert scale)/ Numbers of levels.

Mean range= (5-1)/3 = 1.33

Criteria	Meaning
3.67 - 5.00	High level
2.34 - 3.67	Medium level
1.00 - 2.33	Low level

Table 4: Criteria for interpreting the exposure to propaganda, daily media exposure,

media credibility, attitudes toward propaganda, and national attitudes

The descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of daily media exposure (Mean=3.46, SD=1.04). Respondents was most frequently exposed to radio during a day (32.7%, n = 56), followed by newspaper (28.7%, n = 49); 22.8% of participants (n = 39) said that they most frequently watched TV; and 21.6% of them (n = 37) used social media frequently; 14.6% of 171 participants (n = 25) never used social media; and, 11% of them (n = 19) never watched TV. Percentage of participants who did not read newspaper (6.4%, n = 11) and did not listen to radio (7%, n = 12) nearly equal.

As shown in Table 5, when examining the level of daily exposure of each media, respondents had high daily exposure to radio (M = 3.68, SD = 1.22) and to newspaper (M = 3.66, SD = 1.14) last week in comparison to both exposure to TV (M = 3.32, SD = 1.27) and to radio (M = 3.22, SD = 1.33), which were medium.

Media exposure	Mean	SD
TV	3.32	1.27
Radio	3.68	1.22
Newspaper	3.66	1.14
Social media	3.22	1.33

Table 5: The mean and SD of daily exposure to media

For exposure to propaganda, the descriptive findings revealed that majority of respondents had medium level of exposure to propaganda (Mean=3.66, SD=0.99). Participants were most frequently exposed to propaganda content on social media in the previous week (37.4%, n = 64), followed by newspaper (29.2%, n = 50), TV (24.6%, n = 42), and radio (17.5%, n = 47), respectively. Only 1.8% (n = 3) said that they never saw propaganda content on social media. 2.3% (n = 4) were never exposed to propaganda on radio. And, the same percentage of participants (4.1%, n = 7) admitted not seeing any propaganda on TV and newspaper.

As shown Table 6, the descriptive results found out that the 171 respondents' exposure to propaganda on social media had the highest mean (M = 3.84, SD = 1.11), followed by the mean of exposure to propaganda on newspaper (M = 3.68, SD = 1.12), which were high. The respondents' exposure to propaganda on radio (M = 3.58, SD = 1.13) and on TV (M = 3.56, SD = 1.14) had close means, which were medium, respectively.

Exposure to propaganda on:	Mean	SD
TV	3.56	1.14
Radio	3.58	1.13
Newspaper	3.68	1.12
Social media	3.84	1.11

Table 6: The mean and SD of exposure to propaganda

Participants perceived the credibility of various media differently. The descriptive findings found that majority of sample had medium level of trust for media (Mean=3.08, SD=0.68). All participants perceived that TV, radio, newspaper, and social did contain

some credibility for their own. In the other words, none of 171 participants thought that any of TV, radio, newspaper, and social media was not trustful. The majority of participants expressed their neutral trust for all media with 63.7% (n = 109) voted for TV, 56.1% voted for newspaper (n = 96), 55.6% voted for radio (n = 95), and 52% (n = 89) voted for social media. Moreover, according to Table 9, 10.5% of participants (n = 18) perceived that newspaper had the highest credibility, followed by radio (9.9%, n = 17), social media (8.8%, n = 15), and TV (7.0%, n = 12), respectively.

As shown in Table 7, when examining the level of respondents' trust for media, the results pointed out that they had medium level of trust for all media, including social media (Mean=3.13, SD=0.85), newspaper (Mean=3.12, SD=0.86), radio (Mean=3.06, SD=0.86), and TV (Mean=3.02, SD=0.76).

Media Credibility level	Mean	SD
TV	3.02	0.76
Radio	3.06	0.86
Newspaper	3.12	0.86
Social media	3.13	0.85

Table 7: The mean and SD of media credibility level

The descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of attitude toward 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh (Mean=3.63, SD=0.71) and toward sea security (Mean= 3.39, SD=0.72).

Thirty one percent of respondents (n = 53) strongly agreed and 33.3% (n = 57) agreed on their understanding of five statements of President Ho Chi Minh. Twenty three point four percent of the respondents (n = 40) had neutral voice, followed by 12.3% (n = 21) disagreed. And, none of respondents had strongly disagreement on the content and

the importance of 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh (0%, n = 0). In understanding the content of sea security propaganda, 32.2% (n = 55) agreed that they understood, followed by 23.4% (n = 40) strongly disagreed, 28.7% (n = 49) had neutral answers, 12.3% (n = 21) disagreed, and 3.5% (n = 6) strongly disagreed, respectively. The majority of participants had a neutral opinion about the importance of sea security (60.8%, n = 104). The findings found out that 5.8% of the respondents (n = 10) had the strong agreement on its importance, followed by 19.9% (n = 34) agreed. Only 13.5% (n = 23) disagreed on the crucial role of sea security, but none of them showed the strong disagreement on that. The descriptive statistics found that the understanding about five statements of President Ho Chi Minh scored the highest (M = 3.83, SD = 1.0006) in high level. The understanding of sea security propaganda scored a bit lower (M = 3.60, SD = 1.082), followed by the opinion about President Ho Chi Minh's 5 statements (M = 3.43, SD = .766), then opinion about sea security's crucial role (M = 3.18, SD = .733). According the interpreting criteria, they will belong to the medium level.

As shown in Table 8, when examining the level of respondents' attitude toward 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh, the results found that they had high level of understanding the 5 statements (Mean=3.83, SD=1.00) and medium level of opinion about the importance of President Ho Chi Minh's 5 statements (Mean=3.43, SD=0.76). Meanwhile, the level of respondents' attitude towards sea security, the results found that they had medium level of understanding the sea security (Mean=3.60, SD=1.08) and opinion about the importance of sea security (Mean=3.18, SD=0.73).

Table 8: The mean and SD of attitudes towards 5 statements of President Ho Chi

Minh and sea security.

Attitudes towards 5 statements	Mean	SD
Understanding of 5 statements of	3.83	1.006
President Ho Chi Minh		
Opinions about the 5 statements of	3.43	0.76
President Ho Chi Minh		
Attitudes towards sea security		
Understanding of sea security	3.60	1.08
propaganda		
Opinion about sea security	3.18	0.733

The national attitudes, which consisted of national feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority, and nationalism, were found at medium level (Mean=3.32, SD=0.77) in respondents.

For national feeling, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of feeling (Mean=3.31, SD=0.84). When examining the level of respondents' national feeling, the results found that they had medium level of "I feel I am a real Vietnamese" (Mean=3.46, SD=0.92) and "I feel like Vietnam is my country" (Mean=3.16, SD=0.94).

For national liking, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of liking (Mean=3.26, SD=0.78). When examining the level of respondents' national liking, the results found that they had medium level of "I like Vietnam" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I like Vietnamese people" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I like Vietnamese language" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82), and "I like to be Vietnamese" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82).

For national pride, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of pride (Mean=3.41, SD=0.84). When examining the level of respondents' national pride, the results found that they had medium level of "I am proud to be Vietnamese"(Mean=3.46, SD=0.92), "I am proud of what other Vietnamese achieved" (Mean=3.46, SD=0.922), and "I am proud of Vietnam" (Mean=3.16, SD=0.94).

For national preference, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of preference (Mean=3.36, SD=0.85). When examining the level of respondents' national preference, the results found that they had medium level of "I prefer to live most of my life in Vietnam than in other countries" (Mean=3.46, SD=0.92), "I prefer to hold Vietnamese citizenship" (I prefer to live most of my life in Vietnam than in other countries), and "I prefer to live most of my life in Vietnam than in other countries" (mean=3.16, SD=0.94).

For superiority, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of superiority (Mean=3.26, SD=0.78). When examining the level of respondents' national superiority, the results found that they had medium level of "Vietnamese people are the best" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "Vietnamese nationality is the best" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "Vietnamese people are the best" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82), and "Vietnam is the best country to live in" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82).

As shown in Table 9, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of nationalism (Mean=3.29, SD=0.78). When examining the level of respondents' national superiority, the results found that they had medium level of "I want Vietnamese not to mix with other nationalities" (Mean=3.46, SD=0.92), "I want all

Vietnamese to be protected" (Mean=3.46, SD=0.92), "I want Vietnamese not to collaborate with foreign countries" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I want people of other nationalities to leave Vietnam" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I want people of other nationalities to leave Vietnam" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I want all Vietnamese to live in Vietnam" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82), "I feel each Vietnamese is a member of one big family" (Mean=3.16, SD=0.94), and "I want people of other nationalities to leave Vietnam" (Mean=3.16, SD=0.94).

Table 9: The mean and SD of national attitudes, including national feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority, and nationalism.

National attitudes	Mean	SD
National feeling	3.31	0.84
National liking	3.26	0.78
National pride	3.41	0.84
National preference	3.36	0.85
National superiority	3.26	0.78
Nationalism	3.3	0.78
National attitudes	3.32	0.77
National feeling		
I feel I am a real Vietnamese	3.60	1.08
I feel like Vietnam is my country	3.18	0.73
National liking		
I like Vietnamese language	3.23	0.83
I like Vietnam"	3.30	0.88
I like to be Vietnamese	3.23	0.83
I like Vietnamese people	3.30	0.88
National pride		
I am proud of Vietnam	3.30	0.88
I am proud to be Vietnamese	3.46	0.99
I am proud of what other Vietnamese	3.46	0.99
achieved		
National preference		

I prefer Vietnamese people as my	3.16	0.94
personal contacts than people from other		
countries		
I prefer to live most of my life in	3.46	0.92
Vietnam than in other countries		
I prefer to hold Vietnamese citizenship	3.46	0.92
National superiority		
Vietnamese people are better than	3.30	0.88
people from other countries		
Vietnamese people are the best	3.23	0.83
Vietnam is the best country to live in	3.23	0.83
Vietnamese nationality is the best	3.30	0.88
Nationalism		
I feel all Vietnamese have the same	3.23	0.83
ancestors.		
I feel each Vietnamese is a member of	3.16	0.94
one big family		
I feel all Vietnamese share the same	3.16	0.94
traditions and culture		
I want all Vietnamese to live in Vietnam	3.30	0.88
I want Vietnamese not to mix with other	3.46	0.92
nationalities		
I want people of other nationalities to	3.30	0.88
leave Vietnam		
I want all Vietnamese to be protected	3.46	0.92
I want Vietnamese not to collaborate	3.30	0.88
with foreign countries	0	

4.2 Findings of Hypothesis Testing:

Hypothesis 1.1: Vietnamese millennials who have different *gender* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

As shown in Table 10, One-Way ANOVA analysis revealed that respondents'

gender did not significantly influence their national attitudes, including national liking

($F_{(1)}$ = 3.641, p > .05), followed by national superiority ($F_{(1)}$ = 3.641, p > .05), nationalism

 $(F_{(1)} = 3.170, p > .05)$, national feeling $(F_{(1)} = 2.038, p > .05)$, national pride $(F_{(1)} = 1.658, p > .05)$ p > .05), national preference ($F_{(1)} = 1.565$, p > .05), respectively.

Table 10: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of gender difference towards

National Attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
National Feeling	1.442	1	1.442	2.038	.155
National Liking	2.196	1	2.196	3.641	.058
National Pride	1.181	- 1	1.181	1.658	.200
National Preference	1.127	1	1.127	1.565	.213
National Superiority	2.196	1	2.196	3.641	.058
Nationalism	1.944	1	1.944	3.170	.077

national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials

Hypothesis 1.2: Vietnamese millennials who have different occupation will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

As shown in Table 11, One-Way ANOVA analysis revealed that some occupation significantly influence on national attitudes in aspect of national pride ($F_{(4)} = 1.998$, p > .05) and national superiority ($F_{(4)}$ = 2.799, p < .05). On the other hands, Table 13 showed that respondents' occupation did not significantly influence their national attitudes,

including national liking ($F_{(4)}$ = 2.799, p < .05), followed by nationalism ($F_{(4)}$ = 2.348, p > .05), national feeling ($F_{(1)}$ = 1.599, p > .05), and national preference ($F_{(4)}$ = 1.595, p > .05), respectively.

Table 11: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of occupation difference towards national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials

National Attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
National Feeling	4.489	4	1.122	1.599	.177
National Liking	6.579	4	1.645	2.799	.028
National Pride	5.583	4	1.396	1.998	.097
National Preference	4.545	4	1.136	1.595	.178
National Superiority	6.579	4	1.645	2.799	.028
Nationalism 5.655		4	1.414	2.348	.057

Note: $p^{**} < 0.01$, $p^{***} < 0.001$ (Sig.)

According to the PostHoc Test's LSD analysis in Table 12, some respondents who are governmental officers expressed differently on national feeling (I-J = $.58153^*$, p < .05), followed by national liking (I-J = $.58153^*$, p < .05), national superiority (I-J = $.58153^*$, p < .05), nationalism (I-J = $.52718^*$, p < .05), national pride (I-J = $.48474^*$, p <

.05), and national preference (I-J = $.46811^*$, p < .05) in comparison to the respondents who are corporate employees.

Table 12: PostHoc test's result of the between-subject effects of occupation difference

Dependant Variable	Occupation (I)	Occupation (J)	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std Linear	Sig.
National Feeling	Student	Governmental employee	33480	.23020	.148
		Corporate employee	.14546	.14347	.312
		Business owner	26944	.29949	.370
÷		Other	.25833	.35873	.472
	Governmental employee	Student	.33480	.23020	.148
		Corporate employee	.48027*	.22400	.033
		Business owner	.06536	.34538	.850
		Other	.59314	.39785	.138
	Corporate employee	Student	14546	.14347	.312
		Governmental employee	48027*	.22400	.033
		Business owner	41491	.29475	.161
		Other	.11287	.35479	.751
		Student	.26944	.29949	.370

towards national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials

	Business owner	Governmental employee	06536	.34538	.850
		Corporate employee	.41491	.29475	.161
		Other	.52778	.44157	.234
	Other	Student	25833	.35873	.472
		Governmental employee	59314	.39785	.138
		Corporate employee	11287	.35479	.751
		Business owner	52778	.44157	.234
National Liking	Student	Governmental employee	34314	.21064	.105
	Corporate employee	.23840	.13128	.071	
		Business owner	27778	.27404	.312
		Other	.16667	.32826	.612
	Governmental	Student	.34314	.21064	.105
	employee	Corporate employee	.58153*	.20497	.005
		Business owner	.06536	.31603	.836
		Other	.50980	.36404	.163
	Corporate	Student	23840	.13128	.071
	employee	Governmental employee	58153*	.20497	.005
		Business owner	51617	.26971	.057
		Other	07173	.32465	.825

	Business	Student	.27778	.27404	.312
	owner	Governmental employee	06536	.31603	.836
		Corporate employee	.51617	.26971	.057
		Other	.44444	.40405	.273
	Other	Student	16667	.32826	.612
		Governmental employee	50980	.36404	.163
		Corporate employee	.07173	.32465	.825
		Business owner	44444	.40405	.273
National Pride	Student	Governmental employee	36209	.22966	.117
		Corporate employee	.12264	.14314	.393
		Business owner	39259	.29880	.191
		Other	.36667	.35790	.307
	Governmental	Student	.36209	.22966	.117
	employee	Corporate employee	.48474*	.22348	.032
		Business owner	03050	.34458	.930
		Other	.72876	.39693	.068
	Corporate	Student	12264	.14314	.393
em	employee	Governmental employee	48474*	.22348	.032
		Business owner	51524	.29407	.082

			24402	25207	402
		Other	.24402	.35397	.492
	Business owner	Student	.39259	.29880	.191
		Governmental employee	.03050	.34458	.930
		Corporate employee	.51524	.29407	.082
		Other	.75926	.44055	.087
	Other	Student	36667	.35790	.307
		Governmental employee	72876	.39693	.068
		Corporate employee	24402	.35397	.492
		Business owner	75926	.44055	.087
National Preference	Student	Governmental employee	35327	.23195	.130
		Corporate employee	.11484	.14457	.428
		Business owner	33148	.30177	.274
		Other	.26111	.36147	.471
	Governmental	Student	.35327	.23195	.130
	employee	Corporate employee	.46811*	.22571	.040
		Business owner	.02179	.34801	.950
		Other	.61438	.40088	.127
	Corporate	Student	11484	.14457	.428
	employee	Governmental employee	46811*	.22571	.040

		Business owner	44632	.29700	.135
		Other	.14627	.35750	.683
	Business	Student	.33148	.30177	.274
	owner	Governmental employee	02179	.34801	.950
		Corporate employee	.44632	.29700	.135
		Other	.59259	.44494	.185
	Other	Student	26111	.36147	.471
		Governmental employee	61438	.40088	.127
		Corporate employee	14627	.35750	.683
		Business owner	59259	.44494	.185
National Superiority	Student	Governmental employee	34314	.21064	.105
		Corporate employee	.23840	.13128	.071
		Business owner	27778	.27404	.312
		Other	.16667	.32826	.612
	Governmental	Student	.34314	.21064	.105
	employee	Corporate employee	.58153*	.20497	.005
		Business owner	.06536	.31603	.836
		Other	.50980	.36404	.163
		Student	23840	.13128	.071

	Corporate employee	Governmental employee	58153*	.20497	.005
		Business owner	51617	.26971	.057
		Other	07173	.32465	.825
	Business	Student	.27778	.27404	.312
	owner	Governmental employee	06536	.31603	.836
		Corporate employee	.51617	.26971	.057
		Other	.44444	.40405	.273
	Other	Student	16667	.32826	.612
	Governmental employee	50980	.36404	.163	
		Corporate employee	.07173	.32465	.825
		Business owner	44444	.40405	.273
Nationalism	Student	Governmental employee	32966	.21320	.124
		Corporate employee	.19752	.13288	.139
		Business owner	27083	.27737	.330
		Other	.31250	.33225	.348
	Governmental	Student	.32966	.21320	.124
	employee	Corporate employee	.52718*	.20746	.012
		Business owner	.05882	.31987	.854
		Other	.64216	.36847	.083

Corporate employee	Student	19752	.13288	.139
employee	Governmental employee	52718*	.20746	.012
	Business owner	46835	.27299	.088
	Other	.11498	.32859	.727
Business owner	Student	.27083	.27737	.330
	Governmental employee	05882	.31987	.854
	Corporate employee	.46835	.27299	.088
	Other	.58333	.40897	.156
Others	Student	31250	.33225	.348
	Governmental employee	64216	.36847	.083
	Corporate employee	11498	.32859	.727
	Business owner	58333	.40897	.156

Hypothesis 1.3: Vietnamese millennials who have different *educational level* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

One-Way ANOVA analysis revealed in the Table 13 that respondents' educational level did not significantly influence their national attitudes, including national liking ($F_{(2)} = 2.269$, p > .05), followed by national superiority ($F_{(2)} = 2.269$, p > .05), nationalism ($F_{(2)} = 1.336$, p > .05), national pride ($F_{(2)} = .756$, p > .05), national feeling ($F_{(2)} = .709$, p > .05), and national preference ($F_{(2)} = .634$, p > .05), respectively.

Table 13: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of educational level difference

National Attitudes of Vietnamese Millennials	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
National Feeling	1.013	2	0.506	.709	.494
National Liking	2.739	2	1.369	2.269	.107
National Pride	1.084	2	0.542	.756	.471
National Preference	.921	2	0.460	.634	.531
National Superiority	2.739	2	1.369	2.269	.107
Nationalism	1.653	2	0.827	1.336	.266

towards national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials

Note: $p^{**} < 0.01$, $p^{***} < 0.001$ (Sig.)

Hypothesis 1.4: Vietnamese millennials who have different *income* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

As shown in Table 14, One-Way ANOVA analysis presented that respondents' income difference did not significantly influence their national attitudes, including national liking ($F_{(3)} = 1.422$, p > .05), national superiority ($F_{(3)} = 1.422$, p > .05), national

pride ($F_{(3)} = 1.250$, p > .05), nationalism ($F_{(3)} = 1.219$, p > .05), national preference ($F_{(3)} = 1.207$, p > .05), and national feeling ($F_{(3)} = 1.087$, p > .05), respectively.

Table 14: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of income difference towards

National Attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
National Feeling	2.318	3	0.773	1.087	.356
National Liking	2.594	3	0.865	1.422	.238
National Pride	2.669	3	0.890	1.250	.294
National Preference	2.607	3	0.869	1.207	.309
National Superiority	2.594	3	0.865	1.422	.238
Nationalism	2.264	3	0.755	1.219	.304

national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials

Note: p** < 0.01, p***< 0.001 (Sig.)

Hypothesis 1.5: Vietnamese millennials who have different *care about national issues* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

As shown in Table 15, One-Way ANOVA analysis showed that respondents' care about national issues did not significantly influence their national attitudes, including national feeling ($F_{(1)}$ = .681, p > .05), national pride ($F_{(1)}$ = .672, p > .05), nationalism ($F_{(1)}$ = .659, p > .05), national preference ($F_{(1)}$ = .553, p > .05), national superiority ($F_{(1)}$ = .045, p > .05), and national liking ($F_{(1)}$ = .045, p > .05), respectively.

Table 15: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of care about national issues

National Attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
National Feeling	.486	1	.486	.681	.410
National Liking	.028	1	.028	.045	.833
National Pride	.481	1	.481	.672	.414
National Preference	.401	1	.401	.553	.458
National Superiority	.028	1	.028	.045	.833
Nationalism	.432	1	.432	.695	.406

difference towards national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials

Note: p** < 0.01, p***< 0.001 (Sig.)

Hypothesis 1.6: Vietnamese millennials who have different *travel frequency* will have significant different *national attitude* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

As shown in Table 16, One-Way ANOVA analysis revealed that respondents' gender did not significantly influence their national attitudes, including national liking $(F_{(2)} = 1.116, p > .05)$, national superiority $(F_{(2)} = 1.116, p > .05)$, nationalism $(F_{(2)} = .662, p < .05)$

p > .05), nationalism ($F_{(2)} = .662$, p > .05), national feeling ($F_{(2)} = .278$, p > .05), and national preference ($F_{(2)} = .215$, p > .05), respectively.

Table 16: One-Way ANOVA analysis testing means of travel frequency difference

National Attitudes of Vietnamese millennials	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
National Feeling	.399	2	.199	.278	.758
National Liking	1.365	2	.683	1.116	.330
National Pride	.489	2	.244	.339	.713
National Preference	.314	2	.157	.215	.807
National Superiority	1.365	2	.683	1.116	.330
Nationalism	.825	2	.413	.662	.517

towards national attitudes of Vietnamese Millennials

Note: p** < 0.01, p***< 0.001 (Sig.)

Hypothesis 2: Vietnamese millennials' *media exposure* in regard to media exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and credibility of the media significantly influence their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 2.1: The *media exposure to propaganda* of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure is associated with their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 2.2: The *daily exposure to media* of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure is associated with their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 2.3: The *media credibility* of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure is associated with their *national attitudes*.

A regression was calculated to predict national attitudes based on media exposure of Vietnamese millennials in regard to exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and media credibility. According to Table 17, the results of the regression indicated that the model explained 49.6% of the variance and that the model was a significant predictor of national attitudes ($F_{(3,167)} = 54.758$, $p = .000^{b} < .05$). When examining the constructs of media exposure, Regression found out that all media credibility ($\beta = .310^{**}$, p < .05), exposure to propaganda ($\beta = .308$, p < .05), and daily exposure to media ($\beta = .225^{**}$, p < .05) contributed significantly to national attitudes. These findings also suggested that media credibility had the highest influence on the national attitudes, followed by exposure to propaganda and daily exposure to media.

Table 17: Regression Analysis of Vietnamese millennials' media exposure comprised of exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and media credibility as predictors of their national attitudes.

Coefficients ^a										
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B					

		В	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.456	.235		1.935	.055	009	.921
	Exposure to Propaganda	.308	.046	.395	6.758	.000	.218	.398
	Daily Media Exposure	.225	.044	.303	5.100	.000	.138	.312
	Media Credibility	.310	.066	.274	4.711	.000	.180	.439

a. Dependent Variable: National Attitudes

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	50.725	3		54.758	
	Residual	51.567		.309		
	Total	102.292	170			

a. Dependent Variable: National Attitudes

b. Predictors: (Constant), Exposure to Propaganda, Daily Media Exposure, Media Credibility

Hypothesis 3: Vietnamese millennials' attitudes towards nationalistic

propaganda significantly influence their national attitudes.

Hypothesis 3.1: The *attitude* towards 5 statements of Ho Chi Minh President is

associated with their national attitudes.

Hypothesis 3.2: The *attitude* towards sea security is associated with their *national attitudes*.

A regression analysis was carried out to investigate whether attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda could be significant predictors of national attitudes. According to Table 18, the results of the regression indicated that the model explained 52.8% of the variance and that the model was a significant predictor of national attitudes ($F(_{2,168}) = 93.842$, p = .000^b < .05). Both constructs of nationalistic propaganda, which were the attitudes towards the 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh ($\beta = .517$, p = .000) and attitudes towards sea security ($\beta = .423$, p = .000), contributed significantly to Vietnamese millennials' national attitudes. The finding suggested that their attitudes towards 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh had highest influence on their national attitudes.

Table 18: Regression Analysis of Vietnamese millennials' attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda about the 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh and the sea security as predictors of their national attitudes.

	Coefficients ^a												
	Model			Standardized Coefficients				95.0% Confidence Interval for B					
		В	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound					
1	(Constant)	.009	.245		.037	.970	475	.493					
	Attitude Towards President Ho Chi Minh's 5 statements	.517	.063	.472	8.151	.000	.392	.642					
	Attitude Towards Sea Security	.423	.062	.394	6.811	.000	.300	.546					

a. Dependent Variable: National Attitudes

ANOVA ^a												
Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.						
1	Regression	53.976	2	26.988		.000 ^b						
	Residual	48.315										
	Total	102.292										

a. Dependent Variable: National Attitudes

b. Predictors: (Constant), Attitudes Towards President Ho Chi Minh's 5 statements, Attitudes Towards Sea Security

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSIONS

This chapter summarized the descriptive findings and hypothesis findings and provided discussions on these findings. Besides, this chapter also provided the limitations of the study, and recommendations for application and for future research. The chapter consists of 6 topics follows:

- 5.1 Summary of Descriptive Findings and Discussion
- 5.2 Summary of Hypothesis Testing and Discussion
- 5.3 Conclusion of the Research
- 5.4 Limitations of the Study
- 5.5 Recommendations for Future Application
- 5.6 Recommendations for Future Research

5.1 Summary of Descriptive Findings and Discussion

Throughout the survey, the demographic data of 171 participants were analyzed, including their gender, occupation, educational level, monthly income, their care about national issues, and their frequency of travelling out of the country.

The descriptive findings revealed that Descriptive findings revealed that majority of the sample were female (52%, n = 89), followed by female (48%, n = 82).

Majority of the sample were corporate employees (46.2%, n=79), followed by students (35.1%, n=60), government employees (9.9%, n=17), business owners (5.3%, n=9), and others (3.5%, n=6), respectively.

The descriptive findings also pointed out that most of the sample achieved college degree (89.5%, n=153), followed by master degree (9.4%, n=16) and doctor or higher degree (1.2%, n=2), respectively.

According to the findings, majority of the sample got the monthly salary that was around 11 millions to 20 millions Vietnam dong (41.5%, n=71), followed by lower than or equal to 5 millions Vietnam dong (36.3%, n=62), 5 millions to 10 millions Vietnam dong (14%, n=24), and 21 millions or higher (8.2%, n=14), respectively.

Majority of the sample cared about Vietnam's national issues (74.9%, n=128), followed by those who did not care about Vietnam's national issues (25.1%, n=43), respectively.

Majority of the sample rarely travelled out of Vietnam (87.7%, n=150), followed by those who travelled out of Vietnam more than 2 times per year (10.5%, n=18) and who travelled frequently at least once per month (1.8%, n=3), respectively. It can be concluded that Vietnamese millennials in both male and female gender, despite their educational level, occupation, monthly income salary, and frequency of travelling out of Vietnam care about national issues.

Besides demographic data, the findings also revealed about the exposure to propaganda, daily media exposure, media credibility, attitudes toward propaganda, and national attitudes.

The descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of daily media exposure (Mean=3.46, SD=1.04). When examining the level of daily exposure of each media, the results pointed out that they had high level of exposure for radio (Mean=3.68, SD=1.221), followed by other media in medium level, including newspaper (Mean=3.66, SD=1.144), TV (Mean=3.32, SD=1.267), and social media (Mean=3.22, SD=1.332). From the results, it means that media is a part of Vietnamese millennials' daily life. They still have tendency to expose to radio and newspaper. It can be explained by the transformation of radio platform recently to catch up with the audience and social change. Radio is now on the Internet, such as Youtube and on site, and created into another version - podcast. The content builders for radio also expand their content type, change their story flow and tone of voice to match with ongoing trend; also input more community engagement on each topic (Dong, 2018). Despite the growth of social media, radio is still on the top effective channel for marketing and communication. It can be explained by the growth in number of people using public transportation and grab car to commute in Ho Chi Minh city. While commuting by cars or public transportation during the traffic jam, Vietnamese tend to be exposed to radio. It

can also come from the habit of listening to online media of officer while working (VOH, 2016).

Also, according to the findings, majority of respondents had medium level of exposure to propaganda (Mean=3.66, SD=0.99). When examining the level of respondents' exposure to propaganda on each media, the results pointed out that they had high level of exposure to propaganda on social media (Mean=3.84, SD=1.12) and newspaper (Mean=3.68, SD=1.12), followed by other media in medium level, including radio (Mean=3.58, SD=1.12) and TV (Mean=3.56, SD=1.14). In overall, it can be concluded that social media is the easiest channel for the propaganda content exposure because of the convience and the fast spreading speed of the Internet. Audiences on the social media can actively search and be suggested to other information related to the propaganda. It leads to the high exposure to propaganda content. Newspaper, radio, and TV are considered as official national channels, which are strictly controlled and censored. Therefore, latest news are going to be announced in those channels as soon as possible for the citizens' awareness.

The descriptive findings found that majority of sample had medium level of trust for media (Mean=3.08, SD=0.68). When examining the level of respondents' trust for media, the results pointed out that they had medium level of trust for all media, including social media (Mean=3.13, SD=0.85), newspaper (Mean=3.12, SD=0.86), radio (Mean=3.06, SD=0.86), and TV (Mean=3.02, SD=0.76). It can be concluded that Vietnamese millennials give a high trust on social media and newspaper, which provide two-way communication. The audiences easily express their opinions and interact with the others. That fulfills their freedom of speech and give them control over the content that they consume (Dong, 2018). For radio and TV, the citizens are fully aware of the national control. Hence, information on radio and TV can be from single point of view.

The descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of attitude toward 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh (Mean=3.63, SD=0.71). When examining the level of respondents' attitude toward 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh, the results found that they had high level of understanding the 5 statements (Mean=3.83, SD=1.00) and medium level of opinion about the importance of President Ho Chi Minh 's 5 statements (Mean=3.43, SD=0.76). The ideology of President Ho Chi Minh has been integrated into all stages of education from kindergarten to primary school, secondary school, high school, and up to college (Ministry of Education and Training, n.d). It explains the high understanding of the 5 statement of President Ho Chi Minh in all Vietnamese millennials. Additionally, they agree to the importance of those statements.

The descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of attitude toward sea security (Mean= 3.39, SD=0.72). When examining the level of respondents' attitude towards sea security, the results found that they had medium level of understanding the sea security (Mean=3.60, SD=1.08) and opinion about the importance of sea security (Mean=3.18, SD=0.73). Until recently, sea security is always highlighted by Vietnamese authority in international conferences and on all national news channels ("Premier expresses", 2019). That causes Vietnamese millennials stay conscious of national sea security and its impacts on the national security in general.

The national attitudes, which consisted of national feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority, and nationalism, were found at medium level (Mean=3.32, SD=0.77) in respondents. For national feeling, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of feeling (Mean=3.31, SD=0.84). When examining the level of respondents' national feeling, the results found that they had medium level of "I feel I am a real Vietnamese" (Mean=3.46, SD=0.92) and "I feel like Vietnam is my country" (Mean=3.16, SD=0.94).

For national liking, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of liking (Mean=3.26, SD=0.78). When examining the level of respondents' national liking, the results found that they had medium level of "I like Vietnam" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I like Vietnamese people" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I like Vietnamese language" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82), and "I like to be Vietnamese" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82).

For national pride, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of pride (Mean=3.41, SD=0.84). When examining the level of respondents' national pride, the results found that they had medium level of "I am proud to be Vietnamese"(Mean=3.46, SD=0.92), "I am proud of what other Vietnamese achieved" (Mean=3.46, SD=0.922), and "I am proud of Vietnam" (Mean=3.16, SD=0.94).

For national preference, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of preference (Mean=3.36, SD=0.85). When examining the level of respondents' national preference, the results found that they had medium level of "I prefer to live most of my life in Vietnam than in other countries" (Mean=3.46,

SD=0.92), "I prefer to hold Vietnamese citizenship" (I prefer to live most of my life in Vietnam than in other countries), and "I prefer to live most of my life in Vietnam than in other countries" (mean=3.16, SD=0.94).

For superiority, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of superiority (Mean=3.26, SD=0.78). When examining the level of respondents' national superiority, the results found that they had medium level of "Vietnamese people are the best" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "Vietnamese nationality is the best" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "Vietnamese people are the best" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82), and "Vietnam is the best country to live in" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82).

For nationalism, the descriptive findings found that majority of respondents had medium level of nationalism (Mean=3.29, SD=0.78). When examining the level of respondents' national superiority, the results found that they had medium level of "I want Vietnamese not to mix with other nationalities" (Mean=3.46, SD=0.92), "I want all Vietnamese to be protected" (Mean=3.46, SD=0.92), "I want Vietnamese not to collaborate with foreign countries" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I want people of other nationalities to leave Vietnam" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I want people of other nationalities to leave Vietnam" (Mean=3.30, SD=0.88), "I want all Vietnamese to live in Vietnam" (Mean=3.23, SD=0.82), "I feel each Vietnamese is a member of one big family" (Mean=3.16, SD=0.94), and "I want people of other nationalities to leave Vietnam" (Mean=3.16, SD=0.94).

The results showed that Vietnamese millennials positively express their national attitudes in general. For example, for national pride, they are aware of the talents and

achievement of Vietnamese around the world. They feel proud of their nationality consequently. In term of national preference, because of the economic growth and opportunity for travelling or studying abroad of Vietnamese millennials, majority of them easily compare between lifestyle in Vietnam and other countries. Therefore, with a good condition of income, saving, and living in Vietnam, they do not consider living abroad as the only choice for better future. In term of national superiority and nationalism, the levels are medium to high because of the training program integrated the love for country since early-age education of Vietnamese government. Also, the national strategy keeps propaganda content live on in daily life's aspects such as pubic banners, bandrolls, communnial radio, national holidays so on until recently (Qiuyi, 2016).

5.2 Summary of Hypothesis Testing and Discussion

The samples were tested in the survey based on three main hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Vietnamese millennials who have different *demographic factors* in relations to gender, educational level, occupation, income, awareness towards national news, travel frequency have significant different *national attitudes* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1 was analyzed by One-Way ANOVA with the significance level set at Alpha (α) 0.05 or 0.1. It revealed that the respondents' gender, educational level, monthly income, care about national issues, and travel frequency, except for occupation, did not significantly influence their national attitudes, including national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism. According to the result, occupational difference among respondents significantly influence the samples' national attitudes in term of national liking ($F_{(4)} = 2.799^{**}$, p < .05) and superiority ($F_{(4)} = 2.799^{**}$, p < .05). In the PostHoc Test's LSD analysis, governmental employees express their national attitudes differently from corporate employees. To conclude, the hypothesis 1 was not fully supported. Hypothesis 1 findings supported the Perception theory and Social Identity theory, which posited that perceiving was an active process collecting all information from the surrounding environment by every senses (West & Turner, 2014, p. 497); and, also, people in a group constructed and reaffirmed their identities by comparing themselves to others within the group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The study suggested that surrounding information from environment and media influenced the way people perceive things. Because of the sensitivity in politic discussion, there was no past study on the governmental workplace or communism conducted in Vietnam. However, the result showed that working environment and job requirement for governmental officers made some difference in the way those officer shaped their national attitudes. It was explained by various annual trainings on Communist ideology and President Ho Chi Minh's ethic and spirit as compulsory programs. Meanwhile, in the corporate workplace, the employees are free to expose to foreign ideology and concepts based on corporate culture and the origin of the brand.

Hypothesis 2: Vietnamese millennials' *media exposure* in regards to media exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and credibility of the media significantly influence their *national attitudes*.

To test hypothesis 2, Regression analysis revealed that Vietnamese millennials' media exposure was a significant predictor of their national attitudes. Moreover, when examining the key constructs of media exposure in regards to exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and media credibility. Regression analysis found that each construct was also a significant predictor of national attitudes of Vietnamese millennials (p < .05). In conclusion, hypothesis 2 was fully supported. The findings supported the Social Identity theory and Media Dependency theory, which posited that people usually and actively searched for information on media to support their decision-making process (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1976) and they held the identity set of the belonged group and easily leaved their old belief during social change (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Media exposure, especially traditional news media like TV and radio, influenced on the audiences' sense of belongings towards a group and reassure their group's perceived values, which primarily decided their attitude towards that certain group. Meanwhile, newspaper and the Internet partially make the national attachment declined (Darr, 2011) because they provided audiences more two-way communication and additional sources for reference. The study suggested that Vietnamese millennials' national attitudes should be frequently sustained by the cooperation of media in term of increasing the frequency and, especially, its credibility. The frequency of content related to propaganda, national news, history, culture, and people should be integrated into media program as daily

routine. Also, there should be more interaction between media and its audiences to reduce the misunderstanding and misleading information.

Hypothesis 3: Vietnamese millennials' *attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda* significantly influence their *national attitudes*.

Hypothesis 3 was analyzed by Regression. It revealed that attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda could be significant predictors of national attitudes. In details, examining the attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda comprised of two key constructs, which are attitude towards 5 statements of Ho Chi Minh President and attitude towards sea security (p < .05). The regression analysis found that each construct was also a significant predictor of Vietnamese millennials' national attitudes. It can be said that hypothesis 3 was fully supported. The findings supported the Propaganda and Magic Bullet theory, which posited that each propaganda message was injected into audiences' mind by senders (Lasswell, 1927) and expected the audiences' actions towards what senders' desire (O'Donnell & Jowett, 2015). This result also matched with past study about the purpose of nationalistic propaganda as a communication tool of the government to their citizens in communist country and nationalistic propaganda could influence the construction process of national identity among citizens (Darr, 2011). As citizens define their national identity, they could conduct their attitudes towards their nation. This study suggested that media content creators and national communication department should try to spread propaganda content on specific media channels like radio and TV; and more

control on newspapers and social media in order to reinforce and provoke the national attitudes among Vietnamese.

5.3 Conclusion of the Research

In conclusion, after collecting and analyzing the survey data of 171 respondents, the hypothesis 1 was partially supported while the hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 were fully supported. This study contributes to the understanding of how Vietnamese millennials' perceived national attitudes are affected by their demographic factors, media exposure, and attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda.

It showed that Vietnamese millennials in different demographic factors in relations to gender, educational level, income, awareness towards national news, and travel frequency, except for occupation, did not have significant different *national attitudes* in respect to national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism. In the other hands, their media exposure in regards to media exposure to propaganda, daily exposure to media, and credibility of the media significantly influenced their national attitudes. Also, their attitudes towards nationalistic propaganda significantly made influence on their national attitudes. From these results, Vietnamese millennials' national attitudes could be reinforce or shifted by two sources of information, which were media and working environment.

Hypothesis 1's results supported the Perception theory and Social Identity theory, which suggested that people constantly searched for information to affirm their belonging to certain groups by considering other members. In other words, each person's identity interplayed with their relationship with the group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The process of constructing perception towards some topics such as nationalistic propaganda could influence the perception of identity. That affected the attitudes of the audiences. The findings suggested that Vietnamese millennials, who were working in governments had significant different national attitudes compared to those who were working in corporates.

Hypothesis 2 was supported by the Social Identity theory and the Media Dependency theory, which posited that individuals constantly wanted to reassure their belonging to certain groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and there was a dependent relationship between mass media, audiences and social system (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1976). The hypothesis 2 findings gave conclusion that Vietnamese Millennials depended on media exposure in regards to daily media exposure, exposure to propaganda, and media credibility to adjust their national attitudes. Especially, the credibility of media made highest influence on their perceived national attitudes. It is essential to study about propaganda and media in millennials group and new generation, especially when the demography of Vietnam is changing rapidly with the fast emerge of new media and new content. Vietnamese millennials has more choice of media and freedom to search for further information.

In addition, hypothesis 3 was supported by the Propaganda and Magic Bullet theory, which posited that senders, especially rulers, used propaganda technic to input message into audiences' mind (Lasswell, 1927) and oriented their reactions towards what senders expected (O'Donnell & Jowett, 2015). The findings suggested that nationalistic

118

propaganda influenced the way Vietnamese millennials perceived their national identities. Since Vietnam War, propaganda has been a signature of Vietnam. Propaganda content on banners, billboards, and media always appear in public area across Vietnam. The media content creators should leverage the effectiveness of propaganda to promote positive information and stop misleading one.

5.4 Limitations of the Study

Even though it is necessary to study about the propaganda, media and national attitudes, those are still sensitive topics to be publicly discussed in Vietnam according to regulations and laws. Therefore, official information or past studies were limited and depended only on approved ones. This also influenced the participants on their survey process. Since giving opinion about propaganda and politics is sensitive, they tended to mark on positive answers on the questionnaire. Another concern is that the survey tried to cover many questions; hence, the respondents lost attention in some questions. Casual talk or in-depth interview after questionnaire is a must to really understand the samples' opinions.

The geographic distance also causes a limitation of this study. As many past studies had mentioned, the war caused fragmented division between North and South Vietnam, which, later on, led to the difference in attitudes toward the regime and the perception of national identity. This study was only conducted at some locations in the central district of Ho Chi Minh city in a short time. Therefore, it hardly describes the whole millennials in Vietnam. Also, the locations were in public, so it was hard to describe for the participants the meaning of the survey avoiding their lack of focus and patience on the answering process.

5.5 Recommendations for Future Application

1. Group members holding uncertainty about their national attitudes and national attachment will easily leave their old belief system when they interact with new social movements (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The study also found out about the relations between national attitudes and media exposure. If a nation is seen as an "imagined political community" (Anderson, 2006), it means that perceived national identity is flexible to be created. Therefore, media creators and practitioners can leverage media to encourage national love inside the next generation of Vietnam and make them united. Also, through media content, they can repel an identity that does not contribute to the national image; or promote an identity that can increase the image of Vietnam. In particular, media channel should come up with more call-for-action message related to country loyalty and national pride. Other programs to showcase success stories of Vietnamese around the world, talk shows of Vietnamese young generation talking about their pride of Vietnam also contributed to provoke the perception of national identities among young Vietnamese.

2. The interplay between media in regards to media exposure, media content, media trust, and its audiences' national attitudes was proven. Since the new decade of media and innovative content emerge, the authorities, ministers, and law makers might need the supports of various media to react in time of crisis, reinforce the national loyalty, and call for action when needed. There is a need to improve the trust level of media and the frequency of exposure to media contained nationalistic story. Media editors should come up with more programs, which have two-way interaction with audiences in order to build up their trust on media. Furthermore, policy makers and authority should appear on media more often, especially in live conference and Q&A session with audiences. It might help to increase the credibility of news.

3. Additionally, except for governmental officers who attend annual training about nationalistic regime and Communism, others working in corporate environment might need to frequently review of national attitudes and be provided information about national direction. There should be a program targeting corporate officers sharing and updating about Vietnam, its direction, and national policies. Later on, comments of audiences should be collected and answered in some live conferences or open talks.

5.6 Recommendations for Future Research

After this study, there are various recommendations for future research.

First of all, the demography of participants could be expanded to other provinces across Vietnam, especially in the other four big cities such as Ha Noi, Da Nang, Can Tho, Hai Phong. Generally, the education system is consistent in all public schools. However, the economic stage and accessibility to different media channels might make difference impact.

Secondly, hypothesis 1 showed that the workplace environment could make impact on the perceived national attitudes of millennials. It is easy to understand because for after graduate people spend most of their time in their office. The typical requirements of each job will somehow require them to change their behavior and attitudes to fit in the job description and organization culture. If it is possible, future research can be conducted in deeper questions focusing on different workplace and job types.

Thirdly, two nationalistic propaganda such as President Ho Chi Minh's 5 statements and sea security are just a part of many topics related to nation and politics. Future research could be open to examine on other topics and even explore other contents besides nationalistic propaganda. This study can be conducted in both quantitative and qualitative approach, especially by in-depth interview or focus group. It will support the researchers to examine different points of views about propaganda and national attitudes. From that, the study can explain why and how the samples perceived national attitudes; and hidden opinions that they might not easily tell in the quantitative research.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities (3rd ed.). UK: Verso.
- Andrian, C. (1988). Political change in Vietnam. *Political change in the third world,* (79), 76 118. US and Canada: Routledge.
- Anholt, S. (2013). Beyond the nation brand: The role of image and reputation in international relations. *The Face of Syracuse University Research*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from

https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&htt psredir=1&article=1013&context=exchange

- Anholt, S. (2003). Brand new justice: How branding places and products can help the developing world (pp. 104 - 166). Great Britain: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Anholt, S. (2014). *Which country does the most good to the world?* [Video File] Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://ideas.ted.com/guess-which-country-does-the-most-good-for-the-planet/
- Aronczyk, M. (2013). *Branding the nation: The global business of national identity*. NY: Oxford University Press.

Bechhofer, F., & McCrone, D. (2009). [Introduction]. National Identity, Nationalism and Constitutional Change. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.institute-of-

governance.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/35939/chap1_intro.pdf

- Berger, A. A. (1995). *Essentials of mass communication theory*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Chen, G. M. (2012). The impact of new media on intercultural communication in global context. *China Media Research, 8*(2), 1-10. Retrieved Febuary 1, 2018, from http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=com_fa cpubs
- Cho, Y. (2009). Media use and dependency effect model: Exploring the relationship between new media use habit, dependency relation, and possible outcomes.
 Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The State University of New Jersey, New Jersey.
- Citrin, J., Wong, C., & Duff, B. (2001). The meaning of American identity. In Ashmore,
 R. D., Jussim, L., Wider, D. (Ed.), *Social identity, intergroup, and conflict resolution* (Vol. 3, pp. 4 - 78). US: Oxford University Press.
- Darr, B. (2011). Nationalism and state legitimation in contemporary China (Thesis Dissertation, University of Iowa). Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2771&context=etd.
- Dekker, H., Malova, M., & Hoogendorn, S. (2003). *Nationalism and its explanations*.Paper presented at the first Dutch-Hungarian Conference on Interethnic Relations.Wassenaar: NIAS
- DeFleur, M., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1976). A dependency model or mass-media effects. *Communication Research*, 3(1), 3-21.

- Dong, M. H. (2018). Radio broadcasting in 4.0 environment. *NLB Online*. Retrieved December 1, 2018, from http://nguoilambao.vn/phat-thanh-trong-moi-truongtruyen-thong-40-n9775.html
- Dimitrova, R., Buzea, C., Ljujic, V., & Jordanov, V. (2013). The influence of nationalism and national identity on well-being of Bulgarian and Romanian youth. *Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai Sociologia 8*(1), 69-86. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249970854_The_influence_of_nationali sm and national identity on well-being of Bulgarian and Romanian youth

- Dinnie, K. (2008). Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice. UK: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Dinnie, K. (2012). More than tourism: The challenges of nation branding in Asia. Global Asia, 7(3), 13-17. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://www.globalasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/90.pdf
- Ellul, J. (1973). *Propaganda: The formation of men's attitudes* (Kellen, K., Lerner, J., Trans.). NY, US: Vintage Books Edition (Original work published 1965).
- Friedman, H. A. (2006). The armed propaganda team of Vietnam. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.psywarrior.com/VNArmedPropTeams.html

Godfrey, C. (2015). Vietnam 40 years on: How a communist victory gave way to capitalist corruption. *The Guardian*. Retrieve Febuary 2, 2018, from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/22/vietnam-40-years-on-how-communist-victory-gave-way-to-capitalist-corruption

Hoang, D. A., & Ho, S. (2013). *Vietnam national branding tourism marketing*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282498575

Hoang, T. H. H. (2015). Vietnam cultural policy from the period of renovation (DoiMoi): The preservation of cultural identity in globalization. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://rcsd.soc.cmu.ac.th/web/CCSDG/download.php?filename=X%20HOANG%

20THI%20HONG%20HA%20CCSDG2015.pdf

- Howe, N., & Strauss, W. (2000). *Millennials rising: The next great generation*. NY, US: Vintage Books Edition.
- İnaç, H., & Ünal, F. (2013). The construction of national identity in modern times: theoretical Perspective. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 3* (11), 223 - 232. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol 3 No 11 June 2013/24.pdf
- Kaneva, N. (2011). Nation branding: Toward an agenda for critical research. International Journal of Communication, 5, 117–141. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/download/704/514
- Kelemen, A. (2000). National sentiments and attitudes towards minorities. *Review of Sociology of the Hungarian Sociological Association*, 40 - 62. Retrieved January

1, 2017, from http://real-j.mtak.hu/5509/1/SzociologiaiSzemle_2000_spec.pdf

Kim, N. B. N. (2002). A world transformed: The politics of culture in revolutionary Vietnam, 1945 - 1965. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

- Lambert, T. (2015). *The brief history of Vietnam*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.localhistories.org/viethist.html
- Lasswell, H. D. (1927). *Propaganda technique in World War*. US: University of Michigan.
- Lasswell, H. D. (1927). The theory of political propaganda. *The American Political Science Review, 21*(3), 627 - 631. USA: American Political Science Association.
- Lister, M., Dovey, J., Giddings, S., Grant, I., & Kelly, K. (2009). *New media a critical introduction* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.
- List of Regions of Vietnam (n.d.). In *Wikipedia*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_regions_of_Vietnam
- Maresca, T. (2015). 40 years later, Vietnam still deeply divided over war. USA Today. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/28/fall-of-saigon-vietnam-40-years-later/26447943/
- McCool, G. (2006). Old-style communist speakers blare in Vietnam's new era. *Reuters*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apec-vietnamspeakers-idUSSP20428220061110
- McDermott, R., Johnston, A. I., Herrera Y. M., & Abdelal, R. (2006). Identity as a Variable. *Perspective on Politics*, 4(4), 695-711. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.people.hbs.edu/rabdelal/Identity%20as%20a%20Variable.pdf
- Media of Vietnam (n.d.). In *Wikipedia*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media of Vietnam

Melucci, A. (1995). The process of collective identities. In Social Movements and

Culture (pp. 41-63). US: University of Minnesota Press. Retrieved January 1,

2017, from http://socioweb.ucsd.edu/~jhaydu/melucci-identity.pdf

- Ministry of Education and Training (n.d). Integrate President Ho Chi Minh's ethics and spirit in early-age education. *MOET*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://moet.gov.vn/content/vanban/Lists/VBDH/Attachments/2342/huong%20da n.pdf
- Mock, T. (2013). The saga of Vietnam's country and slogan. *Branding In Asia*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://brandinginasia.com/saga-vietnams-country-slogan-logo/
- Nakayama, T. K., & Martin, J. N. (2010). *Intercultural communication in contexts* (5th ed.). US, New York: Mc Graw Hill.

Nguyen, K. V. (2007). Vietnam: A long history (7th ed.). Vietnam: The Gioi Publishers.

- Nguyen, L. A. T (n.d.). *Tourist slogan for Vietnam*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://thutea.weebly.com/uploads/2/2/7/7/22773844/tourist_slogans_for_vietnam_ -_thu_nguyen.pdf
- Nielson. (2016). *The Millennials: Unlock a generation of potential*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from

http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/nielsenglobal/vn/docs/Reports/2016/The%2 0Millennial%20-%20Unlocking%20a%20generation%20of%20potential.pdf

O'Donnell, V., Jowett, G. S. (2015). *Propaganda and persuasion* (6th ed.). USA: Sage Publication.

- Okwuchukwu, O. D., Ngozi, E., & Emmanuel, U. C. (2014). The media and the challenges of national identity in Nigeria. *American Journal of Social Science*, 2(3), 49 55. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.openscienceonline.com/journal/archive2?journalId=728&paperId=66
 5
- Partels, L. M. (1993). The political impacts of media exposure. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(2), 267-285. Retrieved from October 29, 2017, from https://my.vanderbilt.edu/larrybartels/files/2011/12/Messages_received.pdf
- Pew Research Center (2014). Emerging and developing economies much more optimistic than rich countries about the future. Retrieved March 20, 2017, from http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/09/emerging-and-developing-economiesmuch-more-optimistic-than-rich-countries-about-the-future/
- Pham, Q. C. (2014). *Islands and ocean are the blood ties of the nation* [Digital Image]. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from

http://ducnam1971.violet.vn/entry/show/entry_id/11065917

- Polletta, F., & Jasper, J. M. (2001). Collective identity and social movements. Annual Review Sociology, 27, 283 - 305. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://faculty.sites.uci.edu/polletta/files/2011/03/2001-Polletta-and-Jasper-Collective-Identity.pdf
- Politics of Vietnam (n.d.). *In Wikipedia*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Vietnam

Potter, W. J. (2012). Media effects. US: Sage Publications.

Propaganda. (n.d). In Oxford Dictionary. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/propaganda

- Qiuyi, T. (2016). In Vietnam, propaganda lives on. *Channel News Asia*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/invietnam-propaganda/3082384.html
- Ratilainen, A. M. (2016). Perception on collective national identities: Reflections on the Unity of Vietnam in 2016. Utrecht University, Netherlands. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from

https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/340060/Thesis.pdf?sequence=2

- Rausch, J. A. (2011). The significance of nationalism for the spread of communism to Vietnam and Cuba. Virinia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10102011-121145/unrestricted/Rausch_JA_T_2011.pdf
- Rosen, E. (2015). How young Vietnamese view the Vietnam War. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/youth-vietnam-war-fall-saigon/391769/

Rudiger, C (2003). *World War II and propaganda*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/World%20War%20II%20and%20Propagand a.htm

- Samovar, L. A., Porter, R. E., McDaniel, E. R., & Roy, C. S. (2013). Communication between cultures (8th ed.). Singapore: Cengage Learning.
- San Marzano, R. (n.d.). *A Revolutionary Spirit*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://dogmacollection.com/introduction-to-vietnamese-propaganda-art
- Shah, A. (2003). *Media, propaganda and Vietnam*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.globalissues.org/article/402/media-propaganda-and-vietnam
- Shibai, K. (2015). Vietnamese characteristics of social consciousness and values national character, differences between North and South, and gaps between the Vietnam war generation and the post-war generation. *Behaviormetrika, 42*(2), pp. 167-189. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/bhmk/42/2/42_167/_article

- Smith, A. D. (2010). *Nationalism: Theory, ideology, history* (2nd Ed.). UK and USA: Polity Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1991). National identity. Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press.
- South Vietnam. (n.d.). *In Wikipedia*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Vietnam
- Srichampa, S. (2006). Vietnamese propaganda reflections from 1945-2000. In *1st World Congress on "The Power of Language"*. Bangkok, Thailand. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://sealang.net/sala/archives/pdf8/sophana2007vietnamese.pdf
- Stăiculescu, A. D., Nădrag, M. (2008). The impact of new media on society. Retrieved Febuary 1, 2018, from

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/215489586_The_impact_of_new_media on society

- Stern, L. M. (1993). Renovating the Vietnamese communist party: Nguyen Van Linh and the Programme for Organizational Reform, 1987-91. Singapore: Institutes of Southeast Asia Studies.
- Strabac, Z., Aalberg, T. (2009) Media use, political knowledge and perception of reality A cross-national survey. ISS Report, 74. Retrieved October 29, 2017, from http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/Toril.Aalberg/YFF/code%20book%20survey_print.pdf
- Sullivan, E. D. (2009). Selective exposure (ed.). *The SAGE Glossary of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (p. 194, p.465). SAGE Publication.
- Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In Austin, William G., Worchel, Stephen (2nd ed.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (pp. 7–24).). Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/15341_Readings/Intergroup_Confli ct/Tajfel_&_Turner_Psych_of_Intergroup_Relations_CH1_Social_Identity_Theor y.pdf
- The Creative Future Company (2015). *Country brand index*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.futurebrand.com/uploads/CBI-14_15-LR.pdf

The New Travel (2016). Communist propaganda posters in Vietnam [Blog Spot]. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://www.thenewtravelblog.com/communistpropaganda-posters-in-vietnam-2016/

- Tran, N. B. V. (2015). Vietnam's tourism branding. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://globalbizresearch.org/Vietnam_Conference/pdf/VL515.pdf
- Tsai, C. (2016). *Mass media and national identity*. Retrieved Febuary 1, 2018, from https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-

bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=RESJunSymp2016&paper_id=253

Millennials in Vietnam spend over 15 hours weekly on mobile devices study (2015, Nov 25). *Tuoi Tre News*. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from

http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/31861/millennials-in-vietnam-spend-15-hoursevery-week-on-mobile-devices-study

Premier expresses concern over fragile security in East Vietnam Sea during ASEAN summit (2019, Nov 3).*Tuoi Tre News*. Retrieved December 13, 2019, from https://tuoitrenews.vn/news/politics/20191103/premier-expresses-concern-overfragile-security-in-east-vietnam-sea-during-asean-summit/51750.html

University of St. Andrews (n.d.). Identity, self, and social categorization. Retrieved

January 1, 2017, from http://mavorlab.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/attitudes-action/

US Department of Navy (2007). *The religion of South Vietnam in faith and fact*. London: Forgotten books. (Original work published 1967). Retrieved from January 1,

2017, http://www.sacred-texts.com/asia/rsv/rsv06.htm

Vietnam National Administration of Tourism (2011). Ministry rejected "Vietnam - A Different Orient" slogan. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://vietnamtourism.gov.vn/english/index.php/items/3794 Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency (2017). Vietnam value. Retrieved January 1, 2017,

from

http://www.vietrade.gov.vn/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id

=1106:vietnam-value&Itemid=279

VN's Sovereignty over Truong Sa and Hoang Sa to be updated in new textbooks (2016).

VietnamNet. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from

http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/education/154631/vn-s-sovereignty-over-truongsa---hoang-sa-to-be-updated-in-new-textbooks.html

- VNU University of Economic and Business (2013). The creation of 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh for children and adolescence. Retrieved January 1, 2017, from http://ueb.vnu.edu.vn/newsdetail/hthcm/9114/xuat-xu-cua-5-dieu-bac-hoday-thieu-nien-nhi-dong.htm#.WW3vhdOGOb9
- VOH (2016). Radio Spirit friend of working people. VOH. Retrieved from December 13, 2019, from https://voh.com.vn/40-nam-thanh-lap-dai-tnnd-tphcm/radio-bantinh-than-cua-nguoi-lao-dong!-210524.html
- West, R., & Turner, L. H. (2014). Introducing communication theory (International ed.). NY: McGraw-Hill. Chapter 8. pp 35-47.
- Wilcox, W. (2010). Vietnam and the West: New approaches. NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Programme Publication.

APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE SURVEY

Title: Study on the Impacts of Propaganda on the Construction of National Identity among Vietnamese Millennials

Dear respondents,

I am graduate student of Bangkok University in Communication Arts. As the compulsory requirement of the program, I am conducting a study on the impacts of propaganda on the construction the construction of national identity among Vietnamese millennials. This survey questionnaire, comprised of 46 questions, is one of the crucial parts in my paper. Kindly deliver your answer with the highest genuineness. I appreciate your contributions and times to help me fulfilling this research. For your information, there is no special and sensitive personal information required to disclose during the process of this survey. All the data provided from your answer will be use for educational purpose only.

Many thanks in advance for all of your great support!

Sincerely,

Ms. Thu Anh Do

Master's degree student, Bangkok University, Thailand

Questionnaire

Section 1: Filtering question

Instructions: Please tick (V) Yes/No in accordance to your real profile. If "Yes" are

given to both questions, the participant belongs to required demography and immediately

jumps to section 1 and start the official survey.

1. Were you born between early 1980s and the end of 2000?

 \Box Yes \Box No (Please kindly stop the survey!)

2. Were you born and raised in Vietnam?

 \Box Yes \Box No

Section 2: Demographic Information

Instructions: Following each question will be provided answers with check boxes. Please give the most relevant answer by ticking (\checkmark) in the check box given next to each answer.

- 2.1. What is your gender? (Q1)
 - \Box 1. Male
 - \Box 2. Female
- 2.2. What is your current occupation? (Q2)
 - \Box 1. Student
 - \Box 2. Governmental employee
 - \Box 3. Corporate employee
 - \Box 4. Business owner

\Box 5. Others

- 2.3. What is your highest educational achievement until 2017? (Q3)
 - \Box 1. Lower than college degree
 - \Box 2. Bachelor degree
 - \Box 3. Master degree
 - \Box 4. Doctor or higher
- 2.4 What is your monthly income (Vietnam dong currency) per month? (Q4)
 - \Box 1. Lower than or equal to 5 millions VND
 - \Box 2. 5 millions to 10 millions VND
 - \Box 3. 11 millions to 20 millions VND
 - \Box 4. 21 millions VND or higher
- 2.5. I care about Vietnam's national issues.
 - \Box 1. Yes, I care
 - \Box 2. No, I don't care
- 2.6. I frequently travel out of my temporary location in a year
 - \Box 1. Rarely (0 or 1 time/year)
 - \Box 2. Few times (more than 2 times/year)
 - \Box 3. Frequently (At least once per 2 months)

Section 3: Media Exposure

Instructions: Relate to your daily activities, which involve media. Following each

question will be a blank or provided answer with check box. Please fill in the blank, or

give the most relevant answer by placing a check mark (\checkmark) in the box given next to each answer.

3.1. How often are you exposed to propaganda last few weeks? Please describe the frequency of *media exposure to propaganda* per week from the following media, ranging from 5 most frequently to 1 never.

- 5 Most frequently (more than 6 times per day)
- 4 Frequently (5-6 times per day)
- 3 Sometimes (3-4 times per day)
- 2 Rarely (1-2 times per day)
- 1 Never (0 time per day)

Types of media	Most frequently 5	Frequently 4	Sometimes 3	Rarely 2	Never 1
TV					
Radio			3		
Newspaper	UN		2		
Social media					

3.2. On average, how many *hours per day* do you *spend on* the following media in the past one month period? Please describe the duration of media exposure to the following media, ranging from 5 most frequently to 1 never.

5 – Most frequently (More than 6 hours per day)

4 – Frequently (5-6 hours per day)

3 – Sometimes (3-4 hours per day)

2 – Rarely (1-2 hours per day)

1 -Never (less than 1 hour per day)

Types of media	Most frequently 5	Frequently 4	Sometimes 3	Rarely 2	Never 1
TV					
Radio	OK	UN			
Newspaper	L.				
Social media					

3.3. To what extent do you feel the following media has credibility? Please describe level of credibility that you think about the media, ranging from 5- Strongly trust to 1- Strongly distrust.


- 5 Strongly credible
- 4 Credible
- 3 Neutral (Neither credible nor incredible the media)
- 2 Incredible

Types of media	Strongly credible	Credible	Neutral	Incredible	Strongly Incredible
	5	4	3	2	1
TV					
Radio					

1 – Strongly incredible

Newspaper			
Social media			

Section 4: Nationalistic Propaganda



4.4. Instruction: Review the two chosen propaganda posters. Please use this scale to

indicate your understandings and agreements when being exposed to propaganda

message. Place a check mark (\checkmark) next to the appropriate level on the table provided.

- 5 Strongly agree with the statement
- 4 Agree with the statement
- 3 Neutral (Neither agree nor disagree with the statement)
- 2 Disagree with the statement
- 1 Strongly disagree with the statement

 2 – Disagree with the statement 1 – Strongly disagree with the statement 						
BAN	Strongly agree with the statement 5	Agree with the statement	Neutral	Disagree with the statement 2	Strongly disagree with the statement 1	
I clearly understand the 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh.						
I clearly understand the territorial sea security issue.	$\sum_{i=1}^{N}$	DEN				
I think that territorial sea security is a serious national issue.						
I think that pursuing national ideals following 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh is crucial.						

Section 5: National attitudes

Instructions: Recall the 5 statements of President Ho Chi Minh and the message of the ocean territory protection, think of Vietnam and Vietnamese, your life experience, and your memories. Please use this scale to indicate your national attitudes towards Vietnam. Place a checkmark (\checkmark) next to the appropriate level on the table provided.

- 5 Strongly agree with the statement
- 4 Agree with the statement
- 3 Neutral (Neither agree nor disagree with the statement)
- 2 Disagree with the statement
- 1 Strongly disagree with the statement

Nat	ional Attitudes	Strongly agree with the statement 5	Agree with the statement 2	Neutral	Disagree with the statement 2	Strongly disagree with the statement 1
Nat	tional Feeling (NF)	VDI				
1	I feel I am a real Vietnamese					
2	I feel Vietnam is my country					
Nat	tional Liking (NL)					
3	I like Vietnamese language.					
4	I like Vietnam.					

5	I like to be Vietnamese.					
6	I like Vietnamese.					
Nat	ional Pride (NP)		L			
7	I am proud of Vietnam.					
8	I am proud of being Vietnamese.					
9	I am proud of what other Vietnamese achieved.)K (JN			
Nat	ional Preference (NPR)					
10	I prefer Vietnamese people as my personal contacts than people from other countries.	K			CTT.	
11	I prefer to live most of my life in Vietnam than in any other country.					
12	I prefer to hold Vietnamese citizenship.			6		
Nat	ional Superiority	VDI	D			
13	Vietnamese people are better than other nationalities.			-		
14	Vietnamese people are the best.					
15	Vietnam is the best country to live in.					
16	Vietnamese nationality is the best.					

Nat	ionalism (NA)					
17	I feel all Vietnamese have the same ancestors.					
18	I feel each Vietnamese is a member of one big family.					
19	I feel all Vietnamese share the same traditions and culture.	K	UN			
20	I want all Vietnamese to live in Vietnam.					
21	I want Vietnamese not to mix with other nationalities.	X				
22	I want people of other nationalities to leave Vietnam.				<	
23	I want all Vietnamese to be protected.			6		
24	I want Vietnam not to collaborate with foreign countries.	VD	ED	/		

BIODATA

First Name - Middle Name - Surname: Thu Anh Do

Sex: Female

Nationality: Vietnamese

Date of Birth: 20th March, 1987

Contact Number: (+84) 909 300 411

Email: doanhthu203@gmail.com

Educational Background: Master Degree of Communication Arts, Bangkok University

Address: 860/60s/52 Xo Viet Nghe Tinh street, Ward 25, Binh Thanh District, Ho Chi

Minh City, Vietnam

Bangkok University

License Agreement of Dissertation/Thesis/ Report of Senior Project

Day__17__Month____03___Year__2021___

Mr./ Mrs./ Ms	Ms. Thu Anh Do		now living at <u>860/60s/</u> 52
Soi		_Street	Xo Viet Nghe Tinh
Sub-district	District	Bii	nh Thanh
Province Ho Chi Minh ci	ty, Vietnam Postal Code	e72300	0 being a Bangkok
University student, stude	ent ID 7580300189		
Degree level	Bachelor Master	Docto	rate
Program Communication A	Arts_DepartmentCo	mmunication	School Bangkok University
hereafter referred to as "	the licensor"		

Bangkok University 119 Rama 4 Road, Klong-Toey, Bangkok 10110 hereafter referred to as "the licensee"

Both parties have agreed on the following terms and conditions:

1. The licensor certifies that he/she is the author and possesses the exclusive rights of dissertation/thesis/report of senior project entitled <u>STUDY ON THE IMPACTS OF PROPAGANDA</u> <u>ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL ATTITUDES AMONG VIETNAMESE MILLENNIALS</u> submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for thesis

of Bangkok University (hereafter referred to as "dissertation/thesis/report of senior project"). 2. The licensor grants to the licensee an indefinite and royalty free license of his/her dissertation/thesis/report of senior project to reproduce, adapt, distribute, lend the original or copy of the manuscript.

The licensee shall collect, use or disclose the personal data of the licensor, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permission granted. I, the licensor, hereby consent to the collection, usage and storage of my personal data by the licensee.

3. In case of any dispute in the copyright of the dissertation/thesis/report of senior project between the licensor and others, or between the licensee and others, or any other inconveniences in regard to the copyright that prevent the licensee from reproducing, adapting or distributing the manuscript, the licensor agrees to indemnify the licensee against any damage incurred. This agreement is prepared in duplicate identical wording for two copies. Both parties have read and fully understand its contents and agree to comply with the above terms and conditions. Each party shall retain one signed copy of the agreement.

A. Mpisit Licensee (Licensee (Director, Library and Learning Center) Roth. Pun. Witness) Program Director (mm Witness) (Dean, Graduate School